While we have no consensus, most of these options are using similar stuff at the encrypted layers. Realistically as long as the encryption is good, the Chinese gov't can only block stuff by host/IP/protocol, I think all the VPN providers listed are taking active steps to change IPs and obscure their protocol as needed.
My pref of VPN is you aren't limited to just a voice communications services. ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -ITG (ITechGeek) i...@itechgeek.com https://itg.nu/ GPG Keys: https://itg.nu/contact/gpg-key Preferred GPG Key: Fingerprint: AB46B7E363DA7E04ABFA57852AA9910A DCB1191A Google Voice: +1-703-493-0128 / Twitter: ITechGeek / Facebook: http://fb.me/Jbwa.Net On Tue, Feb 17, 2015 at 7:17 PM, Seth David Schoen <sch...@eff.org> wrote: > Tim Libert writes: > > > thanks all for the many good suggestions! however, in absence of a > clear consensus, I will advise my friend to avoid voice and stick to > encrypted email. my understanding is that the new leadership in china > isn’t f#cking around, so the risk/reward equation here suggests heightened > caution - especially as I cannot make assumptions on technical know-how of > parties involved. > > A countervailing point is that encrypted e-mail with the mainstream > technologies used for that purpose never provides forward secrecy, while > most voice encryption techniques do. So with the use of encrypted e-mail, > there is an ongoing risk into the future (assuming that a recipient's > private key still exists somewhere), while with the voice encryption, > the risk may be time-limited -- assuming that the implementations were > correct enough, and that the key exchange was based on a mathematical > problem that will remain hard for an attacker. > > As a simple analogy, sometimes people prefer to have a phone call about > sensitive matters because it doesn't "create records", while writing a > letters would "make a paper trail". The technical reasons behind the > analogy don't transfer at all, but there might still be something to the > intuition that the encrypted phone call can be more ephemeral than the > encrypted mail. > > -- > Seth Schoen <sch...@eff.org> > Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ > Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join > 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. >
-- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
