Deb –

> Section 10:  The ability to add multiple TLVs to an IS-IS session (possibly 
> not
> the right word) may increase the ability to cause a denial of service via
> resource exhaustion.  If that is a risk, please address this security concern.
> Otherwise, please clarify why it isn't a concern.
>
[LES:] There is nothing today that prevents an attacker from inserting multiple 
copies of a TLV for a given object (with or without varying content).
Implementations which support MP-TLV are likely to be more resilient in the 
face of such attacks.
This point was discussed in the context of Mohammed's review of V11 and the 
following text was added to the Security section:

" Note that support for MP-TLV may result in an implementation being more 
robust in handling unexpected occurrences of MP-TLV."

[DC]  Just to be sure I understand, a system that supports MP-TLV can discard 
extraneous TLV copies more efficiently than older systems?  Or is there more to 
it than that?  [I did see that sentence, and without the context of a possible 
DOS via a resource exhaustion attack, I wasn't sure if that was the point.]
[LES:] In the absence of MP-TLV support, when a system receives two TLVs for 
the same object, the results are unpredictable.
The receiver might prefer one over the other and ignore the less preferred one.
It might try to combine the two in unpredictable ways.
It might use both “by accident” simply because when walking the LSPDB it 
encounters a particular TLV type and doesn’t “remember” that it processed a 
previous TLV for that same object.
Many variants are possible.

With MP-TLV support, the implementation has been enhanced to handle multiple 
TLVs for the same object – so there should be a predictable outcome if that 
occurs.

Also, just to clarify the resource exhaustion topic, if an attacker is capable 
of spoofing IGP authentication, it can then send any number of LSPs with any 
variant of content. It could be multiple TLVs for a single object.
It could be many TLVs for different objects. Probably the most dangerous is to 
send incorrectly formatted TLVs, which might expose a bug in the receiver which 
could produce a crash.
None of this is enhanced/altered by introduction of MP-TLVs.

   Les


    Les


>
_______________________________________________
Lsr mailing list -- [email protected]
To unsubscribe send an email to [email protected]

Reply via email to