On Mon, Aug 18, 2025 at 04:34:48PM -0500, Jeremy Linton wrote: > Its important to note that GCS pages can be read by normal > instructions, but the hardware validates that pages used by GCS > specific operations, have a GCS privilege set. We aren't validating this > in load_user_gcs because it requires stabilizing the VMA over the read > which may fault.
I think in the context of uprobes this is reasonable. We can always go back later and tighten things up. Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broo...@kernel.org> > +/* > + * Unlike put/push_user_gcs() above, get/pop_user_gsc() doesn't > + * validate the GCS permission is set on the page being read. This > + * differs from how the hardware works when it consumes data stored at > + * GCSPR. Callers should assure this is acceptable. s/assure/ensure/
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