On 29.12.2011 20:05, Shmuel (Seymour J.) Metz wrote:
> In <[email protected]>, on 12/29/2011
>    at 01:38 PM, Alessandro Vesely <[email protected]> said:
> 
>> * Neither the RFC nor the draft mention degrading the offending IP's
>>  profile at the firewall.
> 
> I assume that you mean RFC 6449 and not RFC 5965.

Yes, RFC 6449 and draft-ietf-marf-as.

For example, I have a script that bans an IP for a year, at the firewall
level.  I call it for intractable spammers.  The script checks the IP, and if
it finds SMTP listening there, it sends an ARF message there, RCPT TO:
<postmaster>, telling them it is about to ban the IP.  It rarely works, but
sometimes sorts a visible effect.

Neither of those methods are mentioned in either the RFC or the draft.

>> * The RFC says replying to feedback is useless. 
> 
> I don't see that, although I do see "not necessary".

Yes, the Third thing in Section 4.3 of the RFC.  For unsolicited feedback,
consider the first ARF messages that an MTA submits to a given consumer.
MTAs should keep a database of consumers that they send feedback to.  New
entries in the database need to be assessed, and a reply in such cases would
be useful.  For example, the feedback generator could add a Reply-To field to
the header of the ARF messages in case it wishes to receive an acknowledge.

>> The obvious correction for an acknowledged policy contravention
>> is to remove the email address of the original recipient from
>> whatever storage it was retrieved from for sending the reported
>> message, including mailing lists. 
> 
> I would say that the obvious for an acknowledged policy contravention
> is to remove all email address that contravene the policy, not just
> the one in the ARF report. Failing to do so could lead to blocking of
> the sending IP or IP block.

Yes, you already said so on 4 Sep, in the last paragraph of
http://www.ietf.org/mail-archive/web/marf/current/msg01289.html
I amended that paragraph in my working copy, by adding the sentence that you
did not quote.  Then I proposed it for the Security Considerations of marf-as.

As there is no non-invasive established method to prove subscriptions (yet) I
don't think it could make much sense to suggest to carry out such kind of
check, e.g. by asking each user to reconfirm subscription.
_______________________________________________
marf mailing list
[email protected]
https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/marf

Reply via email to