Quoting CAI Qian ([email protected]):
> Hi,
> 
> 
> --- On Wed, 1/28/09, Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]> wrote:
> 
> > From: Serge E. Hallyn <[email protected]>
> > Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH] proc01: SELinux with attr/* Interface - version 2
> > To: "CAI Qian" <[email protected]>
> > Cc: "Kamalesh Babulal" <[email protected]>, 
> > [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], 
> > [email protected]
> > Date: Wednesday, January 28, 2009, 10:57 PM
> > Quoting CAI Qian ([email protected]):
> > > Kamalesh Babulal, well, my approach is that anyone who
> > cares about 
> > > AppArmor can add a list of files should work to the
> > code. it is fair that if different LSMs behave differently,
> > we'll need different lists
> > > (selinux_should_work and apparmor_should_work) to deal
> > with them.
> > > 
> > > > To make it
> > > > generic can we 
> > > > just skip reading the list of files, if they
> > return EINVAL
> > > > or else we 
> > > > have to support checking of different LSM's
> > and add
> > > > support for each of 
> > > > them individually.
> > > > 
> > > 
> > > Yes, but then you will still need to treat different
> > LSMs differently.
> > > 
> > > >         Agree that the coverage of the testcase is going
> > to be
> > > > reduced. It will be 
> > > > reduced more because the list which we are taking
> > care is
> > > > incomplete, 
> > > 
> > > Which ones are missing -- should return EINVAL with
> > SELinux
> > > disabled? 
> > > 
> > > > we could need to add other files to the list like
> > nfs to be
> > > > skipped. 
> > > > Sending another patch which will ignore the file
> > if it
> > > > returns EINVAL or else 
> > > > throw warning.
> > > 
> > > This patch won't able to catch attr/* entries
> > return
> > > EINVAL while SELinux is enabled. It does not look like
> > a good
> > > approach to me, because it is a test coverage
> > regression.
> > > 
> > > CAI Qian
> > 
> > So, just to try and think through this...  If no LSM is
> > enabled,
> > the files should return -EINVAL.  If they don't return
> > -EINVAL,
> > is that a situation we care about?  What would it mean?
> > 
> 
> Yes, Stephen Smalley from National Security Agency of U.S. told it
> means "security modules (e.g. capability) don't support any of those 
> interfaces", so if another errno is returned, it should be brought up
> to attention.

Obviously the correct behavior depends upon the security subsystem,
but you're finagling the checks into fs-specific checks.

It seems to me that if you're going to check for correct return
values from these functions, you should do so under
testcases/kernel/security.

-serge

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