Jeff, could you please look at the section on this threat in the
document, and provide comments on where it is incorrect.
Thank you,
Joel
On 5/6/2013 12:02 PM, Jeff Wheeler wrote:
On Mon, May 6, 2013 at 11:45 AM, Joel M. Halpern <[email protected]> wrote:
The approach being taken in this version of the document seems to me to be
ineffective. As a simple example, section 5.2 says that EID-to-RLOC cache
Threats are Severity level 2, meaning that it can be dealt with by turning
off certain features in pubic deployments.
That concerns me, not because I care about the threats document much;
but because EID-to-RLOC cache attacks cannot be dealt with through any
means. There is literally no way.
_______________________________________________
lisp mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/lisp
