Andy Chiu <andyb...@gmail.com> writes:
> On Wed, Aug 14, 2024 at 02:57:52PM +0200, Björn Töpel wrote:
>> Björn Töpel <bj...@kernel.org> writes:
>>
>> > Andy Chiu <andy.c...@sifive.com> writes:
>> >
>> >> We use an AUIPC+JALR pair to jump into a ftrace trampoline. Since
>> >> instruction fetch can break down to 4 byte at a time, it is impossible
>> >> to update two instructions without a race. In order to mitigate it, we
>> >> initialize the patchable entry to AUIPC + NOP4. Then, the run-time code
>> >> patching can change NOP4 to JALR to eable/disable ftrcae from a
>> > enable ftrace
>> >
>> >> function. This limits the reach of each ftrace entry to +-2KB displacing
>> >> from ftrace_caller.
>> >>
>> >> Starting from the trampoline, we add a level of indirection for it to
>> >> reach ftrace caller target. Now, it loads the target address from a
>> >> memory location, then perform the jump. This enable the kernel to update
>> >> the target atomically.
>> >
>> > The +-2K limit is for direct calls, right?
>> >
>> > ...and this I would say breaks DIRECT_CALLS (which should be implemented
>> > using call_ops later)?
>>
>> Thinking a bit more, and re-reading the series.
>>
>> This series is good work, and it's a big improvement for DYNAMIC_FTRACE,
>> but
>>
>> +int ftrace_make_call(struct dyn_ftrace *rec, unsigned long addr)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long distance, orig_addr;
>> +
>> + orig_addr = (unsigned long)&ftrace_caller;
>> + distance = addr > orig_addr ? addr - orig_addr : orig_addr - addr;
>> + if (distance > JALR_RANGE)
>> + return -EINVAL;
>> +
>> + return __ftrace_modify_call(rec->ip, addr, false);
>> +}
>> +
>>
>> breaks WITH_DIRECT_CALLS. The direct trampoline will *never* be within
>> the JALR_RANGE.
>
>
> Yes, it is hardly possible that a direct trampoline will be within the
> range.
>
> Recently I have been thinking some solutions to address the issue. One
> solution is replaying AUIPC at function entries. The idea has two sides.
> First, if we are returning back to the second instruction at trap return,
> then do sepc -= 4 so it executes the up-to-date AUIPC. The other side is
> to fire synchronous IPI that does remote fence.i at right timings to
> prevent concurrent executing on a mix of old and new instructions.
>
> Consider replacing instructions at a function's patchable entry with the
> following sequence:
>
> Initial state:
> --------------
> 0: AUIPC
> 4: JALR
>
> Step1:
> write(0, "J +8")
> fence w,w
> send sync local+remote fence.i
> ------------------------
> 0: J +8
> 4: JALR
>
> Step2:
> write(4, "JALR'")
> fence w,w
> send sync local+remote fence.i
> ------------------------
> 0: J +8
> 4: JALR'
>
> Step3:
> write(0, "AUIPC'")
> fence w,w
> send sync local+remote fence.i (to activate the call)
> -----------------------
> 0: AUIPC'
> 4: JALR'
>
> The following execution sequences are acceptable:
> - AUIPC, JALR
> - J +8, (skipping {JALR | JALR'})
> - AUIPC', JALR'
>
> And here are sequences that we want to prevent:
> - AUIPC', JALR
> - AUIPC, JALR'
>
> The local core should never execute the forbidden sequence.
>
> By listing all possible combinations of executing sequence on a remote
> core, we can find that the dangerous seqence is impossible to happen:
>
> let f be the fence.i at step 1, 2, 3. And let numbers be the location of
> code being executed. Mathematically, here are all combinations at a site
> happening on a remote core:
>
> fff04 -- updated seq
> ff0f4 -- impossible, would be ff0f04, updated seq
> ff04f -- impossible, would be ff08f, safe seq
> f0ff4 -- impossible, would be f0ff04, updated seq
> f0f4f -- impossible, would be f0f08f (safe), or f0f0f04 (updated)
> f04ff -- impossible, would be f08ff, safe seq
> 0fff4 -- impossible, would be 0fff04, updated seq
> 0ff4f -- impossible, would be 0ff08f (safe), or 0ff0f04 (updated)
> 0f4ff -- impossible, would be 0f08ff (safe), 0f0f08f (safe), 0f0f0f04
> (updated)
> 04fff -- old seq
>
> After the 1st 'fence.i', remote cores should observe (J +8, JALR) or (J +8,
> JALR')
> After the 2nd 'fence.i', remote cores should observe (J +8, JALR') or
> (AUIPC', JALR')
> After the 3rd 'fence.i', remote cores should observe (AUIPC', JALR')
>
> Remote cores should never execute (AUIPC',JALR) or (AUIPC,JALR')
>
> To correctly implement the solution, the trap return code must match JALR
> and adjust sepc only for patchable function entries. This is undocumently
> possible because we use t0 as source and destination registers for JALR
> at function entries. Compiler never generates JALR that uses the same
> register pattern.
>
> Another solution is inspired by zcmt, and perhaps we can optimize it if
> the hardware does support zcmt. First, we allocate a page and divide it
> into two halves. The first half of the page are 255 x 8B destination
> addresses. Then, starting from offset 2056, the second half of the page
> is composed by a series of 2 x 4 Byte instructions:
>
> 0: ftrace_tramp_1
> 8: ftrace_tramp_2
> ...
> 2040: ftrace_tramp_255
> 2048: ftrace_tramp_256 (not used when configured with 255 tramps)
> 2056:
> ld t1, -2048(t1)
> jr t1
> ld t1, -2048(t1)
> jr t1
> ...
> 4088:
> ld t1, -2048(t1)
> jr t1
> 4096:
>
> It is possible to expand to 511 trampolines by adding a page
> below, and making a load+jr sequence from +2040 offset.
>
> When the kernel boots, we direct AUIPCs at patchable entries to the page,
> and disable the call by setting the second instruction to NOP4. Then, we
> can effectively enable/disable/modify a call by setting only the
> instruction at JALR. It is possible to utilize most of the current patch
> set to achieve atomic patching. A missing part is to allocate and manage
> trampolines for ftrace users.
(I will need to digest above in detail!)
I don't think it's a good idea to try to handle direct calls w/o
call_ops. What I was trying to say is "add the call_ops patch to your
series, so that direct calls aren't broken". If direct calls depend on
call_ops -- sure, no worries. But don't try to get direct calls W/O
call_ops. That's a whole new bag of worms.
Some more high-level thoughts: ...all this to workaround where we don't
want the call_ops overhead? Is there really a use-case with a platform
that doesn't handle the text overhead of call_ops?
Maybe I'm missing context here... but I'd say, let's follow what arm64
did (but obviously w/o the BL direct call optimization, and always jump
to a trampoline -- since that's not possible with RISC-V branch length),
and just do the call_ops way.
Then, as a second step, and if there are platforms that care, think
about a variant w/o call_ops.
Or what I wrote in the first section:
1. Keep this patch set
2. ...but add call_ops to it, and require call_ops for direct calls.
Just my $.02.
Björn
