Jeff,
There was some good discussion regarding this issue on the mailing list between
March 20 and 21. As I recall, seven approaches were discussed. I wonder if the
threats document will be updated to reflect any of that discussion?
Ron
> -----Original Message-----
> From: [email protected] [mailto:[email protected]] On Behalf Of
> Jeff Wheeler
> Sent: Monday, May 06, 2013 12:03 PM
> To: Joel M. Halpern
> Cc: [email protected]
> Subject: Re: [lisp] draft-ietf-lisp-threats
>
> On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Joel M. Halpern <[email protected]>
> wrote:
> > The approach being taken in this version of the document seems to me
> > to be ineffective. As a simple example, section 5.2 says that
> > EID-to-RLOC cache Threats are Severity level 2, meaning that it can
> be
> > dealt with by turning off certain features in pubic deployments.
>
> That concerns me, not because I care about the threats document much;
> but because EID-to-RLOC cache attacks cannot be dealt with through any
> means. There is literally no way.
>
> --
> Jeff S Wheeler <[email protected]>
> Sr Network Operator / Innovative Network Concepts
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