On Mon, Sep 19, 2016 at 2:01 PM, Alex Elsayed <eternal...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Mon, 19 Sep 2016 14:08:06 -0400, Zygo Blaxell wrote:
>> On Sat, Sep 17, 2016 at 06:37:16AM +0000, Alex Elsayed wrote:
>>> > Encryption in ext4 is a per-directory-tree affair. One starts by
>>> > setting an encryption policy (using an ioctl() call) for a given
>>> > directory, which must be empty at the time; that policy includes a
>>> > master key used for all files and directories stored below the target
>>> > directory. Each individual file is encrypted with its own key, which
>>> > is derived from the master key and a per-file random nonce value
>>> > (which is stored in an extended attribute attached to the file's
>>> > inode). File names and symbolic links are also encrypted.
>> Probably the simplest way to map this to btrfs is to move the nonce from
>> the inode to the extent.
> I agree. Mostly, I was making a point about how the ext4/VFS code (which
> _does_ put it on the inode) can't just be transported over to btrfs
> unchanged, which is what I read Dave Chinner as advocating.
>> Inodes aren't unique within a btrfs filesystem, extents can be shared by
>> multiple inodes, and a single extent can appear multiple times in the
>> same inode at different offsets.  Attaching the nonce to the inode would
>> not be sufficient to read the extent in all but the special case of a
>> single reference at the original offset where it was written, and it
>> also leads to the replay problems with duplicate inodes you pointed out.
> Yup.
>> Extents in a btrfs filesystem are unique and carry their own attributes
>> (e.g. compression format, checksums) and reference count.  They can
>> easily carry a reference to an encryption policy object and a nonce
>> attribute.
> Definitely agreed.
>> Nonces within metadata are more complicated.  btrfs doesn't have
>> directory files like ext4 does, so it doesn't get directory filename
>> encryption for free with file encryption.  Encryption could be done
>> per-item in the metadata trees, but in the special case of directories
>> that happen to the the roots of subvols, it would be possible to encrypt
>> entire pages of metadata at a time (with the caveat that a snapshot
>> would require shared encryption policy between the origin and snapshot
>> subvols).
> Encrypting tree values per-item is actually one of the best arguments in
> _favor_ of nonce-misuse-resistant AEAD. Its security notion is very, very
> strong:
> If a (key, nonce, associated data, message) tuple is repeated, the only
> data an attacker can discover is the fact that the two ciphertexts have
> the same value (a one-bit leak).
> In other words, if you encrypt each value in the b-tree with some key,
> some nonce, use the b-tree key as the associated data, and use the value
> as the message, you get a _very_ secure system against a _very_ wide
> variety of attacks - essentially for free. And all _without_ sacrificing
> flexibility, as one could use distinct (crypto) keys for distinct (b-
> tree) keys.
> (You still need something for protecting the _structure_ of the B-tree,
> but that's a different issue).
>> This is what makes keys at the subvol root level so attractive.
> Pretty much.
>>> So there isn't quite a "subvol key" in the VFS approach - each
>>> directory has a key, and there are derived keys for the entries below
>>> it. (I'll note that this framing does not address shared extents _at
>>> all_, and would love to have clarification on that).
>> Files are modified by creating new extents (using parameters inherited
>> from the inode to fill in the extent attributes) and updating the inode
>> to refer to the new extent instead of the old one at the modified
>> offset. Cloned extents are references to existing extents associated
>> with a different inode or at a different place within the same inode (if
>> the extent is not compatible with the destination inode, clone fails
>> with an error).  A snapshot is an efficient way to clone an entire
>> subvol tree at once, including all inodes and attributes.
> There is the caveat of chattr +C, which would need hard-disabled for
> extent-level encryption (vs block level).

What about raid56 partial stripe writes? Aren't these effectively nocow?

Chris Murphy
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