On Mon, Aug 6, 2012 at 9:08 PM, Jacob Appelbaum <[email protected]> wrote: > Ali-Reza Anghaie: >> >> Except you're trying to solve a resource and environmental OPSEC >> problem while effectively reducing the available exfiltration surface >> (as it were) to a point where the adversary Nation-State (one use >> case) can shut it down even easier. And you're still not addressing >> the whole of the problem set an end-user in these hostile environments >> will face. > > Huh? > > If your internet cafe has a key logging or a screen logging system, > they're equal. If they can break SSL, you lose on the network.
Let me try this again - sorry. If Cryptocat only works on fewer available systems because it's trying to build in more technical resiliency then it also becomes easier to shutdown in hostile environments (e.g. Iran). On top of that it also reduces the number of people capable of using it at all. I think I have to throw together a table w/ real-world use/region examples from say Iran to communicate it better. -Ali _______________________________________________ liberationtech mailing list [email protected] Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a daily digest?" You will need the user name and password you receive from the list moderator in monthly reminders. You may ask for a reminder here: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech Should you need immediate assistance, please contact the list moderator. Please don't forget to follow us on http://twitter.com/#!/Liberationtech
