From: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>

tpm2_buf_append_auth() has a single call site and most of its parameters
are redundant. Open code it to the call site so that less cross-referencing
is required while browsing the source code.

Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
---
v6:
- Trimmed the patch by removing comment update as it is out of scope.
---
 security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 40 ++++-------------------
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 33 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c 
b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index a7ea4a1c3bed..d3a5c5f2b926 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -190,36 +190,6 @@ int tpm2_key_priv(void *context, size_t hdrlen,
        return 0;
 }
 
-/**
- * tpm2_buf_append_auth() - append TPMS_AUTH_COMMAND to the buffer.
- *
- * @buf: an allocated tpm_buf instance
- * @session_handle: session handle
- * @nonce: the session nonce, may be NULL if not used
- * @nonce_len: the session nonce length, may be 0 if not used
- * @attributes: the session attributes
- * @hmac: the session HMAC or password, may be NULL if not used
- * @hmac_len: the session HMAC or password length, maybe 0 if not used
- */
-static void tpm2_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 session_handle,
-                                const u8 *nonce, u16 nonce_len,
-                                u8 attributes,
-                                const u8 *hmac, u16 hmac_len)
-{
-       tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + nonce_len + hmac_len);
-       tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, session_handle);
-       tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, nonce_len);
-
-       if (nonce && nonce_len)
-               tpm_buf_append(buf, nonce, nonce_len);
-
-       tpm_buf_append_u8(buf, attributes);
-       tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, hmac_len);
-
-       if (hmac && hmac_len)
-               tpm_buf_append(buf, hmac, hmac_len);
-}
-
 /**
  * tpm2_seal_trusted() - seal the payload of a trusted key
  *
@@ -518,9 +488,13 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
                 * could repeat our actions with the exfiltrated
                 * password.
                 */
-               tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, options->policyhandle,
-                                    NULL /* nonce */, 0, 0,
-                                    options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+               tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 9 + options->blobauth_len);
+               tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->policyhandle);
+               tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, 0);
+               tpm_buf_append_u8(&buf, 0);
+               tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
+               tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
+
                if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
                        tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf, 
TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
                } else  {
-- 
2.39.5


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