Hi,
On Fri, Feb 23, 2001 at 10:05:53AM -0800, Andrew Morgan wrote:
> Andreas Gruenbacher wrote:
> > > > In fact, I'm not entirely happy with the acl_posix namespace, and after
> > > > thinking about it consider the previous classification (user, inode,
> > > > trusted, system) better. (This is also what Robert Watson suggested.)
> > > >
> > > > The different system attributes (ACLs, CAPs, MAC labels, etc.) could then
> > > > be identified by attribute name, e.g., "acl.posix.access",
> > > > "acl.posix.default", "acl.afs", "cap", etc.
>
> I'm still concerned by the proposed CAP_TRUSTED thing. As with
> capabilities, ACLs already have a 'POSIX.1e' restriction on being
> manipulated. Adding CAP_TRUSTED to the capabilities needed to manipulate
> any 'trusted' EA seems superfluous.
As I understand it, "system" EAs are semantically-rich ones which the
kernel interprets specially, but "trusted" EAs are just normal opaque
attributes which happen to be in a privileged namespace and which
cannot be accessed by the user. ACLs will be system attributes so
they won't be subject to the default CAP_TRUSTED test, but will have
whatever test the native ACL support mandates.
Cheers,
Stephen
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