Looks good, Nadim. Abine will stay signed on (it's just "Abine," not "Abine Software," though). And I'd like to sign as an individual (Sarah A. Downey, Esq.).
Thanks! -Sarah On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:26 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <[email protected]> wrote: > Okay everyone, > the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration > of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your > signature there (or add it!) > > http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ > > We'll be publishing next week. > > > NK > > > On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <[email protected]> wrote: > >> We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but >> Reporters >> Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it. >> >> Best, >> >> >> Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : >> >> Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of >> reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you >> said into consideration. >> >> >> NK >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian <[email protected] >> > wrote: >> >>> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government >>> surveillance section: >>> >>> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may >>> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered >>> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, >>> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of >>> National Security Letters. >>> >>> >>> You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people >>> signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to >>> real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, >>> and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't >>> specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, >>> >>> Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance >>> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require >>> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I >>> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law >>> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, >>> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without >>> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US >>> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 >>> >>> Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as 50 >>> U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of >>> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of >>> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a >>> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains >>> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not >>> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be >>> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney >>> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass >>> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint >>> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by >>> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for >>> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is >>> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United >>> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify >>> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized >>> probable cause determinations or supervise the program. >>> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) >>> >>> >>> While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign >>> on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. >>> >>> >>> >>> On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <[email protected]>wrote: >>> >>>> Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, >>>> >>>> I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to >>>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as >>>> signatories: >>>> >>>> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ >>>> >>>> The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. >>>> >>>> Thank you, >>>> NK >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >> >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> >> >> -- >> Grégoire Pouget, >> New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias >> Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières >> @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr >> GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > -- *Sarah A. Downey* Privacy Analyst | Attorney Abine <http://goog_822727389>, Inc <https://www.abine.com>: Online privacy starts here. t: @SarahADowney <https://twitter.com/#/SarahADowney> | p: 800.928.1987 Blogging on privacy at Abine.com/Blog Like us? Spread the word! <http://abine.com/likeus.php>
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