On Tue, Dec 16, 2025 at 11:21:41AM +0200, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote:
TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always does
set up either password or HMAC session.
Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting
TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised at
run-time, and thus does not cause regressions.
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <[email protected]>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <[email protected]>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +---------
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index d3a5c5f2b926..3666e3e48eab 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -451,10 +451,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 blob_handle)
{
- struct tpm_header *head;
struct tpm_buf buf;
u16 data_len;
- int offset;
u8 *data;
int rc;
@@ -495,14 +493,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
tpm_buf_append_u16(&buf, options->blobauth_len);
tpm_buf_append(&buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len);
- if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) {
+ if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip))
tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, &buf,
TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0);
- } else {
- offset = buf.handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE;
- head = (struct tpm_header *)buf.data;
- if (tpm_buf_length(&buf) == offset)
- head->tag = cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS);
- }
}
rc = tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, &buf);
--
2.39.5
J.
--
"Never test for an error condition you don't know how to handle."
--Steinbach