On 18 Jul 2011, at 15:03, Robert Raszuk wrote:

> Hi Damien,
> 
> > So this goes in the direction of Jeff saying that the churn problem
> > should not be neglected.
> 
> Very much indeed.
> 
> And to save one more email from Luigi .. I do not buy the argument that this 
> is simply "out of scope" as this would really mean "out of practical reality".
> 

Definitely, the scalability problem is a major issue in LISP if we do not
do the things correctly. The first part of the scalability work was to see if
LISP data-plane could work in the current situation (cache papers). The
second  part was to see if the control-plane (mapping system) could work
in such situation (we started with LISP-Tree and are still working to see how
to ensure the control-plane scalability). As it seems that LISP could work
in the current Internet (with the assumption we made), we have to explore
the potential new deployment cases of LISP (i.e., corse vs fine grained
mapping decomposition, where to put the xTRs...). Then for the deployments,
see how to model the traffic to check if data-plane and control-plane can
resist. And finally consider that malicious people could attack LISP itself
to success attacks. We are still evaluating how to have "new LISP 
deployment pattern" and have started to lisp the intrinsic security flows
in LISP. So we will eventually be able to see how LISP would react to
new deployments with the presence of LISP based security threats. We are
still far from being able to answer, but at least we show that under certain
given assumptions LISP could be used and work. With baby steps we are
going to more complex cases, but I prefer to have a system that works but
must be optimized that an optimal system that does not work.

So definitely scalability and security are key points for LISP.

Thank you,

Damien Saucez

> Cheers,
> R.
> 
> 
>> Hello,
> >
>> On 18 Jul 2011, at 10:12, Robert Raszuk wrote:
>> 
>>> Hi Damien,
>>> 
>>> Many thx for your reply.
>>> 
>>> Let me clarify ...
>>> 
>>>> I am not sure I understand perfectly what you mean. Why should a small home
>>>> site would have millions of destinations? It would mean that you observe 
>>>> at least
>>>> millions of flows within your small network.
>>> 
>>> Yes. Imagine if you or me announce wiki-leaks-2 content on our IPv4/IPv6 
>>> home web server. I think number of flows will explode. And imagine we are 
>>> lucky users of FTTH so no bandwith issue :)
>>> 
>>> Moreover those may not be DOS or spoofing. Those may be legitimate 
>>> addresses. And I do not think the server will die.
>>> 
>>> And I am not saying LISP will or will not be able to handle it. I am just 
>>> asking how it will handle it ;) Maybe the answer is to in the moment of 
>>> exceeding capacity threshold of any xTR push some of the traffic to few 
>>> bigger proxies ... just a thought.
>>> 
>> 
>> Thank you for the clarification, this is a nice example indeed!
>> 
>> You are right that for such legitimate traffic there is problem as it can be
>> assimilated to a flash crowd. In you particular example, I think
>> that it is the Map-Resolver or the control plane itself that will cause the
>> problems!
>> 
>> If we consider  the cache size it should be ok. If we have
>> one million client *simultaneously* and that the system is stupid and
>> stores the mapping records as-is, that all the requesters are IPv4 and
>> have two rlocs, then 40MB of storage is required. It is especially what
>> the small home routers have today, but it is not 1million times more
>> than the memory they provide now, so it would not be too hard.
>> 
>> But the control-plane in these routers would suffer and these boxes
>> are in general pure software and have slow processors so I don't know
>> if they will enjoy to update the cache at a rate higher than a few hundreds
>> entries per second. To be honest I don't know what could be achieved by
>> such devices. And even if they are able to deal with this speed, it will 
>> maybe
>> be complicated for the boxes to find a MR that will not rate limit the number
>> of requests.
>> 
>> So this goes in the direction of Jeff saying that the churn problem should
>> not be neglected.
>> 
>> Thank you,
>> 
>> Damien Saucez
>> 
>>> Cheers,
>>> R.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Even in campus networks like our
>>>> university we do not observe millions of concurrent flows. In one day we 
>>>> have in
>>>> general 3 million different IP addresses in our network and there is no 
>>>> mechanism
>>>> to limit the traffic but more interestingly, during 5 minute periods, we 
>>>> observe
>>>> peaks at around 60K to 70K concurrent destination addresses and  peaks to 
>>>> 1.2M
>>>> L3 flows and interestingly, from 5min time slots to 5min time
>>>> slots, we can see big variations (having 60K destination then 20K then
>>>> 40K ... is common) maning that actually the ground traffic that would stay 
>>>> in the
>>>> cache for what ever TTL is not so important. Indeed, a top few (~ 
>>>> thousands)
>>>> destinations are contacted all the time, while the rest could be seen as 
>>>> noise
>>>> with short period of time (from a few seconds to a few hours). So a good 
>>>> cache
>>>> eviction algorithm should solve most of the case. Regarding the cache 
>>>> size, I
>>>> think that the mistake is in the specs, where it is recommended to have a 
>>>> TTL
>>>> of one day.  From the temporal locality of Internet traffic, we can say 
>>>> that this
>>>> choice is meaningless. xTR should be able to fix themselves the TTL of the
>>>> mappings they install in their cache (TTL_cache<= TTL_Map-Reply).
>>>> 
>>>> Nevertheless, it is true that a site like google may have to deal with 
>>>> millions of
>>>> mappings while indexing. I do not know how google work for indexing, but I 
>>>> presume
>>>> that this million of pages are not indexed in one minute by a single 
>>>> machine.
>>>> Probably that the indexing takes several hours (days?) and is from 
>>>> different machines
>>>> with load balancers. Probably that the indexing of a site takes at much a 
>>>> few tens of
>>>> minutes, the ITR could thus limit the TTL to that amount of time. In 
>>>> addition, if
>>>> load balancers are actually used, one could imagine to use these LB 
>>>> directly as
>>>> xTRs.
>>>> 
>>>> Another case where you can observe peaks of destinations is with mails, if 
>>>> your
>>>> server is attacked and becomes a relay for spams, it can potentially have 
>>>> to
>>>> contact a huge number of destinations. It is a problem, but I think that 
>>>> the problem
>>>> is not LISP but the way the server is managed.
>>>> 
>>>> But you and Jeff are right that LISP has a big problem in case of sort of 
>>>> flash crowds.
>>>> The question is to know what will die first, the cache or the services 
>>>> that are
>>>> flash crowded. Such peaks can also be done with DDoS and this is why we are
>>>> working on techniques to avoid spoofing with LISP. And yes, we have to be
>>>> honest we do not have the perfect solution now for this problem.
>>>> 
>>>> Thank you,
>>>> 
>>>> Damien Saucez
>>>> 
>>>>> 
>>>>> Many thx,
>>>>> R.
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>>> 
>>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 

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