On 2/25/2021 1:03 AM, [email protected] wrote:
... what I'm seeing is a sort of displacement where supplements and fertilisation -- if not of manufactured chemical origin -- is harvested from human manures, especially urine. If there is a technological fix worth pursuing, that's it: getting human piss and shit back to the fields. In ancient China there was even a market in the stuff.

Dave, no objection in principle - and some of the most advanced analysis of sewage piping is actually by a marxist geographer, Erik Swyngedouw <https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/erik.swyngedouw.html> (my office-mate 35 years ago during PhD studies), who keeps innovating in urban political ecology. But be wary when it comes to the devils in the details of implementation, especially where our version of semi-peripheral capitalism's peri-urban race, gender, class and geographical power relations amp up uneven and combined development to levels you may not have imagined possible but that are abundantly evident at the scale of the body.

If interested, drawing on my favorite city's foibles, here <https://sci-hub.se/downloads/2020-01-27/4f/[email protected]#view=FitH> is a long analysis of "Tokenistic water and neoliberal sanitation in post-apartheid Durban" published in the /Journal of Contemporary African Studies /last year. Just the crucial section, below, shows how the Gates-style and Gates-funded tech fixes in South Africa's third major city is one of the world's most advanced in imposing neoliberal strategies, with predictable sorry results.

The key 'graf:

   Several silver-bullet technological fixes emerged, including a 2010
   pilot project which paid low-income residents for
   collection/recycling of urine from UDs in view of a coming “peak
   phosphate” problem faced in commercial agriculture ($4/month per
   household). In 2015, some municipal officials proposed converting
   the UDs into low-flush systems with mini-septic tanks. However, in
   2016, a more attractive option for the city emerged within an
   innovative biopolitical strategy: maintaining the UDs without any
   changes, but hiring outsourced workers to empty the waste (‘sludge’)
   from UD sites, for trucking to a large sewage treatment plant in
   South Durban. There, according to designers Nick Alcock /et al/,
   thanks to a $1.3 million Gates Foundation grant, Durban would
   attempt “the breeding of Black Soldier Fly Larvae (BSFL) to process
   the waste.” One Gates-funded academic study in 2014 “found the use
   of BSFL could provide a solution to the health problems associated
   with poor sanitation and inadequate human waste management in
   developing countries… the prepupae produced have a value that could
   provide a source of income for communities or local entrepreneurs”.
   A /Nature /journal reporter was enthusiastic: “The factories
   dehydrate the larvae to make an animal feed or extract a fatty oil,
   which has a range of uses from cosmetics to bio-diesel. The leftover
   organic matter becomes a soil conditioner.”

In reality, it was a failure in every respect, if you want context and further details:

***

(Section excerpt from longer /JCAS /article)

*Urine diversion beyond the ‘Sanitation Edge’*

Starting at the level of the household, Durban's Ethekwini Water and Sanitation (EWS) leader Neil Macleod (2008a, 2) acknowledged that with the city’s expansion in 2001, there were 200,000 families – roughly a third of the population – without basic sanitation. Many lived beyond what was initially termed ‘the sanitation edge’, a vast peripheral band of the municipality in which Macleod deemed it fiscally unrealistic to lay sewage lines (Figure 1). Much of this area was in the vicinity of the Inanda Dam so there was no physical water shortage to be concerned with, only the power and width of water supply piping and the proximity of sewage treatment facilities.

At that stage, in 2008, Durban had 60,000 pit latrine toilets – without a water supply to flush – that had filled up to the point they could no longer be used. The city was unable to fulfill its commitment to a “free basic sanitation service in the form of one pit emptying every five years,” Macleod (2008a, 7) conceded at the 2008 Africa Sanitation conference in Durban. Indeed many pits were unlined; the “toilets [were] subject to catastrophic collapse”; many were “constructed in inaccessible locations”; and there was high variability in content, size and cost of emptying. According to Simphiwe Nojiyeza and Baruti Amisi (2008, 2), Durban then still suffered from “148,688 pit latrines without ventilation as well as 41,880 chemical toilets. Bucket latrines have been reduced to 9270.” VIPs were increasingly filling up but not being emptied not only in Durban but across South Africa.

Yet the world’s richest man, philanthropist Bill Gates (2010), visited these sites and reported on his blog page, “Neal [sic] showed me the VIP toilet – which isn’t as fancy as its name suggests, but is a breakthrough in basic sanitation through the use of simple ventilation methods and other inexpensive construction methods, such as installing a fly screen on the ventilation pipe.” To be sure, The VIP was an improvement over regular pit latrines, dating to its design by Peter Morgan (2013 Stockholm award winner) during the early 1970s in rural Zimbabwe, which allowed odors to escape and also prevented flies from spreading disease. But internal semi-darkness posed a disincentive to use especially for children, and the continual need to empty pits became too expensive. The cost of emptying each pit averaged $120 per pit, compared to “the cost of constructing new single Ventilated Improved Pit-latrine (VIP) type toilets: $140 to $420”, according to Macleod (2008a, 7), making the emptying process “uneconomic.”

As a result, Macleod (2008a, 7) turned to another water-less technology: “double pit, urine diversion (UD) toilets, outside the urban edge.” This in turn permitted further transfer of sanitation maintenance responsibilities away from the state. As Gounden et al (2013) explain, “The UD toilet consisting of two chambers is constructed above or slightly below ground. The pedestal is designed to allow urine to flow to a soak away, while the faecal matter collects in the first chamber… The householder is required to remove the contents, dig a hole and bury the contents on site. The pedestal is moved back to the now empty first chamber”[1] <#_ftn1> (Figure 2).

For the UD technology to prevent contamination of the solid with the liquid requires consistent hygienic education. Contamination is a frequent problem, in a context of high rates of diarrhea (oftentimes associated with AIDS-related opportunistic diseases, since Durban has the world’s highest level of urban HIV+ prevalence), humid weather, hilly slopes, poor drainage and turbulent rain. Nevertheless, according to Macleod (2008a, 8), the 63,000 new UD toilets constructed by 2008 were “able to be emptied by households at an affordable cost” and they used “minimum amounts of water, if at all.” (Indeed the UD is designed to /not /use any flushing mechanism.) Ultimately more than 85,000 UDs were imposed on residents in these areas.

Macleod (2008b) explained, “A piped sewerage system is not economically justifiable in rural areas, where the densities are too low, and in these areas onsite sanitation is the only viable option available.” The capital cost of each UD toilet was an average of $500, but municipal maintenance costs fell away because “emptying is the responsibility of the household, with entrepreneurs already offering their services at $4 per chamber emptied” (Macleod 2008a, 8-9). As Barbara Penner (2010) observed, however, Macleod’s “preference for self-contained sanitation options is also clearly consistent with a more troubling pattern in the world’s water and sanitation community, where costs and maintenance responsibilities are being shifted onto users as a matter of (neoliberal) policy.”

Yet Macleod (2008a, 8-11) claimed that “follow-up visits after construction have increased acceptance levels and emphasised the family’s responsibilities for maintenance of the toilet. The period needed for follow ups extends to years” because of the need to “evaluate acceptance of the solution and to confirm that the hygiene messages have been internalised.” Not only were civil society critics increasingly vocal (Galvin and Nojiyeza 2011), but studies by even Macleod’s allies in 2013, 2014 and 2017 contradicted the claim of consumer acceptance. Yet it was this innovation that had most impressed a /Science /journalist (Koenig 2008, 744) who in 2008 termed UD the “best solution” to Durban’s sanitation challenge. The UD will become “the future of toilet technology” in the Third World, according to a London /Guardian /report (Kaye 2012). Here, endorsements of sanitation neoliberalism – both in Durban and in international water management – overlap, but without reference (in either /Science /or /The Guardian/) to social dissent.

For various reasons, complaints about UDs became increasingly common, including near the Inanda Dam where Durban’s main water reserves are stored. As community organiser Dudu Khumalo remarked about the Umzinyathi and KwaNgcolosi pilot communities, “These communities are repelled by human excrement as fertiliser, because of the many diseases surrounding them, compared to cow-dung. The burden of cleaning is left to women. Other creative opportunities for bio-gas are also foreclosed by UDs” (Bond 2019). Journalists at Durban’s /Daily News /picked up the story in mid-2010: “Local residents who complained are aghast, not only at the unbearable stench, but the thought of digging out their own waste and using it on their vegetable patches” (Adriaan, Ngcobo and Mngoma 2010).

By 2013, a municipal/academic survey of 17,000 recipients of the UD toilet made it evident that the system had failed, and a new strategy would be required (Roma /et al /2013; Coertzen 2014). Fully 99 percent of respondents observed that a flush toilet inside their house would be optimal; many used the flush toilet at work in the city but when back in peri-urban home areas were unhappy about substandard sanitation. Foul smells were the biggest problem, causing 80 percent dissatisfaction. On the one hand, diarrhoea reports suggested a 40 percent improvement, as a result of having access to sanitation, but on the other hand, the fact that widespread diarhhoea made drying excrement difficult especially in the humid summer months wasn’t even surveyed (Coertzen 2014). There were other grievances about the city’s sanitation-on-the-cheap strategy: EWS officials gave the UD recipients inadequate instructions on emptying the excrement, include digging a pit and planting a papaya tree. EWS’ privatisation of the task of emptying the buckets assisted just 10 percent of users (but payment price was not known).

In 2017, Nosipho Mkhize /et al /(2017, 114) conducted another consumer satisfaction survey, and found that “the participants generally did not accept the UD (independent of the condition of the toilet)… More than 95 percent of the participants reported that they do not regard the UD as a permanent asset and they all aspired to have a flush toilet, which is associated with being a first-class citizen.” The dilemma, however, is that water-borne sewage piping is required to link a household to the mains and then to a sewage treatment plant, and by using incrementalist sanitation strategies, such piping could not be built until a critical mass of households reached an income threshold (to afford flushing) and geographic proximity to become “economic,” and until then, on-site disposal was the only option. The discriminatory policy, hence, locks in residential segregation on class and spatial grounds.

Given the ongoing hostility, new EWS strategies were needed. Several silver-bullet technological fixes emerged, including a 2010 pilot project which paid low-income residents for collection/recycling of urine from UDs in view of a coming “peak phosphate” problem faced in commercial agriculture ($4/month per household). In 2015, some municipal officials proposed converting the UDs into low-flush systems with mini-septic tanks. However, in 2016, a more attractive option for the city emerged within an innovative biopolitical strategy: maintaining the UDs without any changes, but hiring outsourced workers to empty the waste (‘sludge’) from UD sites, for trucking to a large sewage treatment plant in South Durban (Ismail 2018). There, according to designers Nick Alcock /et al/ (2016, 5), thanks to a $1.3 million Gates Foundation grant, Durban would attempt “the breeding of Black Soldier Fly Larvae (BSFL) to process the waste.” One Gates-funded academic study in 2014 “found the use of BSFL could provide a solution to the health problems associated with poor sanitation and inadequate human waste management in developing countries… the prepupae produced have a value that could provide a source of income for communities or local entrepreneurs” (Banks et al 2014, 14, 20). A /Nature /journal reporter (Wald 2017: 148) was enthusiastic: “The factories dehydrate the larvae to make an animal feed or extract a fatty oil, which has a range of uses from cosmetics to bio-diesel. The leftover organic matter becomes a soil conditioner.”

The main point of the latter project, according to Alcock /et al /(2016, 3), was “to explore opportunities for the management of UD toilet products and testing various systems for removal and beneficial use using incentivised contracts with private organisations or individuals to ensure a safe, efficient, quality service.” The UK-based firm AgriProtein was the main beneficiary (Bond 2019). But such incentivised “beneficial use” was easier said than done. The faecal sludge’s dangerous pathogens – including salmonella – proved resistant to destruction during heat processing, especially when urine-derived struvite (magnesium ammonium phosphate) was present due to the unexpected mixture of solids and liquids. By mid-2019, UKZN researchers and theWater Research Commission’s Sudhir Pillay admitted to peers at an international water conference, “A key research need identified for the continued beneficiation of waste was the microbial risks associated with struvite production from urine” because “cross contamination of urine may be occurring through incorrect UD usage with faeces entering the urine collection receptacle. It is recommended that municipality re-start their community education programme on the use of UDs” (Vivian /et al /2019, 148).

But even worse problems were reported at theBill and Melinda Gates Foundationin December 2019, in the main larvae advocates’ own critical self-assessment of the Isipingo-based solution. According to Maximillian Grau and Alcock (2019, 2-6): “the initial process flow for the BSFL processing plant did not achieve the desired results in terms of reaching viability” because nearly everything that could go wrong, apparently did go wrong:

·The UD faecal sludge contained more solid waste (detritus) and other inorganics such as rubble and sand than expected (up to 40 percent). Separating the organic content from the detritus was undertaken by hand, was labour intensive and substantially increased health and safety risks

·The use of an unsophisticated air-conditioner and basic humidifier in the nursery were not sufficient to maintain a stable climate to achieve acceptable growth in the nursery

·The low temperatures and humidity levels in the growout sheds in winter and at night (below 20 degrees Celsius and 60 percent humidity) without any climate control system prevented satisfactory growth of larvae and bioconversion of the substrate (sludge mix)

·The wet separation system was not effective as almost all of the residue and some larvae settled in the agitation bin and thus did not reach the screening system

·Theoil press which was designed to crush the larvae to make oil was not effective

·The rotary kiln did operate for several months but ultimately failed due mainly to the moisture content of the residue being too high on entry to the kiln

On the positive side, the neoliberal loo was, at least, subject to continual adjustments and to partial auto-critiques after its repeated failures. But such research – in contrast to the funding of standardwater systems – only meant that the struggle by neoliberal municipal officials would continue to be waged against Durban’s rebellious black bodies.


------------------------------------------------------------------------

[1] <#_ftnref1>. There is a substantial difference between the UD device chosen in Durban (without water and with maintenance/cleaning responsibility completely devolved to the household) and UN Habitat’s recommended low-cost sanitation system. The latter has various advantages over the UD system, and has witnessed more than a million installations in India: “The twin-pit system uses 1.5-2 litres of water per use in a flush toilet that is connected to two pits that allows recharging of the soil and composting, and a close-loop public toilet system attached to a bio-gas digester” (Reddy 2007).




-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-
Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group.
View/Reply Online (#6706): https://groups.io/g/marxmail/message/6706
Mute This Topic: https://groups.io/mt/80894234/21656
-=-=-
POSTING RULES &amp; NOTES
#1 YOU MUST clip all extraneous text when replying to a message.
#2 This mail-list, like most, is publicly &amp; permanently archived.
#3 Subscribe and post under an alias if #2 is a concern.
-=-=-
Group Owner: [email protected]
Unsubscribe: https://groups.io/g/marxmail/leave/8674936/21656/1316126222/xyzzy 
[[email protected]]
-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-


Reply via email to