Milton Mueller wrote:
>
> I agree that both drafts have their flaws, but very definitely
> view the Paris
> draft as the lesser of the two evils. In fact, I am not sure that
> it has any
> evil in it at all.
>
> The dnso.org application's recognition of a "Trademark and
> anti-counterfeiting"
> constituency is an unfair and discriminatory approach to the definition of
> constituencies. As has been pointed out many times, its only
> purpose is to gain
> the political support of the trademark constituency. While we all
> recognize
> trademark interests as players in this process, it is logically wrong and
> politically unfair to take one side of a policy issue and give
> its adherents
> special representation, while denying it to the other side. The
> dnso.org group
> was asked to compromise by balancing this constituency with one
> devoted to free
> expression or public interest groups, but it refused. It was also
> pointed out
> that no TM constituency was needed, as TM owners are businesses
> and have had no
> difficulty making themselves heard throughout the process.
>
Registries are also businesses, and have had even less difficulty than TM
owners in making themselves heard, yet there has been no opposition to
granting them a constituency.
> The Paris draft group, on the other hand, was responsive to this
> same criticism.
> I commend them for this.
On the other hand, the Paris group was completely unresponsive to criticism
that its veto provisions gave too much power to registries.
>
> I also support the focus on research and policy development that
> is contained in
> the Paris draft. That is something that ICANN and the process
> will actually
> need. It is, for a change, actually a forward-looking and
> constructive approach
> instead of a defensive and paranoid one. It is clear that the
> developers of the
> dnso.org draft were more interested in controlling policy than in
> understanding,
> formulating, and constructively developing it.
>
> A few rejoiners below:
>
> John B. Reynolds wrote:
>
> > There are number of problems with the Paris draft. Section 2.1
> leaves the
> > issue of who is eligible for DNSO membership up to ICANN by making it
> > coextensive with ICANN's membership. It is not yet clear what
> the makeup of
> > this membership will be or whether it would be appropriate for the DNSO.
>
> I see this as a great strength of the Paris draft.
So, if ICANN's membership is limited to businesses, you are willing to live
with the DNSO's being similarly limited?
>
> > Section 3.2 requires the General Assembly to "self-organize into diverse
> > constituencies" without providing any mechanism for doing so. If
> > discussions on these mailing lists are any indication, this is likely to
> > generate endless squabbles about the proper number and type of
> > constituencies that would likely not be resolved until ICANN
> stepped in to
> > impose a solution.
>
> Seems like the IETF has worked well this way for years.
DNSO constituencies are likely to divide over political lines rather than
functional ones. There is also much more at stake from a policy standpoint
in the DNSO case. Both of these factors substantially increase the
probability of conflict.
>
> > The real show-stoppers are in Article V, specifically Sections
> 5.8 through
> > 5.11. The "Fair Hearing" provisions of Sections 5.8, 5.10, and
> 5.11 make it
> > possible for any special interest or special interest group to
> delay almost
> > indefinitely any policy that they disagree with. Section 5.9 goes even
> > further. It elevates the particular special interest group of
> registries
> > above all others by giving it veto power and by requiring an essentially
> > unachievable 3/4 supermajority of registries for approval. These
> > provisions, taken individually and in toto, would make it
> nearly impossible
> > for the DNSO to produce any substantive policy recommendations
> whatsoever.
> > That is unacceptable to me. It is my hope and expectation that it will
> > prove to be unacceptable to ICANN as well.
>
> I share some of these concerns but do not see them as a show
> stopper, just as a
> reflection of the paranoia that pervades this process.
Opposition to an explicit registry veto is rooted in "paranoia", but
assertions that giving business and trademark interests 1/3 representation
somehow grants them "control" are not? Sorry, doesn't scan.
>
> > The flaws in the Washington draft are relatively minor by comparison.
> > Business interests are overrepresented, and there is no mechanism for
> > individual users or domain holders to participate directly
> (Section I.B).
>
> That's minor, eh?
By comparison with the outright registry veto in the Paris draft, yes.
>
> > It also fails to make clear whether Names Council members are
> elected by the
> > constituencies they represent or by the entire membership
> (Section I.E). I
> > regard the former approach as necessary to prevent the Names
> Council from
> > being captured by a special interest group or groups
> constituting a majority
> > of the membership.
>
> I'm quite sure that the business interests who put the dnso,org proposal
> together have the latter in mind.
Under the Paris draft proposal, if business and trademark interests
constitute a majority of the membership, they will likely be in a position
to define the constituencies such that they will be guaranteed a majority on
the Names Council. Even with the ambiguity in Section I.E, the Washington
draft provides greater protection against special interest capture than does
the Paris draft.
>
> > The Washington draft, however, would create a DNSO that is
> capable of taking
> > action. For that reason, I support it, albeit as the lesser of
> two evils.
>
> The Washington draft is designed to create a DNSO that is safely under the
> control of established business interests. I am not sanguine
> about the kind of
> "action" such an organization would take.
>
As an advocate of expansion of the TLD space and policies that would protect
domain registrants from exploitation based on registry lock-in, I prefer to
take my chances with the business community than with the incumbent TLD
registries.
