The NSA being part of the Google "partner" landscape, however unwillingly on the part of Google..
Best Regards | Cordiales Saludos | Grato, Andrés L. Pacheco Sanfuentes <[email protected]> +1 (817) 271-9619 On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 5:38 PM, Dan Staples <[email protected]> wrote: > And keep in mind, the uProxy project doesn't seem to be trying to > provide anonymity, only uncensored internet access. There are many > challenges to anonymity that a simple browser plugin can't solve. > Browsers are extremely easy to fingerprint, which is why Tor is now > being packaged as an entire browser bundle. > > What I'm most curious about is how much information about the users of > uProxy will be collected and analyzed by Google and shared with its > partners. > > Dan > > On 10/21/2013 06:09 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote: >> On 21-10-13 22:49, Nick wrote: >>> Despite the provenence of the story, I'm still suprised there was no >>> mention of Google's cooperation with repressive elements of its own >>> government through PRISM and the like. Or (though this is probably >>> far too optimistic) a mention of whether surveillance as overarching >>> paradigm is compatible with the sort of self-representation they >>> offer here. >>> >> google is a many headed dragon, like the US government, with one head >> canceling out some actions of others. It is a shame that those heads are >> not all the same size (like DoD vs State). Still I would encourage the >> small heads to go on and do their work. >> >>> >>> I also wonder how anonymous it is for the relay side - whether it's >>> really just an interface to Tor bridge nodes, and therefore the >>> relay can't see everything their "friend" is up to, or if it's a >>> straight proxy. I would guess the latter as their emphasis seems to >>> be completely about helping people hop out of their country's >>> repressive internet policies. >> >> Seeing the description and the involvement of brave new software I >> assume it is related to or a rename of Lantern, lantern is a proxy >> software that uses the google social graph to find access. Maybe someone >> from BNS could elaborate >> >> In terms of threat model it would be reasonable to trust the 'friend' in >> this scenario, I would be more concerned with adversary externaly >> observing the connections, seeing that a group of people from within >> country X are connecting to the same ip in country Y , thus relating >> those people in that group as sharing a node in a social graph, so to >> eachother, while they might not have seen them as related before.. >> >> >> Cheers, Sacha >> >> >> > > -- > Dan Staples > > Open Technology Institute > https://commotionwireless.net > OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc > Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of > list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > [email protected]. -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at [email protected].
