Steven,

Thanks for raising these points and for the compliment. Both objections are 
important, and I actually think they strengthen the argument. I'll address them 
one at a time.

On recall, the main point is that there’s no legal recall for federal office, 
and if there were, the right would use it to target every elected socialist 
throughout their term. But the checklist never relied on a constitutional rule, 
and neither did the classic approach. Most parliamentary systems where the 
Comintern operated didn’t have legal recall either. Instead, recall was handled 
internally. The party could expel a deputy, pull its endorsement, withdraw 
support, and run someone else at the next chance. What mattered wasn’t the law, 
but the deputy’s dependence on the party—its press, resources, funding, and 
base.

So for DSA, the real issue isn’t whether Congress allows recall but whether the 
representative still relies on the organization to secure reelection. The Avila 
Chevalier case already hints at this dynamic. If an organization can help 
someone win a seat, it can also take it away—unless the representative finds 
another group to back her. That’s how drift happens in the American system, and 
it happens fast, often within one term, because incumbents quickly build their 
own donor lists and staff and press contacts and get support from the 
Democratic caucus. Soon, the endorsement that got them elected becomes 
something they can afford to lose.

In practice, recall means getting commitments from candidates when the 
organization has the most leverage—before the primary, not after they take 
office. This could mean wage agreements, staffing the office through the 
organization instead of hiring from the usual political pool, and having a real 
socialists-in-office group with authority over votes. NYC-DSA technically has 
these commitments, so its record is worth looking at honestly. There should 
also be a clear, public understanding that endorsements are conditional and can 
be revoked. None of this needs a change in the law. It just means the 
organization should keep its leverage rather than use it all to win. Your point 
about the right using legal recall actually supports this argument: the 
alternative has to be internal, because a state-level recall would be used 
against us.

About Sweden and the New Deal, I don’t think the argument makes those 
achievements seem impossible. The point isn’t that reformism never delivers. 
Luxembourg actually starts by saying reforms are real, possible, and 
essential—they’re the daily training ground for the class. The prediction is 
more specific: first, what reformist officials achieve depends on the class’s 
own organized power, not just the officials’ intentions. Second, when it comes 
to challenging property, the leadership will defend the status quo. Both your 
examples show this dynamic, and Sweden’s case makes it especially clear.

Swedish social democracy succeeded for decades because of strong external 
pressure: union density was nearly 90%, bargaining was centralized, and the 
labor movement was larger and older than the parliamentary party. SAP officials 
were kept in check by this external force, as the essay describes. In this 
case, it was LO, not a revolutionary group. You already pointed out the key 
test: the Meidner wage-earner funds were a classic transitional demand, meant 
to shift capital ownership gradually to workers [1]. What happened? The party 
leadership watered it down, delayed it, buried it in committees, and then led 
the neoliberal shift in the 1980s and 1990s [2]. LO pushed for change, but the 
leadership stopped it. This situation isn’t an exception to the framework—it’s 
precisely what the framework predicts.

The New Deal aligns with this pattern when you consider the aspects of the 
congressional anti-monopoly narrative that Stoller often downplays: In 1934, 
three general or near-general strikes occurred in Toledo, Minneapolis, and San 
Francisco, each led by organized radicals. The New Deal follows the same 
pattern if you look at what’s often left out: in 1934, major strikes in Toledo, 
Minneapolis, and San Francisco were led by organized radicals, followed by the 
CIO’s rise. Laws like Wagner, Social Security, and the FLSA were won because 
the working class was active, and it was cheaper for capital to make 
concessions than to fight. Laissez-faire was out, and the coming war economy 
needed labor peace. When that pressure faded, the reforms also diminished, 
including Taft-Hartley in 1947, the long rollback, and PATCO. The officials 
didn’t change between 1935 and 1947; what changed was the balance of power. The 
available evidence supports the thesis rather than contradicts it.

Our situation is different, and that’s the challenging part. DSA members take 
office without the things that made midcentury reformism possible. There’s no 
big union presence to apply outside pressure and no economic growth, making it 
easy for capital to yield ground. The pull of the institution on 
representatives is as strong as ever, but there’s less to offer in return. 
That’s why building our own organizational counter-form is even more important 
now than it was in Stockholm in 1955. The Swedes could rely on LO to help keep 
discipline. We don’t have that. We have to create our own counter-form, or the 
institution will shape us instead.

Tony

[1] Rudolf Meidner, Employee Investment Funds: An Approach to Collective 
Capital Formation (London: Allen and Unwin, 1978).

[2] On the dilution and defeat of the funds, see Jonas Pontusson, The Limits of 
Social Democracy: Investment Politics in Sweden (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1992); and Mark Blyth, Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and 
Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), chap. 7.

--
Tony


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