Hi Jonathan, I went over my spam mail folder I found your email, which is obviously not spam. I use gmail. This is what gmail said about your email:
""" *Why is this message in Spam?* It has a from address in yahoo.com but has failed yahoo.com's required tests for authentication. """ Strange. I wonder what are yahoo's tests for authentication. Regards, real. On Mon, Oct 5, 2015 at 8:37 PM, Jonathan Wilkes <jancs...@yahoo.com> wrote: > Glad to see you finally removed Oneswarm. :) > > I personally find your chart difficult to read. Nevertheless, I have a > suggestion > that I believe would improve its quality for a general audience: > > You really need a color that means "available and widely-used". > > You can probably just ask the respective devs whether their software is > widely-used, and > they'll give you an honest answer. However as a shortcut just ask: > > 1) Do the devs of other projects use this software as a point of reference? > For example, Joanna (Qubes) and Patrick (Whonix) have both written publicly > about TAILS (as has pretty much every other serious security expert). That > doesn't mean one should necessarily use it, but it does mean the user has > a better chance of understanding the benefits and costs of using that piece > of software. > 2) Is the software usable by non-technical people? If not it's less likely > to have a lot of users. > > As an example-- Gnunet filesharing may technically be "available", but I > haven't > used it successfully nor heard of a single person using it successfully. > (I even > asked on their irc and nobody there used it.) TAILS, for better or worse, > _is_ > anonymity on the web/net. It's misleading to use the same color for those > two > pieces of software. > > -Jonathan > > > > > On Monday, October 5, 2015 10:51 AM, carlo von lynX < > l...@time.to.get.psyced.org> wrote: > > > On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 04:17:05PM +0200, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote: > > Well, we don't have build farms for ARM, so it is common for people to > > build all there, for example. Following upstream means building more than > > gentoo, because the dependencies are totally explicit at any point. > > Oh, good to know. On the other hand it should be safe to randomly use > prebuilt binaries because all binaries are reproducible, so a malevolent > provider cannot know in advance which packages will be checked for > reproducibility... yes? > > > As for the rest of your advices, I'm quite aware about the uses of > > leaked metadata, the problems of xmpp, etc. :) I quite follow the > project. > > I just wanted to help have more pieces in the map - I do not consider > > them a final solution. > > Yes, none of the things on the map solve the entire puzzle. There's > plenty of redundancy while at the same time there isn't a complete > stack ready to go, let alone several. > > > Maybe you could mention also somewhere that modern PGP thing (which is > pgp at > > the end): keybase.io. It just came to mind. > > There are several stop-gap opportunistic approaches to key retrieval > around.. pEp, LEAP. I think we should be leveraging the social graph > for key acquisition instead, with a private distributed implementation > like GNS for example. You use it like an address book and your social > network guarantees that you picked the correct public key, without > any state authority knowing anything. > > > -- > E-mail is public! Talk to me in private using encryption: > http://loupsycedyglgamf.onion/LynX/ > irc://loupsycedyglgamf.onion:67/lynX > https://psyced.org:34443/LynX/ > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. > > > > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations > of list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. > Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. >
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