Well, Hari may well call himself a "Stalinist", but whatever the case, he is one of the few who clearly understands Syria. Shockingly, there were a number of 'Trotskyist' groups that ended up in the tankie/campist mould essentially backing Assad, such as the grotesque 'Socialist Action' sect in the US, so though most Trots were better than most Stalinists on this, there was nothing like a neat division.
I will just add to Hari's excellent response. Hari sees the mass base of the Baath Party as analogous to the mass base of traditional fascist parties, though he rightly sees this as a later development, whereas the early Baath was more fluid and could have gone in different directions. Definitely by the time we get to the Assad regime, the corporatist-totalitarian model did have a strong resemblance to consolidated fascist rule. But I took Marvin's question to mean the traditional rise of fascism, at least how we have understood it from Trotsky's classic analysis, that is, that it begins with a violent 'plebeian' mass movement in the streets which wages armed attacks against the workers movement and the left (or minorities or other targets etc), and only later the corporatist-totalitarian party-state consolidated itself having crushed the workers movement already, sometimes then to violently shed its own no-longer-needed plebeian movement, as in the night of the long knives. In contrast, the Baathist party-regimes, mass-base and all, came to power from the top in classic military coups. Of course, we could argue whether Trotsky's definition of fascism is the only 'real one' or whether it is too narrow etc. The interesting thing to me though is that in the case of Syria, the process was arguably reversed. When the Baathists seized power, there was no powerful workers' movement to crush; they were modernist coups against the traditional elites, but certainly also against any nascent working class, which however was in its infancy. However, the Syrian uprising beginning in 2011 was working-class, small-peasant and above all urban-poor based. From the start, alongside massive state violence against the people, including destruction of entire cities by the airforce and missiles and a torture gulag on an almost unprecedented scale, the regime organised a large-scale movement of sectarian death-squads, known as 'Shabiha', who first began as snipers who shot into the protests in 2011 and carried out other forms of repression, including capture, torture and killing, but then in 2012 turned to carrying out countless large-scale, sadistic, sectarian-driven massacres in Sunni town and neighbourhoods across Syria, deliberately aimed at sectarianising the conflict. What were the Shabiha? Recruited mostly from poor sectors of the Alawi population on a sectarian but also loyalty to the Assad-family basis, especially among those connected to organised crime, they actually existed since the 1970s, but were mostly just gangs, and were kept on a tight leash by the regime. I would argue that once they were unleashed en masse to help crush the revolution, they were the equivalent of a genuine fascist violent mass-based street movement. Ironically, it took place chronologically backwards compared to classical fascism. Some resources on Shabiha: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/31/ghosts-syria-regime-shabiha-militias https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2023/07/08/syria-ngo-brings-proof-the-shabiha-were-killers-in-the-pockets-of-the-assad-regime_6046765_4.html https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session21/A-HRC-21-50_en.pdf On Thu, Oct 31, 2024 at 9:13 PM hari kumar via groups.io <hari6.kumar= [email protected]> wrote: > Good am Mark: This supersedes an earlier strand (From message # hari > kumar Oct 30 #33239 - and your query to me about this at # Mark Baugher > Oct 30 #33242 ) where this discussion started up. > > 1. *I agree a mass party type involvement is central to sensible > definitions on fascism. * > Did this/does this exist in Syria? I would reply 'yes'. It was/is the > Ba'th Party. > I first refer to a piece here that was referenced in the prior work I sent > responding to Duane's false equation involving a dubious phrase "*all > Stalinists*" and what they all do. In that context Duane was alleging > that :all Stalinists" support Assad. So in that particular iteration, it > dates from May 2018. It is entitled: *"The Class Character of Syria - > From an Oriental Despotic State to Neo-Colony to Fascist Dictatorship to > Civil War; Part 1 web-uploaded November 2020*"; and can be found at: > > https://mlcurrents.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/class-character-syria-assad.pdf > > 2. There I make these following claims. > First that: > "During the neo-colonial period, Syria saw the rise of a Pan-Arab > Nationalism, in the form of the Ba’ath Party, founded in 1947. > Subsequently, the Ba’ath did not develop in an un-interrupted growth of a > single party. In fact, the Ba’ath served as a flexible scaffold, around > which three successive groupings created their own party base. This process > unfolded from 1947 up to the year Hafiz Assad took sole power, in 1970, and > extended till 2000. In 2000 it entered a new, fourth phase under Bashar > al-Assad." > > 3. As things unfolded the fourth phase was this, in my view: > "When Hafiz Assad turned on his coalition, and took sole power in 1970, a > new phase began. In this the B’ath was transformed into the mass ‘people’s’ > façade - of the fascist state of Hafiz Assad. This can be described early > on as a Bonapartist military dictatorship under Hafiz Assad. But the > character of the state became increasingly an open fascist state. Assad had > created a corporate state, using the mass base of the Ba’ath Party. Under > the Land Reforms, Ba’ath Party increased the land-mass of the rich > peasantry, and enabled the high landlords to transform themselves into a > capitalist class. This was the consolidation of a nascent weak national > bourgeoisie." > > 4. As we go further to use an apparently now *forbidden word* (I will not > take that particular battle for a new 'Directory" of allowed and disallowed > words on at this time) - the neo-liberalism era raised its 'needs': > > "By the start of the 21st century, Syria had plunged into a globalized > neo-liberalism. The corporate state under Hafiz Assad, with its pro-peasant > policies, did raise living standards to some extent. But now the living > standards of the people again plummeted. Small surprise that the eruptions > of the so-called “Arab Spring” resonated in Syria. The spark of the Syrian > Resistance, or Uprising rapidly ignited the Syrian masses. A brutal > suppression inevitably led to a Civil War. But in the Middle East, no > peoples are allowed to play out class battles without the intercession of > foreign powers. This is what duly ensued." > > The piece draws as its main sources (amongst several others including > Comintern era documents often as cited by the superb *Jane Degras*) from: > *Van Dam Nicholas: "The Struggle for power in Syria. Politics & Society > Under Assad & the Ba’ath party"; London 1997;* > *Seale, Patrick: "Assad - The Struggle for the Middle East"; London; > 1988; * > and the incomparable* Batatu, Hanna: “Syria’s peasantry, the Descendants > of its lesser Rural Notables and Their Politics”; 1999; Princeton.* > > Along the way it also depicts the early revisionism of the CPs in the era > of Khalid Bhakdash: > "Khalid Bakdash became the party Secretary-general in early 1932. The > Comintern rejected the formation of a federation of Arab communist parties, > on the grounds of security. However the CPCL was accorded in effect the > guardianship of the region. Under Bakdash, the Party adopted several > incorrect, or openly revisionist steps over the ensuing years. Moreover > over the next years his leadership was marked by major swings in policy, > and a general refusal of principled debate or criticism. > In fact it never went beyond the demands of nationalism: > “the party never went beyond the rightist positions of support for the > national bourgeoisie, as is borne out by a programe which speaks only of > independence and social justice, without daring to propose an agrarian > reform. For fear of alienating the bourgeoisie”. > (*Amin, Samir: “The Arab Nation. Nationalism and class struggles”; > London; 1983; p.46)."* > > It was indeed - in my view - the revisionism of that era that led to the > awfulness and unspeakable regimes of the Assads. > > Be Well, Mark. > > > > -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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