Also-- how does Gmail know the address failed Yahoo's test?
On Tuesday, October 6, 2015 12:58 AM, realcr <rea...@gmail.com> wrote:
Hi Jonathan,
I went over my spam mail folder I found your email, which is obviously not spam.
I use gmail. This is what gmail said about your email:
"""
Why is this message in Spam? It has a from address in yahoo.com but has failed
yahoo.com's required tests for authentication.
"""
Strange. I wonder what are yahoo's tests for authentication.
Regards,
real.
On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 8:37 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancs...@yahoo.com> wrote:
Glad to see you finally removed Oneswarm. :)
I personally find your chart difficult to read. Nevertheless, I have a
suggestionthat I believe would improve its quality for a general audience:
You really need a color that means "available and widely-used".
You can probably just ask the respective devs whether their software is
widely-used, andthey'll give you an honest answer. However as a shortcut just
ask:
1) Do the devs of other projects use this software as a point of reference?For
example, Joanna (Qubes) and Patrick (Whonix) have both written publiclyabout
TAILS (as has pretty much every other serious security expert). Thatdoesn't
mean one should necessarily use it, but it does mean the user hasa better
chance of understanding the benefits and costs of using that pieceof software.
2) Is the software usable by non-technical people? If not it's less likelyto
have a lot of users.
As an example-- Gnunet filesharing may technically be "available", but I
haven'tused it successfully nor heard of a single person using it successfully.
(I evenasked on their irc and nobody there used it.) TAILS, for better or
worse, _is_anonymity on the web/net. It's misleading to use the same color for
those twopieces of software.
-Jonathan
On Monday, October 5, 2015 10:51 AM, carlo von lynX
<l...@time.to.get.psyced.org> wrote:
On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 04:17:05PM +0200, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote:
> Well, we don't have build farms for ARM, so it is common for people to
> build all there, for example. Following upstream means building more than
> gentoo, because the dependencies are totally explicit at any point.
Oh, good to know. On the other hand it should be safe to randomly use
prebuilt binaries because all binaries are reproducible, so a malevolent
provider cannot know in advance which packages will be checked for
reproducibility... yes?
> As for the rest of your advices, I'm quite aware about the uses of
> leaked metadata, the problems of xmpp, etc. :) I quite follow the project.
> I just wanted to help have more pieces in the map - I do not consider
> them a final solution.
Yes, none of the things on the map solve the entire puzzle. There's
plenty of redundancy while at the same time there isn't a complete
stack ready to go, let alone several.
> Maybe you could mention also somewhere that modern PGP thing (which is pgp at
> the end): keybase.io. It just came to mind.
There are several stop-gap opportunistic approaches to key retrieval
around.. pEp, LEAP. I think we should be leveraging the social graph
for key acquisition instead, with a private distributed implementation
like GNS for example. You use it like an address book and your social
network guarantees that you picked the correct public key, without
any state authority knowing anything.
--
E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using encryption:
http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/
irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX
https://psyced.org:34443/LynX/
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