Since I already have more skepticism of Google Ideas and Jared Cohen than I need, let me pose this question:
With the understanding that uProxy provides no anonymity protections, *is it providing anything that other circumvention tools do not already?* What's unique about it? On Mon, Oct 21, 2013 at 3:38 PM, Dan Staples < [email protected]> wrote: > And keep in mind, the uProxy project doesn't seem to be trying to > provide anonymity, only uncensored internet access. There are many > challenges to anonymity that a simple browser plugin can't solve. > Browsers are extremely easy to fingerprint, which is why Tor is now > being packaged as an entire browser bundle. > > What I'm most curious about is how much information about the users of > uProxy will be collected and analyzed by Google and shared with its > partners. > > Dan > > On 10/21/2013 06:09 PM, Sacha van Geffen wrote: > > On 21-10-13 22:49, Nick wrote: > >> Despite the provenence of the story, I'm still suprised there was no > >> mention of Google's cooperation with repressive elements of its own > >> government through PRISM and the like. Or (though this is probably > >> far too optimistic) a mention of whether surveillance as overarching > >> paradigm is compatible with the sort of self-representation they > >> offer here. > >> > > google is a many headed dragon, like the US government, with one head > > canceling out some actions of others. It is a shame that those heads are > > not all the same size (like DoD vs State). Still I would encourage the > > small heads to go on and do their work. > > > >> > >> I also wonder how anonymous it is for the relay side - whether it's > >> really just an interface to Tor bridge nodes, and therefore the > >> relay can't see everything their "friend" is up to, or if it's a > >> straight proxy. I would guess the latter as their emphasis seems to > >> be completely about helping people hop out of their country's > >> repressive internet policies. > > > > Seeing the description and the involvement of brave new software I > > assume it is related to or a rename of Lantern, lantern is a proxy > > software that uses the google social graph to find access. Maybe someone > > from BNS could elaborate > > > > In terms of threat model it would be reasonable to trust the 'friend' in > > this scenario, I would be more concerned with adversary externaly > > observing the connections, seeing that a group of people from within > > country X are connecting to the same ip in country Y , thus relating > > those people in that group as sharing a node in a social graph, so to > > eachother, while they might not have seen them as related before.. > > > > > > Cheers, Sacha > > > > > > > > -- > Dan Staples > > Open Technology Institute > https://commotionwireless.net > OpenPGP key: http://disman.tl/pgp.asc > Fingerprint: 2480 095D 4B16 436F 35AB 7305 F670 74ED BD86 43A9 > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > [email protected]. > -- *Note: *I am slowly extricating myself from Gmail. Please change your address books to: [email protected] or [email protected]. US: +1-857-891-4244 | NL: +31-657086088 site: jilliancyork.com <http://jilliancyork.com/>* | * twitter: @jilliancyork* * "We must not be afraid of dreaming the seemingly impossible if we want the seemingly impossible to become a reality" - *Vaclav Havel*
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