Ross, On 7/14/11 4:55 AM, Ross Callon wrote: > I have read a couple of papers on this issue, which I believe are probably > the ones that you are referring to. The papers that I read both assume that > the granularity of the EID-to-RLOC tables will be the same as the granularity > of the current top level BGP routing table. If this assumption is wrong, then > the results will be correspondingly inaccurate. > > To me it seems highly unlikely that this assumption is within an order of > magnitude of being correct.
There are now two discussions intermixed in this thread: 1. What is the projected cache growth rate based on legitimate use? 2. What are the security considerations regarding cache attacks. In the first instance, let me suggest that the whole point of LISP is to disentangle memory consumption from number of reachable points on the Internet, but rather bound it to the number of sites actually being reached. That is what induces the concern that Jeff has raised with the 2nd discussion. What Jeff has described is a variation of the classic reflection attack. This is, IMHO, probably worth noting more explicitly, as an area for future work. I do not agree with Jeff that the only approach to solving this problem is to allow for overlapping negative / positive responses. That itself can cause other problems. For instance, it causes confusion as to when in fact a query must be sent if a negative entry is already cached, but there exists a positive entry somewhere in the world. In any case, I suggest we add a line that states the risk but not attempt to solve it in this round of the experiment. Eliot _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
