Linux-Advocacy Digest #183, Volume #27 Mon, 19 Jun 00 07:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: [Fwd: Newsweek US Edition: Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors] ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Claims of Windows supporting old applications are reflecting reality or
fantasy? (John Wiltshire)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [Fwd: Newsweek US Edition: Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors]
Date: 19 Jun 2000 07:01:37 -0400
On Sun, 18 Jun 2000 13:50:08 -0700, Jimmy Navarro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
>--------------030AA1171B29ABA0EAA9715C
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>
>Early this morning I read the Newsweek June 19, 2000, article authored
>by Jared Sandberg. I was just trying to access it, somehow seems M$
>redirecting it to MSNBC to ERROR 404!
>
>
>--------------030AA1171B29ABA0EAA9715C
>Content-Type: message/rfc822
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>Content-Disposition: inline
>
>X-Mozilla-Status2: 00000000
>Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Date: Sun, 18 Jun 2000 03:51:24 -0700
>From: Jimmy Navarro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>Organization: Los Angeles Free Net
>X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.72 [en] (X11; I; Linux 2.2.14-3 i686)
>X-Accept-Language: en
>MIME-Version: 1.0
>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Subject: Newsweek US Edition: Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors
>Content-Type: multipart/mixed;
> boundary="------------16CBEA263EFC4A57DDF392FA"
>
>This is a multi-part message in MIME format.
>--------------16CBEA263EFC4A57DDF392FA
>Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
>Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
>
>It's 3:49 a.m. I was just done replying some Usenet posting. Some
>posters and readers in the Pinoy newsgroup just post and post and post
>but no whole idea what really the surrounding circumstances. I think
>I'll stop going there because it's just much waste of time replying
>their rans. Anyway, see this on-line edition of Newsweek covering the
>trial.
>
>http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/st/a20907-2000jun11.htm
>
>
>
[ quoted-printable, HTML crap snipped ]
Here's the same Web page in ASCII text format (with the banners
omitted):
Microsoft's Six Fatal Errors
[INLINE]
Bill Gates
Hanging in there: a defiant Gates after the verdict (Dan Lamont -
Corbis-Sygma)
[35]On Air
Did the tactics that made Bill Gates the world's richest man provoke
the threat of a breakup? The judge thought so. The road to a harsh
verdict.
[INLINE]
By Jared Sandberg
Newsweek, June 19, 2000
It was a bleak winter day in early 1998, and [36]Microsoft's lawyers
had come from Redmond to appear before Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson
in the other Washington. In a legal clash predating the landmark
[37]antitrust suit, Jackson had asked the company to remove its Web
browser from Windows 95 on the grounds that forcing the browser on PC
makers violated a prior pact with the Feds. Microsoft said a
separation was technically impossible. But to comply with the judge's
order, the company produced one browser-free version of Windows 95 so
old that its shelf life was even shorter than [38]Bill Gates's temper.
Another browserless version was so broken its only feature was an
error message. The judge was clearly angry that Microsoft insisted the
only way to comply with his order was to ship defective products. It
was a hardball maneuver that cost Bill Gates & Co. dearly.
The judge's frustration had been mounting. Already in this early
skirmish, Microsoft had submitted a legal brief questioning the
technical know-how of [39]Justice Department attorneys-and by
extension the judge-who "have no vocation for software design." It
also went over his head to the appeals court. Ultimately siding with
Microsoft, the appellate judges overruled Jackson and told him the
courts shouldn't be software designers. For Gates's empire, it was a
short-lived victory. Looking back recently, one Microsoft insider said
that first round clearly came at a high price: "We shouldn't have
pissed off the judge."
Last week Jackson ordered the biggest software redesign Microsoft has
ever known, concluding that splitting the software giant into two
independent companies was "imperative." In one of the few
court-ordered breakups over the past 100 years, the judge endorsed the
government's plan to create one company that would sell Windows and
another that would sell everything else. Jackson's strongly worded
opinion left little doubt why he went for the ax, as opposed to milder
restrictions: Microsoft's bad attitude. First, he said, the company
consistently maintained that it has done nothing wrong. Second,
Microsoft could continue to flout the law and unfairly bully
competitors. Last, referring to that first encounter more than two
years ago, he called Microsoft "untrustworthy." Elaborating on the
Windows incident, Jackson told NEWSWEEK, "I found their compliance to
be less than genuine." Microsoft's attitude calls for the kind of
remedy that it can't weasel out of, the judge seemed to say, because
it has been a weasel before.
If upheld, Jackson's order, aside from causing the biggest Windows
crash in the company's 25-year history, would bring an end to a
software empire that became the planet's most valuable company and an
engine of the New Economy. Some-Microsofties among them-will blame the
judge. Some will blame an overzealous government that has
unsuccessfully tried to rein in Microsoft for more than a decade. A
NEWSWEEK reconstruction of the key moments on the road to Microsoft's
Judgment Day, however, suggests that the most likely culprit is the
same defiant corporate culture that made Microsoft so successful in
the first place. In the marketplace, rough-and-tumble tactics can be a
virtue, but in the legal arena, Microsoft's blood sport backfired-at
least with this judge. One critical turning point: Gates's own
videotaped deposition in which he ducked questions and denied the
obvious. After the tape was played in court, Jackson noted that Gates
wasn't "particularly responsive." Watching the video, the judge wagged
his head and rolled his eyes. And he practically double-dared the
chairman to testify. "Microsoft took a scorched-earth approach," says
Howard University law-school professor Andrew Gavil, "and they got
scorched."
Just after the judge's decision, Gates blasted the order as "an
unwarranted and unjustified intrusion" but also appeared almost
relieved to be heading to any courtroom other than Jackson's. "People
say a lot of things about us," Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer told
NEWSWEEK. "But never has anyone said we're untrustworthy." The company
likes its odds on appeal. Microsoft's lawyers and executives will be
upgraded to geniuses if their reading of the law squares as well with
higher courts as it has in the past. Jackson has had his fair share of
reversals. The company has plenty of supporting law to lean on, as
well as public support from two thirds of Americans. And many
antitrust experts think the company won't be broken up even if higher
courts find some violations. With the exception of last week's
disaster, Microsoft has had a string of successes in the courtroom.
"The company is fundamentally arrogant when it comes to litigation,"
says one company insider, "because it has historically won." Along
with the early Windows misstep, there are five other moments that led
Gates & Co. to its gloomy Judgment Day:
Let's Not Make a Deal
In May 1998, in the weeks before the government filed its latest
antitrust action against Microsoft, antitrust chief Joel Klein and
Gates met at the offices of Microsoft's lawyers in the capital. Their
conversations went well enough that "it looked like we were going to
have a settlement," recalled David Boies, Klein's chief prosecutor.
But when William Neukom, Microsoft's natty general counsel, met with
Klein and officials at the Justice Department on May 15 in an
eleventh-hour effort to head off litigation, each side quickly felt
the other wasn't serious about settling. By their Saturday-morning
meeting, Microsoft thought the government wasn't willing to negotiate;
the Feds thought Microsoft was backtracking on its concession to give
consumers a choice of browsers. Talks collapsed by midday. "For
reasons I will never understand," said one official in the
negotiations, "Microsoft was not prepared to implement the
settlement." The following Monday, May 18, when Microsoft started
shipping Windows 98 with its browser built in, Klein filed the
lawsuit, accusing the company of trying to extend its Windows
[40]monopoly to the Internet. The news shaved $10 billion off the
value of Microsoft shares in a single day.
If Microsoft had offered to give consumers a choice of browsers and
give PC makers more control of software they wished to promote, the
government's case might never have been filed. "It would have blunted
the case," conceded one government official. Such a settlement would
have spared Microsoft the subpoena wars that allowed the government to
rifle through more than 3 million company documents and produce one
damning e-mail after another. ("This antitrust thing will blow over,"
Gates purportedly said, according to one of the government's favorite
documents.) The hunt only served to broaden the charges against the
software giant. "At that point, we were not aware of all the powerful
evidence that later would be disclosed," said Connecticut Attorney
General Richard Blumenthal, "and that led to heightened demands for
stronger remedies."
Candid Camera
It was August 1998, and Bill Gates was under oath. In a Redmond
conference room filled with leather chairs and a government video
camera, Gates sat next to three Microsoft lawyers he apparently didn't
think he needed. He refused to answer questions on his own during the
30-hour deposition. Shifting and rocking in his chair, he appeared
either petulant, contemptuous or bored. Whether Gates received good
coaching from his lawyers or ignored it may never be known. He
quibbled over the meaning of the simplest words ("compete" and "ask"
were real stumpers). And on the occasions that he remembered e-mails
he authored, he denied knowing what he meant by them. The same
detail-oriented, driven genius who created the world's most valuable
company-and a GDP-size fortune of his own-was seemingly out to lunch.
The video was a turning point for three reasons. First, it indicated
that Gates & Co. were more confident than careful. "Nobody realized,"
admitted one Microsoft insider, "they were going to be able to play
the Gates video in trial"-which they did, starting just after the
gavel fell on day one. (Microsoft says the judge admitted the video
into court after he originally said he wouldn't.) The video also set
the stage for a massive credibility attack on the company, casting
doubt on the dozen Microsoft witnesses who followed. Any judge
weighing conflicting testimony is inclined to accept the more
believable witness. And from his first ruling it was clear that none
of Microsoft's witnesses convinced the judge of anything.
"Credibility, in general and in the abstract," Jackson said last week,
"is very important." The video seemed to head off any argument from
Microsoft's lawyers that the company's aggressive tactics were the
work of rogue employees. Finally, antitrust experts think the video
was a blown opportunity to introduce themes for the defense that could
be reinforced throughout the trial. The company failed "to use the
deposition as a chance to create a commercial," says [41]George
Washington University law-school professor William Kovacic. Instead,
the government put it on heavy rotation.
The E-Mail Trail
By January 1999, as Microsoft began its defense, the credibility
attack seemed to be working. Typically, each of the company's
witnesses would give no ground in testimony, only to be embarrassed
when Boies produced an e-mail that directly refuted his or her version
of events. The darkest day of testimony was when Microsoft's lord of
Windows, Jim Allchin, took the stand. Far from the stereotype of the
rabid Microsoft executive, Allchin is a soft-spoken man whose silver
hair and pale complexion suggest he's been weathered by years of hard
work. Antitrust experts say Allchin was a perfect example of a missed
opportunity to explain the wonders of Windows and how trifling with it
would be dangerous. Instead, a videotape intended to demonstrate that
Microsoft couldn't separate the browser from the operating system
without damaging Windows looked doctored. Icons on the computer screen
in the tape mysteriously appeared from one moment to the next. As
Boies pointed out inconsistencies, the judge watched, head in hand.
"It simply casts doubt on the reliability-the entire reliability-of
the video demonstration," Jackson finally intoned. It was as if
Microsoft hadn't taken the case seriously enough to make sure
everything was Boies-proof.
None of these courtroom gaffes might have mattered; they could have
been dismissed as theatrics with no bearing on the law-a point
Microsoft made almost every day on the courthouse steps. But in his
findings of fact issued last November, the judge's first ruling,
Jackson quoted Allchin's e-mail at length and identified him as the
mastermind behind the strategy to crush rival [42]Netscape by bolting
Internet Explorer to the operating system. It was just the kind of
monopoly leveraging-using one monopoly product to enter into a new
market-that sets off antitrust alarms. And there it was in Allchin's
e-mail: "We must leverage Windows more." To the judge, no courtroom
testimony could explain that e-mail away.
By the time Microsoft's final witness took the stand in February 1999,
the judge seemed to have had enough of Microsoft's denials.
Microsoft's last witness, group vice president Robert Muglia, was
trying to explain a piece of Gates's e-mail in which the chairman
appeared to be trying to hobble a competitor. After the judge
expressed doubt about Muglia's gentler spin, Muglia persisted. Jackson
erupted in one of his angriest outbursts. Pointing at Muglia he
yelled, "No! Stop!" and then called a recess.
'Still in Denial'
Just days earlier Microsoft had taken its second stab at a settlement.
In three meetings at the Justice Department beginning on Feb. 24, the
two sides sat down to talk. Microsoft submitted several drafts to
Klein. "We put three proposals on the table," said one Microsoft
insider. "We felt like we were offering more." But more wasn't enough.
The government, which was considering a breakup even then, wanted
Microsoft to submit to curbs on its behavior. Microsoft refused many
of them, such as putting government-appointed people on the board. To
Microsoft, the government was simply taking control of the company and
nationalizing it. To the government, "they were still in denial that
they would lose," said Boies. The government believed Microsoft was
submitting the same settlement proposal it had offered before the
trial began. By the last meeting on June 2, the talks had stalled.
A month earlier Jackson set up a procedural framework that would give
Microsoft another opportunity to settle. In an unusual move, he
decided not to release his findings of fact (his decisive version of
the facts) and his conclusions of law (how those facts overstepped
antitrust law) simultaneously. Instead, he staggered their release.
That way, he could focus both sides on arguing the same set of
facts-his own. And by releasing his facts first, he would tip his hand
and give the losing side incentive to wrap up the case.
That incentive arrived in Redmond on Nov. 5 last year. If Microsoft
had missed any prior signals that things were going badly, only a
megaphone might have been clearer than Jackson's findings of fact. Of
the document's 412 paragraphs, no more than four looked favorably on
Microsoft.
The Last Dance
Weeks later Jackson appointed Judge Richard Posner, one of the most
respected jurists in the country, to try to make a deal. A prolific
author and revered professor, Posner is most importantly a member of
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals and is well schooled in the
economic and legal gymnastics of antitrust law. In a case certain to
be appealed by either side, there was perhaps no one better to peer
over the legal horizon and give both sides enough to worry about to
make a settlement look irresistible. Posner met with both sides
separately, probing the facts and the elasticity of each side's
stance. He met privately in Chicago with Gates, who convinced the
judge, himself a conservative wary of government intervention, that a
breakup was out of the question.
There was a moment of hope in February. Posner asked the government if
it was willing to set aside breakup proposals and base a settlement on
rules that Microsoft must live by. Though some of the 19 states that
were also parties to the suit opposed the idea, the Feds decided that
they could live with "conduct remedies" if it meant they'd be
implemented quickly, rather than at the end of protracted litigation.
It was a major concession, one that could have given Microsoft one
last opportunity to dodge the breakup bullet. But to Microsoft, the
conduct remedies were "effective breakups anyway," said one
Microsoftie. And the company didn't want to strike a deal with the
Feds if the 19 states wouldn't also agree to it.
The government, for its part, believed Gates & Co. weren't going far
enough and hadn't faced the fact they were about to lose in court yet
again when the judge issued his conclusions of law. "Microsoft's
argument kept coming down to: we're not really a monopoly, so we
should be able to do what we want," Boies explained last week. "They
were not willing to constrain their conduct in any way." By Saturday
morning, April Fools' Day, Posner, sensing that the gap between the
two sides couldn't be bridged, called off the talks. They headed back
to the courtroom, and last week the judge issued [43]his devastating
ruling.
Now Microsoft faces an uphill battle to reverse the judge's decision.
It has delayed the breakup pending an appeal and is trying to hold off
the conduct restrictions that Jackson imposed. It may be even harder
to reverse the collateral damage from the rulings. Goldman Sachs
analyst Rick Sherlund estimates that the lawsuit has lopped off as
much as $175 billion from Microsoft's market capitalization. The
expense of the suit, the distraction and the demoralization of the
past two years have taken an emotional toll. Some employees, once true
believers, are now skittish, wondering for the first time whether they
should head for the exits. And what about the confidence of customers
and software partners? "It's not something you put in a spreadsheet,"
says Sherlund. "But it is something that concerns us."
Private antitrust suits are also threatening the company. Had
Microsoft settled, it could have prevented last week's ruling.
Instead, for the roughly 170 law firms pressing 137 lawsuits against
the company, the document is Exhibit No. 1 in their effort to prove
that Microsoft harmed consumers. Though many of the cases won't
prevail, any that do will win treble damages. That dollar figure, says
high-octane class-action lawyer Stanley Chesley, "could be in the
billions." That may not dent the company's $21 billion war chest. But
Chesley vows to exercise the right "to take the deposition of every
major officer of Microsoft."
Now Microsoft's fate rests in the hands of higher courts. If the
company wins, the victory would be more stunning than the
government's. But it's a win so costly that it could still seem like a
loss.
� 2000 Newsweek, Inc.
[44]Back to the top
Web Exclusives:
[45]Campaign 2000
[46]Artscope
Live Talks:
[47]Cover Talk-Bill's Judgment Day:
The verdict is in. Last week, Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson ordered
Microsoft split into two independent companies, one that will sell
Windows and one that will market application software. What does the
future hold for Bill Gates & Co.? Jared Sandberg joined us for a Live
Talk about Microsoft on Wednesday, June 14th.
[48]Read the transcript.
[49]Politics Talk-The New Odd Couple:
Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan are dark-horse candidates in the race for
the White House. But with both working hard to gain the support of
America's labor unions, they are certain to have a real impact on
Campaign 2000. Newsweek's Matt Bai joined us for a Live Talk about the
political season on Thursday June 15th.
[50]Read the transcript.
From Newsweek U.S. Edition
The Cover: [51]Bill's Judgment Day
National Affairs
Campaign 2000: [52]The New Odd Couple
International
Syria: [53]Death of a President
Special Report
Education: [54]Why Teachers Are Cheaters
Society
Sports: [55]How Jackson Got the Lakers' Groove Back
Arts & Entertainment
Museums: [56]An Interactive Homage to Rock and Roll
From Newsweek International Edition
World Affairs
Syria: [57]A Survivor's Legacy
Asia
The Koreas: [58]A Turning Point?
Europe
Russia: [59]Funny Money
Business
Entrepreneurs: [60]Digital Dreams
Society & the Arts
Languages: [61]The Sound of Silence
Opinion
Paul Kelley: [62]Sorry Lessons From Oxford
[63][LINK]
[INLINE]
[64]Print Edition Banner
[65][ISMAP]
IFRAME:
[66]http://ad.doubleclick.net/adi/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;sz=468x
60;ptile=2;ord=?
[67][LINK]
References
1. file://localhost/../../maps/topnav_767.map
2. file://localhost/../../maps/bottomnav_printed_767.map
3. file://localhost/../../maps/banner_us_scitech.map
4.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/adi/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;pos=top;sz=468x60;ord=?
5.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;pos=top;sz=468x60;ord=?
6. http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;sz=139x60;ord=?
7.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;sz=88x31;ptile=1;ord=?
8. http://washingtonpost.com/
9. http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/wpni.newsweek/;pos=britannica;sz=132x20;ord=?
10. file://localhost/tmp/a21056-2000jun15.htm
11. file://localhost/tmp/a21056-2000jun15.htm
12. file://localhost/tmp/a21051-2000jun15.htm
13. file://localhost/tmp/a20907-2000jun11.htm
14. file://localhost/tmp/a20908-2000jun11.htm
15. file://localhost/tmp/a20910-2000jun11.htm
16. file://localhost/tmp/a20909-2000jun11.htm
17. file://localhost/tmp/a20911-2000jun11.htm
18. file://localhost/sr/a21011-2000jun13.htm
19. file://localhost/na/a21042-2000jun15.htm
20. file://localhost/in/a21033-2000jun14.htm
21. file://localhost/so/a20936-2000jun11.htm
22. file://localhost/ae/a20871-2000jun10.htm
23. file://localhost/dept/ps/a20918-2000jun11.htm
24. file://localhost/dept/cw/a20837-2000jun10.htm
25. file://localhost/dept/cw/a20837-2000jun10.htm
26. file://localhost/dept/cs/a20840-2000jun10.htm
27. file://localhost/dept/my/a20852-2000jun10.htm
28. file://localhost/dept/dl/a20891-2000jun11.htm
29. file://localhost/dept/pe/a20930-2000jun11.htm
30. file://localhost/dept/nm/a20897-2000jun11.htm
31. file://localhost/dept/tn/a20866-2000jun10.htm
32. file://localhost/dept/lw/a20861-2000jun10.htm
33. file://localhost/../int/front.htm
34. file://localhost/../special/front.htm
35.
javascript:QTaudioWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/multimedia/nwonair/m21023-2000jun13.htm')
36.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/ms.htm')
37.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/al.htm')
38.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/bg.htm')
39.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/jd.htm')
40.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/mo.htm')
41.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/gwu.htm')
42.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/ns.htm')
43.
javascript:spawnWindow('http://www.newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/hyper/20000619/pj.htm')
44. file://localhost/tmp/NW.html#TOP
45. file://localhost/../../web/special/campaign2000/campaign_2k.htm
46. file://localhost/../../tnw/today/as/front.htm
47. file://localhost/../../talk/cover/000614/front.htm
48. file://localhost/../../talk/cover/000614/front.htm
49. file://localhost/../../poltalk/000615/front.htm
50. file://localhost/../../poltalk/000615/front.htm
51. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/st/a20907-2000jun11.htm
52. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/na/a20887-2000jun11.htm
53. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/in/a20905-2000jun11.htm
54. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/sr/a20927-2000jun11.htm
55. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/so/a20936-2000jun11.htm
56. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/us/ae/a20871-2000jun10.htm
57. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/int/wa/a20969-2000jun11.htm
58. file://localhost/../int/asia/a20957-2000jun11.htm
59. http://newsweek.com/nw-srv/printed/int/eur/a20948-2000jun11.htm
60. file://localhost/../int/wb/a20994-2000jun12.htm
61. file://localhost/../int/socu/a20953-2000jun11.htm
62. file://localhost/../int/dept/wv/a20991-2000jun12.htm
63. http://www.neodata.com/Newsweek/set1/subscriptions5.htm
64. file://localhost/../../maps/topnav_767.map
65. file://localhost/../../maps/bottomnav_printed_767.map
66.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/adi/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;sz=468x60;ptile=2;ord=?
67.
http://ad.doubleclick.net/jump/wpni.newsweek/technology;kw=;sz=468x60;ptile=2;ord=?
------------------------------
From: John Wiltshire <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.os.ms-windows.advocacy,comp.os.ms-windows.nt.advocacy
Subject: Re: Claims of Windows supporting old applications are reflecting reality or
fantasy?
Date: Mon, 19 Jun 2000 11:06:31 GMT
On Sun, 18 Jun 2000 00:33:41 -0400, "Colin R. Day"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>John Wiltshire wrote:
>
>> I think you've blinded yourself to the possibilities. There's a
>> kernel httpd at the moment which is frighteningly fast. Why not X?
>>
>
>Perhaps the fragility of GUI code?
I accept that GUI code is more complex than daemon code for the most
part (naturally it depends on the GUI and the daemon). Still, the
possibility exists and I think it is probably a good option for some.
John Wiltshire
------------------------------
** FOR YOUR REFERENCE **
The service address, to which questions about the list itself and requests
to be added to or deleted from it should be directed, is:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
You can send mail to the entire list (and comp.os.linux.advocacy) via:
Internet: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Linux may be obtained via one of these FTP sites:
ftp.funet.fi pub/Linux
tsx-11.mit.edu pub/linux
sunsite.unc.edu pub/Linux
End of Linux-Advocacy Digest
******************************
