Hi! Good work :)
First: some nitpicking: third-parties in the second paragraph should probably lose the hyphen. Second: I would be very happy to see a Telecomix signature on this letter :) Best regards /P On 18 January, 2013 - Nadim Kobeissi wrote: > Okay everyone, > the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious collaboration > of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to keep your > signature there (or add it!) > > http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ > > We'll be publishing next week. > > > NK > > > On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <[email protected]> wrote: > > > We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but > > Reporters > > Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it. > > > > Best, > > > > > > Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : > > > > Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of > > reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you > > said into consideration. > > > > > > NK > > > > > > On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian > > <[email protected]>wrote: > > > >> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government > >> surveillance section: > >> > >> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may > >> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered > >> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, > >> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of > >> National Security Letters. > >> > >> > >> You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the people > >> signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have access to > >> real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, say that, > >> and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it doesn't > >> specify under what situations the government can perform an interception, > >> > >> Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance > >> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require > >> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I > >> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law > >> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, > >> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without > >> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US > >> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 > >> > >> Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as 50 > >> U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of > >> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of > >> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a > >> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains > >> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not > >> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be > >> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney > >> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass > >> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint > >> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by > >> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for > >> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is > >> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United > >> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify > >> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized > >> probable cause determinations or supervise the program. > >> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) > >> > >> > >> While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to sign > >> on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. > >> > >> > >> > >> On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <[email protected]> wrote: > >> > >>> Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, > >>> > >>> I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to > >>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as > >>> signatories: > >>> > >>> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ > >>> > >>> The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. > >>> > >>> Thank you, > >>> NK > >>> > >>> -- > >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > >>> > >> > >> > >> -- > >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > >> > > > > > > > > -- > > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > > > > > -- > > Grégoire Pouget, > > New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias > > Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières > > @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr > > GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE > > > > > > -- > > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech -- Petter Ericson ([email protected]) Telecomix Sleeper Jellyfish -- Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech
