Good idea. I've added Bates's name as a recipient.
NK On Fri, Jan 18, 2013 at 11:51 AM, Ryan Gallagher <[email protected]>wrote: > Good work, more concise than the previous version and something about the > general tone of the thing has been improved. Might it be worth also > publicly CCing Tony Bates on the letter (he's pres of the Skype division at > Microsoft)? > > > On 18 January 2013 16:26, Nadim Kobeissi <[email protected]> wrote: > >> Okay everyone, >> the *final draft* has been posted online, with the gracious >> collaboration of the EFF. Please take a look at it, make sure you want to >> keep your signature there (or add it!) >> >> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ >> >> We'll be publishing next week. >> >> >> NK >> >> >> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 4:29 AM, Grégoire Pouget <[email protected]>wrote: >> >>> We'd like to see the final / rewritten version of the letter first but >>> Reporters >>> Without Borders <http://rsf.org> would be happy to sign it. >>> >>> Best, >>> >>> >>> Le 17/01/2013 08:01, Nadim Kobeissi a écrit : >>> >>> Thanks for your expert advice, Chris. We're currently in the process of >>> reworking the letter with assistance from the EFF and we'll take what you >>> said into consideration. >>> >>> >>> NK >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Jan 17, 2013 at 1:58 AM, Christopher Soghoian < >>> [email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> You may want to consider rewriting your law enforcement/government >>>> surveillance section: >>>> >>>> As a result of the service being acquired by Microsoft in 2011, it may >>>> now be required to comply with CALEA due to the company being headquartered >>>> in Redmond, Washington. Furthermore, as a US-based communication provider, >>>> Skype would therefore be required to comply with the secretive practice of >>>> National Security Letters. >>>> >>>> >>>> You don't articulate why being subject to CALEA is bad. Are the >>>> people signing the letter arguing that law enforcement should never have >>>> access to real-time intercepts of skype voice/video communications? If so, >>>> say that, and why. If not, CALEA merely mandates access capabilities, it >>>> doesn't specify under what situations the government can perform an >>>> interception, >>>> >>>> Also, if you want to raise the issue of secretive surveillance >>>> practices, NSLs wouldn't be at the top of my list (yes, they don't require >>>> a judge, but they can at best be used to obtain communications metadata). I >>>> would instead focus your criticism of the fact that US surveillance law >>>> does not sufficiently protect communications between two non-US persons, >>>> and in particular, the government can intercept such communications without >>>> even having to demonstrate probable cause to a judge. Specifically, non-US >>>> persons have a real reason to fear FISA Amendments Act of 2008 section 702 >>>> >>>> Section 702 of the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 ("FAA"), codified as >>>> 50 U.S.C. 1181a, which allows the Attorney General and the Director of >>>> National Intelligence ("DNI") to authorize jointly the targeting of >>>> non-United States persons for the purposes of gathering intelligence for a >>>> period of up to one year. 50 U.S.C. 1881a(1). Section 702 contains >>>> restrictions, including the requirement that the surveillance "may not >>>> intentionally target any person known at the time of acquisition to be >>>> located in the United States." 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1). The Attorney >>>> General and DNI must submit to the FISC an application for an order ("mass >>>> acquisition order") for the surveillance either before their joint >>>> authorization or within seven days thereof. The FAA sets out a procedure by >>>> which the Attorney General and DNI must obtain certification from FISC for >>>> their program, which includes an assurance that the surveillance is >>>> designed to limit surveillance to persons located outside of the United >>>> States. However, the FAA does not require the government to identify >>>> targets of surveillance, and the FISC does not consider individualized >>>> probable cause determinations or supervise the program. >>>> (from: http://epic.org/amicus/fisa/clapper/) >>>> >>>> >>>> While I am happy to provide feedback, I'm in no way authorized to >>>> sign on to this letter on behalf of the ACLU. >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> On Wed, Jan 16, 2013 at 11:58 AM, Nadim Kobeissi <[email protected]>wrote: >>>> >>>>> Dear Privacy Advocates and Internet Freedom Activists, >>>>> >>>>> I call on you to review the following draft for our Open Letter to >>>>> Skype and present your name or the name of your organization as >>>>> signatories: >>>>> >>>>> http://www.skypeopenletter.com/draft/ >>>>> >>>>> The letter will be released soon. Feedback is also welcome. >>>>> >>>>> Thank you, >>>>> NK >>>>> >>>>> -- >>>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>>>> >>>> >>>> >>>> -- >>>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>>> >>> >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Grégoire Pouget, >>> New Media Desk // Bureau Nouveaux Médias >>> Reporters Without Borders // Reporters sans frontières >>> @fightcensors_en @fightcensors_fr >>> GPG ID : 2BBC1ECE >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >>> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >>> >> >> >> -- >> Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: >> https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >> > > > -- > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password at: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech >
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