Marv: While we await to hear of what happened today in Minneapolis - a now far more important matter - I come back to your actual query. It was not clear to me before your recent clarification as below. You have now made it clearer to me. You re-phrased it as this:
Marv: "My question to you was whether you would have supported Stalin’s Popular Front policy from 1934-45. It was in response to your statement “as M&E always said - be open about your independence. Meaning - your communism”. I interpreted it to be more in line with the discredited Third Period policy abandoned by the Comintern in 1934. I suggested that the turn away from the Third Period policy was a recognition that rather than being independent and open about their communism, "CP militants necessarily had to be more circumspect about their affiliation to avoid state repression and political estrangement from the the mass of activists seeking reform rather than revolution in the unions and other social movements.” My mention of Trotsky was in reference to his sharp criticism of the Popular Front. He and his supporters considered that the interwar period was still revolutionary and that the Popular Front was a capitulation to the “progressive” liberal and social democratic bourgeoisie. Hence, my question to you of whether you would at the time have echoed Trotsky's criticisms of Stalin." My reply is as follows: i) I am not sure if I would say this was "Stalin's policy". That may not become clear for a bit until more definitive data is through. I have held that the CI was not under control of Stalin at some point after 1925 or so. ii) Would I have supported the Popular Front policy? My response is no - not as it was played out with in effect "no independence" of the CP. Bland has previously written of this. For example on the application in France: "After the Nazi seizure of power, Ernst Thaelmann*, the leader of the German Communist Party, had been arrested by the Nazis, and in May 1934: ". . . the Comintern sent a message to the French Communist Party, asking it to wage a campaign to save Thaelmann. . . . The Comintern also asked the French Communist Party to appeal directly to the Socialists, which it did. The Socialist leadership accepted on June 5, and a meeting between the delegates of the two parties took place on June 11. The Socialist Party delegates expressed their willingness to undertake a joint campaign, under the sole condition that the Communist Party call a halt to its attacks against the Socialist leaders. The Communist delegates declined this condition, and the negotiations were broken off. . . . The Communists' desisting from attacking the Socialist leaders was a conditio sine qua non (essential condition -- Ed.)". (Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 247-48). The revisionist leaders of the Comintern, however, Socialists' 'essential condition' should be met: "Manuilsky* . . . remarked that the Communist Party leadership must not be given time to 'make a mess of things again't Vassart suggested to him that a counter-proposal be drafted which not only would accept the idea of 'non-aggression', but would go even further". (Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 248). Accordingly, Vassart drafted a letter to be sent by the French Communist Party to the French Socialist Party. The main point of the draft was that the Communist and Socialist Parties would organise: " . . . common action against fascism". (Albert Vassart: Draft of Proposal to Socialist Party, in: Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 250). but it included the pledge of mutual abstention from criticism: "During this period of common action, the two parties shall abstain from reciprocal attacks, insults and criticsm against the organisations and party militants loyally participating in the action". (Ce1ie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 250-51). Vassart's text: ". . was approved at once by the Secretariat of the Comintern and was cabled to the French Communist Party for submission to the Socialists". (Ce1ie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 251). In these circumstances: " . . . Thorez brought about the shift in the party line at the national conference of the Communist Party in Ivry, June 23-26". (Celie & Albert Vassart: op. cit.; p. 251). "The change in FCP policy only came in June (1934 -- Ed. at the Party's national conference at Ivry. Fresh from a visit to Moscow and with a telegram of instructions recently arrived from the Comintern, Maurice Thorez, the party leader, used his closing speech to start the delicate process of reversing policy by calling for unity of action with socialist workers to be achieved 'at any price"'. (David A. L. Levy: 'The French Popular Front: 1936-37', in: Helen Graham & Paul Preston (Eds.): 'The Popular Front in Europe'; Basingstoke; 1987; p. 61).... ... In his closing speech to the Conference of the French Communist Party on 26 June 1934, Thorez assured the Socialists that his party stood for united action against fascism 'at all costs' and, in the event of agreement being reached on such united action, would refrain from all criticism of the Socialist Party: "We want at all costs to realise unity of action with the socialist workers against fascism. . . . The united front is not a manoeuvre. . . We have said and we repeat: We, the Communist Party, are ready to renounce, during the common action, criticism of the Socialist Party. . . In the whole of our press, there will not be the least attack on the organisations and leaders of the Socialist Party, ... At all costs, we want unity of action.At all costs, we want unity of action". (Maurice Thorez: 'United Front to Defeat Fascism', Closing Speech at National Conference of FCP (26 June 1934), in: 'Oeuvres' (Works), Volume 2, Book 6; Paris; 1951; p. 179, 183, 186).... It follows that a Popular Front government can exist in a country where the capitalist class holds political power only if the participating Communist Party serves the interests, not of the working class, but of the capitalist class, that is, if it has surrendered to opportunism, defined as: " . . . adapting the Labour Movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie". (L. Harry Gould: 'Marxist Glossary'; San Francisco; 1946; p. 60)... ... In giving priority to the organisational maintenance of the Popular Front over the principles on which the Front had been created, the French Communist Party had clearly sunk into opportunism. But this opportunism was, in fact, tacitly sanctioned by the Comintern, for the resolution of the 7th World Congress had instructed Communist Parties that if the principles on which the united front or Popular Front had been formed were broken, they should not declare the front at an end, but should: 1) "appeal to the masses'; 2) 'continue to struggle for the restoration of the disrupted unity': "The Communists, if the agreement is broken, must immediately appeal to the masses while continuing their tireless struggle for the restoration of the disrupted unity of action". (Communist International: Resolution on 'The Offensive of Fascism and the Tasks of the Communist International in the Fight for the United Front against Fascism', in: 'Full Text of the Resolutions adopted at the 7th Congress'; London; 1936; p. 18). Following these instructions, the revisionist-led French Communust Party continued loyally to support the Popular Front long after it had ceased to resist fascism or defend the interests of working class. Indeed, the more openly reactionary partners in the Popular Front did not hesitate to make use of the Party's fidelity to the maintenance of the unity of the Popular Front slogan, and of the prestige of the Communist Party among the working class, to serve their interests." For the full context see from where this is extracted: See : COMPASS; Journal of Communist League; April 1994; N.112; THE "POPULAR FRONT' IN FRANCE. Re-publication at: https://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/PopularFrontFranceSpain_Final.htm (iii) That this had dire consequences is something Bland out forward, and that I believe is correct. That includes for sure in France - but also for the revolutionaries and peoples of Spain: " In July 1936 Spanish fascist generals, headed by Francisco Franco*, launched an armed rebellion against the Popular Front government which had been elected in Spain in February. The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War proved a critical test for the French Popular Front: "The Spanish crisis tested it (the Popular Front -- Ed.) at its ideological weak point -- on the issue of anti-fascism". (David A. L. Levy: op. cit,.; p. 72). The Spanish Popular Front government, which regarded the Popular Front government in France as its 'sister', immediately applied to the French government for the sale of arms for its defence: "On July 26 the Frente Popular appealed confidently to the Front Populaire for supplies of arms". (Richard L. Stokes: op. cit.; p. 258-59). "The case for supporting the Spanish Government seemed overwhelming. Not only was the Spanish Government ideologically the friend of the French Popular Front Government, but . . . it was the friend of France". (Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 375j. However, the Blum government refused: "Blum refused to help". (Maxwell Adereth: op. cit.; p. 79). "The French Government . . . would deliberately not permit the Spanish Government to buy arms, although the Spanish Government had the money to pay for them, had the means of importing them and, by all international precedent, had every right to buy them". (Denis W. Brogan: op. cit.; p. 714). This was not because the mass of the French working people were reluctant to assist the Spanish government: "Feeling ran high among the French working class not only against Italy and Germany, but also against the Blum Government, which had 'taken sanctions against the legal government of Spain"'. (Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 381). "Many of his (Blum's -- Ed.) working-class supporters interpreted moderation as akin to betrayal and their willingness to support the government declined accordingly". (David A. L. Levy: op. cit.; p. 75). The refusal of the French government to sell arms to Spain was all the more unprincipled because treaty obligations prohibited the Spanish government from buying arms from any other country but France: "In 1935, the Spanish government had signed a trade agreement with France. One of the clauses stipulated that in case of need the Spanish government could not purchase arms from any country other than France. With this agreement in its hand, the Republican government appealed to the French for the arms and equipment needed to protect the nation from aggression. The French government flatly refused to sell (not to give, loan or aid, but to sell!)". (Dolores Ibarruri: 'They shall not pass: The Autobiography of "La Pasionaria"'; London; 1966; p. 201-02). In fact, Blum's decision was dictated by the threats of the British government that if France became involved in war as a result of supplying arms to Spain, Britain would regard her obligations to give military assistance to France under the Locarno Treaty of 1925 as no longer valid: "At the beginning of August (1936 -- Ed.), M. L6on Blum was informed that the guarantee given by Great Britain to maintain the frontiers of France would not remain valid in the event of independent French action beyond the Pyrenees". (Andre Geraud ('Pertinax'): Preface to: Eleuthere N. Dzelepy: 'The Spanish Plot'; London; 1937; p. viii). "This British warning . . . was conveyed to M. Yvon Delbos*, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the course of a visit by Sir George Clerk*, British Ambassador in Paris. Sir George is understood to have said that if France should find herself in conflict with Germany as a result of having sold war material to the Spanish government, England would consider herself released from her obligations under the Locarno Pact and would not come to help". (Julio Alvarez del Vayo: 'Freedom's Battle'; London; 1940; p. 69-70). In short, the Popular Front government betrayed the anti-fascist basis on which it was elected, to become an appendage of the pro-fascist British Conservative government: "The policy of the Blum Government may be summed up in a few words: caution, and rapprochement with England". (Alexander Werth: op. cit.; p. 370)." >From Ibid reference above. For more on the ultimate betrayal of the Spanish people - at least from this lens of the role of the 'Popular Front' and its government in France -> "COMPASS"; COMMUNIST LEAGUE: April 1996, No.123: THE SOVIET UNION AND THE SPANISH CIVIL WAR "; re-published at Alliance ML ca.2000 -> https://ml-review.ca/aml/CommunistLeague/Compass123-Spain1996.htm I hope I have now answered your query to me. Whether you can accept or not, the interpretation of mine is another matter of course. Be well, HK -=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=-=- Groups.io Links: You receive all messages sent to this group. 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