Another one: The front page of ybti.org says "Yellow is for projects in development" which is clearly wrong.
On Tue, Oct 06, 2015 at 10:12:20AM +0200, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote: > Hello lynX, > > it'd be great if, additional to the map, there was a text version of it. I > mean a list of the technologies (with urls?), with the map row span and > colour. It is really difficult to find a specific thing in it, to know its > classification, or to check if it is there all. > > Regards, > Lluís. > > On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 05:33:53PM +0200, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote: > > On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 04:52:03PM +0200, carlo von lynX wrote: > > > On Mon, Oct 05, 2015 at 04:17:05PM +0200, Lluís Batlle i Rossell wrote: > > > > Well, we don't have build farms for ARM, so it is common for people to > > > > build all there, for example. Following upstream means building more > > > > than > > > > gentoo, because the dependencies are totally explicit at any point. > > > > > > Oh, good to know. On the other hand it should be safe to randomly use > > > prebuilt binaries because all binaries are reproducible, so a malevolent > > > provider cannot know in advance which packages will be checked for > > > reproducibility... yes? > > > > Well, it is not so simple. Not all builds are binary-reproducible yet, but > > that is a desired goal. Of course, the reproduceability can be checked by > > anyone. > > > > > > Maybe you could mention also somewhere that modern PGP thing (which is > > > > pgp at > > > > the end): keybase.io. It just came to mind. > > > > > > There are several stop-gap opportunistic approaches to key retrieval > > > around.. pEp, LEAP. I think we should be leveraging the social graph > > > for key acquisition instead, with a private distributed implementation > > > like GNS for example. You use it like an address book and your social > > > network guarantees that you picked the correct public key, without > > > any state authority knowing anything. > > > > I agree; i just mentioned these for the map. > > > > As for key interchange, there is also SafeSlinger. Just for the > > map. > > > > -- > > (Escriu-me xifrat si saps PGP / Write ciphered if you know PGP) > > PGP key D4831A8A - https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/ > > -- > > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of > > list guidelines will get you moderated: > > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > > compa...@stanford.edu. > > -- > (Escriu-me xifrat si saps PGP / Write ciphered if you know PGP) > PGP key D4831A8A - https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/ > -- > Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of > list guidelines will get you moderated: > https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, > change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at > compa...@stanford.edu. -- (Escriu-me xifrat si saps PGP / Write ciphered if you know PGP) PGP key D4831A8A - https://emailselfdefense.fsf.org/ -- Liberationtech is public & archives are searchable on Google. Violations of list guidelines will get you moderated: https://mailman.stanford.edu/mailman/listinfo/liberationtech. Unsubscribe, change to digest, or change password by emailing moderator at compa...@stanford.edu.
