Principles of Direct Action
There are two main forms of peaceful protest - planned actions, which
presuppose an agreed set of goals between the different forces in the
United Front, and snap actions that can occur during a planned protest or
in response to an immediate crisis.
Snap actions must have an identified political opportunity or else they
become diversions and take people away from the main protest. An example of
a successful snap action was during the Richmond SC occupation when
supporters went to the Education Department in Melbourne demanding a
meeting in response to losing an Equal Opportunity Case. It was an attempt
to turn defeat into victory. The police and private security over-reacted
before the TV cameras and a propaganda victory was won.
Propaganda
The propaganda (leaflets, posters, web pages etc) will reflect the
political agreement within the United
Front in preparation for the action. Within the group, different parties
and groups can still bring out their own propaganda for the action. The
propaganda should be concrete eg "Save this School", "Reinstate Mr X". The
demands are therefore winnable and can bring people into struggle.
Socialists will then have a wider audience for the broader issues they
raise.
Too abstract, too broad, too multi-issue propaganda is dangerous. It is
easier for the ruling class, and especially the Labor Party, to agree to
"End Poverty" or "Support Free Education" than to support a concrete, real
demand of workers in motion such as save a particular school from closure,
reinstate a particular group of workers etc.
It is in the fight for these concrete reforms that workers come into
conflict with the state, the mass media, the labour movement bureaucracy
and thereby become more open to socialist ideas.
As Peter Camejo outlined in a 1970 speech to the US SWP, "we advocate many
things, but we try to put into practise those things the masses are
prepared for. We advocate general strikes, but we don't call them, because
we're not fools. We know there cannot be a general strike, on any issue
right now, given the present level of consciousness. And you won't get to
the point where there can be general strikes unless you put people in
motion, precisely because when they start to move on one issueSpeople begin
to question the whole society and to see the interrelationship between the
different issues. In fact, it is the way people radicalise."
Intelligence/Police Liaison
Drawing together as much information in advance is key. Knowledge of the
geography of the protest area and possible police movements are key to
ensuring the ability for quick tactic shifts in plan on the day, if
necessary. The Richmond SC occupation had been forewarned by leaks in the
opponent's camp of a raid on the school, which helped tremendously in
planning. At S11 information from Crown staff has useful to the campaign on
the first day of the protest.
The SP usually supports police liaison before an event, but always with two
or more protestors in attendance. Such meetings often give us some idea of
police plans for the day. A meeting with the police before the trial of
Nazi leader Michael Brander allowed Militant (now SP) to hear of police
plans for the placement of the Nazi and anti-Nazi supporters outside the
County Court and allowed us to successfully push for us to get the higher
ground.
No agreements should be entered into in these meetings-that's the job of
the broader campaign body. Campaign police liaison representatives should
be elected. They should have the mobile numbers for their equivalent in the
police. On secondary issues, this can be useful. For example, on the Sunday
night before S11, protest police liaison representative were able to
pressurise police to turn off water sprinklers that had turned on at 11pm
and were in danger of wrecking our first aid equipment.
Infrastructure
A good PA system and if necessary a stage is key. This allows campaign
representatives to inform the protestors of latest developments, it allows
for entertainment, and most importantly provides a political space for the
campaign. It is key that this equipment is not hijacked by one component
part of the campaign, but allows space for all ideas, within the context of
the agreed goals of the United Front.
First Aid equipment is essential, even on the smallest of rallies. The
police can sometimes block emergency professionals and non-government first
aid may have a political bias against the protest (eg St Johns at S11).
Often protestors can negotiate access and egress through police lines for
first aiders-which can prove useful information for the campaign. All
injuries should not only be treated but also recorded in an incident book,
with a copy to legal support.
Marshalling and Communications
Marshals should be elected in advance so they have the confidence of the
group. They should reflect the diversity of the campaign. Their role is to
induct rally attendees into the organisational tasks for the action, and
also play a basic political role in going over the main demands of the
action. They should play a leading role on pickets and on the edges of
rallies to provide direction and information to the demonstrators. They
should ensure no one is unintentionally isolated and open to arrest.
The campaign should provide the marshals with clear identifying clothing
(T-shirt or at least an armband). On long events, marshals should have
strictly limited periods of duty to ensure they are alert. To do the job
properly marshals need mobile phones or walkie-talkies and/or megaphones
linked to a central marshal or marshals situated in a safe position.
Mobiles can be scambled or, more mundanely, batteries can run out. A big
event requires radio communications as used by the S11 campaign and on the
docks in Melbourne during the MUA dispute.
Legal/Video/Camera support
The state has made it practise to arrest protestors on demonstrations, even
if they know a subsequent court case will be thrown out. The goal is to
take militants out of action, and disorganise a protest. The presence of
clearly identified legal support is useful in making police command aware
that the action is well organised and will counter-attack legal as well as
politically and industrially to any assault.
Legal support allows for the on-the-spot documentation of arrests and
assaults, bail information and so on.
The presence of camera and video operators, independent of the mass media,
allows for recording of police brutality, all arrests, and video interviews
at key times. Independent video footage was used in the victorious trial of
the Richmond 8, while getting footage of the baton charge off commercial TV
was like pulling teeth out. Campaign footage should not be sold to the
mass media without campaign approval and never given to the police.
Pickets and Blockading
The tendency is for all protestors to want to be on the picket line or
blockade point. Unlike the police, we therefore have no ready reserve to
strengthen weak spots when necessary. Army and police training manuals make
no such mistakes. At S11, the police studied the deployment of protestors
and then used regular diversions to confuse, demoralise and disperse
blockaders. At a set moment, they would then attack a particular blockade
point. Good communications and intelligence information is key to overcome
these tactics.
Records should be kept of police movements and shift changes. Information
should only be accepted when it is first hand.
Even more important is, if at all possible, the use of reserves of
protestors. At the MUA dispute on the Melbourne docks, the main gate was
staffed not only by picketers but also a ready reserve of people resting or
enjoying the entertainment. Good communications meant this group of people
could be redeployed to weak spots as required. When the police made their
main move against the picket, they blocked the pickets and this ready
reserve at this gate, to allow other police to attack another picket
without fear of picket reinforcements. This plan was defeated when the
CFMEU mobilised a second reserve force (passive reserve) from building
workers in the CBD who left work and marched behind the lines of the police
blocking force at the main gate, forcing a police surrender.
Occupations
Long-term occupations are rare and usually the occupiers can enter and
leave the building at will. Therefore the organising principals that apply
to a long-term picket or blockade would be the same here. The best
reference for long term occupations is Behind the Lines, the story of the
Richmond SC occupation of 1992-93 (available from SP). Short-term
occupations are usually of a siege character (like the RMIT occupation of
1996). Therefore as important as the occuping group inside is a separate
but connected support group on the outside, to co-ordinate union and
community support, supplies for the occupiers etc.
Riots
The youth involved in some of the anti-globalisation protests have shown
tremendous courage and determination in the teeth of state repression and
harassment. However, not just some anarchist groups but also a small layer
of youth have engaged in rioting during the anti-globalisation protests in
the US and Europe. The riots are an indication of the desperation of a
section of youth that are deeply alienated from capitalist society and
'politics'.
Predicably, the media and governments have enormously exaggerated this
aspect of the protests in order to attempt to discredit the movement as a
whole. In our material we have to stress the provocative and brutal role
of the riot police in these events. (Undoubtedly, agent provocateurs play a
role in these events as well). But it is also the duty of Marxists to
clearly oppose the counterproductive consequences of rioting, which only
plays into the hands of the ruling class and gives the state the excuse to
increase repressive measures against protesters and the working class as a
whole. Of course, protesters have the right to defend themselves against
state repression, but this must be organised democratically.
Changing tactics
It is rare for the main strategy of a DA to change midstream, but tactical
changes can occur. For example, on the morning of the third day of the S11
protest, the SP comrades argued successfully that a warning should be sent
to the police and their backers. If a baton charge was used again, we would
maintain our strategy of peaceful protest, but change our tactics-from
standing at the gates of the Crown Towers to gridlocking the City by
blocking the key roads in the area.
We put this to the police directly and through the media and they backed
off from a continuation of the baton charges of the day before.
For tactical changes to be made, a democratic decision making process must
exist. Such democratic organisation would allow a real discussion on
tactics, including how to prepare to marshal and defend the demonstrations
and other protests, and also what contingency plans should be adopted
including when and how to retreat or change tactics in an orderly fashion,
for instance when faced with over whelming force and violence from the
police.
Tactical options relevant to M1 include occupations of corporate and
government facilities, gridlocking of key roads, marches, pickets or mass
visits to workpaces and campuses to persuade workers to stop work.
The SP is preparing a pamphlet on this issue taking up these questions in
much more detail. These discussions will continue in the anti-capitalist
movement, in particular around M1. We welcome the input of activists on
these questions.
--
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