On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Joel M. Halpern <[email protected]> wrote: > The approach being taken in this version of the document seems to me to be > ineffective. As a simple example, section 5.2 says that EID-to-RLOC cache > Threats are Severity level 2, meaning that it can be dealt with by turning > off certain features in pubic deployments.
That concerns me, not because I care about the threats document much; but because EID-to-RLOC cache attacks cannot be dealt with through any means. There is literally no way. -- Jeff S Wheeler <[email protected]> Sr Network Operator / Innovative Network Concepts _______________________________________________ lisp mailing list [email protected] https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
