Olaoluwa Osuntokun <laol...@gmail.com> writes: >> This is orothogonal. There's no point probing your own channel, you're >> presumably probing someone else's. > > In my scenario, you're receiving a new HTLC, from some remote party > unbeknownst to you.
You have incoming and outgoing channels, and no other information. So, every HTLC? > Without something like an "unadd" you > can't do anything against an individual attempting to prob you other than > drop packets (drop as in don't even add to your commit, resulting in an HTLC > timeout) , as if you cancel back, then they know that you had enough > bandwidth to _accept_ the HTLC in the first place. I don't see how "unadd" helps? And even if it did, if we lie about what channel actually failed, it degrades the entire network; might as well remove that information from the protocol entirely. While we can come up with mitigations, I think we are going to have to live with this information leakage to keep the network functioning. Cheers, Rusty. _______________________________________________ Lightning-dev mailing list Lightning-dev@lists.linuxfoundation.org https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/lightning-dev
