On 07/08/12 09:25, Luke Allnutt wrote: > > With Frank's message in mind, do list members have thoughts about the > best dumbed-down guide for activists to stay safer online?
http://hacktivista.net/hacktionlab/index.php/Tech_tools_for_activists of course nothing is perfect and that booklet is in the process of being seriously updated. > > I know EFF, MobileActive, and Movements.org have done some good work > in this field, but wondered whether there is a consensus on a good > short, easy-to-understand document for activists? > > Luke > > > > > *<[email protected]>* > Sent by: [email protected] > > 08/07/2012 07:19 AM > > > To > "Moxie Marlinspike" <[email protected]>, > [email protected] > cc > > Subject > Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat > > > > > > > > > > Hey guys, > > I appreciate the importance and depth of this discussion. But I also > wish to underscore that most of the people who are at risk are not > using any tools whether they be CrytoCat, PGP, GChat or others for the > simple reason that they either cannot figure them out, or don't have > time to figure them out, or both. And I am talking about people at > risk in many different nations. > > No doubt the functional security of tools is an indispensable, > essential concern. Ignoring any vulnerabilities is dangerous, indeed. > But the usability of the same tools and making them accessible to > non-technologists is just as big a concern, in my view. I know you > guys think that many such users including Western journalists are > simply lazy. But many, if not most of the available tools are simply > not intuitive, or not as much as most technologists who already know > how to use them seem to think. > > How many people on this list have spent time asking non-technologists > and other users who have tried, but have since given up even trying to > use tools like PGP? Or have examined how new users interact with such > tools? I have a great deal of respect for this community. But to be > honest it seems to me that neither the technologists nor the donors > have spent much time asking such questions. > > If a novice user make a mistake in PGP, for example, it's over. > Options are not intuitive if you don't already know them. And if you > hit the wrong button, you can end up at a deadend with no guidance how > to get back on track. Trust me. I know. And I am not trashing PGP. I > know well and fully appreciate it's value and I have used it and > continue to use it hostile environments. And I also know that users > and only users can make crucial choices during use for their own > security. I get that, too. But most digital security tools still do > not do a good job of laying out, let alone explaining the options. And > I say that with respect for the value of the tools and options > themselves. > > Cryptocat is one of the most user-friendly tools out there, and I > think Nadim deserves credit for the effort. Of course, the > vulnerabilities must be fixed before anyone should use it in a hostile > environment. Although the level of vulnerability might also depend on > the nature of the threat in any particular environment. But I also > think we need to spend as much time making tools accessible as we do > making them secure if we are going to reach the people who really need > them. And right now few if any of these tools are having the reach > that we all agree is needed. And that is an issue largely of usability. > > I think with more constructive collaboration we would achieve both. We > need to. Thanks. > > Best, Frank > > Frank Smyth > Executive Director > Global Journalist Security > [email protected]_ <mailto:[email protected]> > Tel. + 1 202 244 0717 > Cell + 1 202 352 1736 > Twitter: @JournoSecurity > Website: _www.journalistsecurity.net_ > <http://www.journalistsecurity.net/> > _PGP Public Key_ > <http://www.journalistsecurity.net/franks-pgp-public-key> > > > > Please consider our Earth before printing this email. > > _Confidentiality Notice_: This email and any files transmitted with it > are confidential. If you have received this email in error, please > notify the sender and delete this message and any copies. If you are > not the intended recipient, you are notified that disclosing, copying, > distributing or taking any action in reliance on the contents of this > information is strictly prohibited. > > > > -------- Original Message -------- > Subject: Re: [liberationtech] What I've learned from Cryptocat > From: Moxie Marlinspike <[email protected]_ > <mailto:[email protected]>> > Date: Mon, August 06, 2012 10:29 pm > To: [email protected]_ > <mailto:[email protected]> > > > > > On 08/06/2012 06:59 PM, Eleanor Saitta wrote: > > Except that with your harm mitigation, you push many potential users > > back to plaintext, where they are guaranteed to be owned. What > > percentage of potential cryptocat users would the plugin version have to > > stop from using the tool for you to accept that there was a place for > > the non-plugin version? > > Let's stop using the word "plaintext," because my understanding is that > none of the chat services we're speaking of transmit data in the clear. > As I see it, there are currently three possible vectors for attack with > "existing" web-based chat services: > > 1) SSL interception. > 2) Server compromise. > 3) Server operator. > > The technology in CryptoCat v1 does not address any of these three > vectors, and all of them remain possible. My position is that it's > actually more susceptible to attack via #1 and #2 than existing > web-based chat solutions. I believe your position is that it improves > on vector #3 by virtue of being not-Facebook. (I'm curious how you > measure #3 in comparison to GChat.) > > If we postulate that CryptoCat does improve vector #3 by virtue of being > not-Facebook, it isn't a result of the technology, but simply that we've > agreed Nadim has a better monitoring/interception track record than > Facebook. If that's something you think is valuable, it actually seems > like it'd potentially be better served by having someone like the EFF or > Riseup host a web-based and SSL-protected chat service, without brining > any additional cryptography confusion into the mix. A trust project, > not a cryptography project. > > Unfortunately for me, I'd rather depend on cryptography than people. > But I believe that CryptoCat is actually well positioned to drive > changes in the ecosystem that will allow them to really improve on those > three vectors in time. I think it's difficult to experiment in public > with security tools, however, and that it's a sage decision to make a > secure solution available (CryptoCat v2) and work on reducing friction > while maintaining security from there. > > - moxie > > -- _ > __http://www.thoughtcrime.org_ <http://www.thoughtcrime.org/> > _______________________________________________ > liberationtech mailing list_ > [email protected]_ > <mailto:[email protected]> > > Should you need to change your subscription options, please go to: > _ > __https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech_ > > If you would like to receive a daily digest, click "yes" (once you > click above) next to "would you like to receive list mail batched in a > daily digest?" > > You will need the user name and password you receive from the list > moderator in monthly reminders. 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