My understanding is that Husserl was the one who first identified the significance of quale philosophically in his book Ideas. I think it is where the notion of phenomenology was invented in western culture although the ancient Hindu literature is light years ahead of anything like it and so perhaps my use of the word "inventing" is ridiculous and my qualification "in Western culture" critical.
My understanding was he was a mathemetician trying to provide a precise intellectual foundation to psychology and ran into philosophy. His phenomenological "epoke" or "bracketing" which is part of his "phenomenological reductions" are a process where one "sets aside" consideration about what one is seeing - questions that interpret it in terms of objects present - in order to see that there is something left - some phenomenological residue - that is pure experience. He analyzes this with respect to meaning and realizes that even meaning itself is phenomenological. Heiddeger then used Husserl's technique to investigate the meaning of Being using phenomenological technique in his book "Being and Time" and largely uncovered the flaw that had trapped Western philosophy since Greece. Sartre then looked at the meaning of Being in relationship to the meaning of Nothingess. His book "Being and Nothingness" is based on the idea that Being is transphenomenal and that the "phenomenon of being" cannot be reduced to "the being of the phenomenon". I believe this is where he made his critical error. On that error his entire philosophy is based. It is amazing how rich the tradition is and how unaware contemporary philosophy seems to be of the work that has already been done. I would bet that that is just my ignorance speaking but I have been unable to find a good critique of their work that makes progress. It seems like there is just a giant lack of awareness that the problem was already addressed and to a large part "solved" once phenomenology, the idea of it, was invented. Progress still needs to be made. To skip to the end, the notion of quale applies to meaning as well as sensory experience. And when that notion is applied to ontology then the distinction between quale and reality disappears and the basis for science, why in fact it is true because it is based in experiment is revealed. It is not accidental that the root of the word experience is the same as experiment.This collapse is at the foundation of the esoteric content of religious tradition also - (not the fundamentalist "exoteric" form of religion which is solidly "objective" and believes that the phrase "the garden of eden" refers in fact to a garden like one might have in ones back yard). It also is the "solution" of the mind-body problem and can influence ethical discussions regarding what it is that needs "protection" in life. Discussions on quale by contemporary philosophers seem to lack an awareness of how primative the notion of something being "really there" as "opposed" to being "merely experienced" when it is applied to the idea of quale really is. On Nov 25, 10:19 am, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > These philosophical issues are deeply misunderstood, not least by > practitioners of them. When we unpick rationalities we usually > discover them to be less rational than we had hoped or thought. This > is an unlikely place for 'answers' as you rightly point out Orn. On > the notion of even 'smelling' differently from someone else (not as a > result of body odour) DJ, the point is merely that this could be the > case in argument such as that around qualia. On Levine, one can > easily point to recent attempts to create life at Harvard in which > fatty-acids form 'cell-membranes' on contact with water - there is a > complex chemo-mathematical explanation of this, yet it falls short of > all kinds of other questions we can raise. Science does tend to > support that perception depends on the receiver, that it is > 'computational'. Other thought experiments include how a Martian with > no notion of empathy and so on could understand a memorial service. > > My eventual view is that we are broadly incapable of rational action > because we can't recognise the extent to which we are driven and > individuated - in short are kept several shillings short of the full > quid by basic issues in competition rather than solidarity. There is > a paradox - I loathe individualism yet yearn to be free as one. I > would restrict life in terms of population control, in order that life > could be worthwhile. I believe we could establish an acceptable > rationality by taking account of big and brutal facts, but in the end > people have to grok this. I wonder what the average person > experiences of revealing self in company? > > On 25 Nov, 09:57, ornamentalmind <[email protected]> wrote: > > > At the risk of appearing extremely naïve and ignorant, I question what > > I can only guess is the prevailing view of the ‘hard problem of > > consciousness’. As I dog paddle, no, merely wade in the shallows of > > the ocean of western qualia, ….I stumble across Joseph Levine: “…our > > knowledge of chemistry and physics makes intelligible how it is that > > something like the motion of molecules could play the causal role we > > associate with heat…. Once we understand how this causal role is > > carried out there is nothing more we need to understand.” (Levine > > 1983) To this I reply balderdash! > > > A quick look at Popper finds his formula: > > PS1-->TT1-->EE1-->PS2 > > > Here he assumes that PS2 in fact is ‘more applicable’ than PS1 > > apparently by fiat. Further, even his own notion (requirement?) of > > falsifiability does not seem to apply! At least he does soften the > > more fanatical views of materialists. > > > I may just have to learn something here. So far, it is all too easy to > > just throw raspberries. Perhaps in time, it will not be a painful, > > however, for now, I still need water wings. As a not too small aside, > > I am quite happy that I’ve explored much of this territory without > > drinking the Kook-Aid of previous dogmatic views. > > > More from the stoned philosopher….errrr, philosopher’s stone > > anon! ....after I purchase a snorkel... [yawn] > > > On Nov 24, 11:57 pm, ornamentalmind <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > It is great to read these issues from you Neil! All too often, your > > > (appropriate) skepticism reduces most to an absurd and quickly > > > rejected state. Here, with just the few sketches by you of areas of > > > western philosophy, I have been given a taste of and arrows to new > > > (for me) areas of study even though the term is not new. It merely is > > > not a part of my vocabulary yet. Upon a quick perusal of things > > > qualia, almost immediately I shut down knowing from the first few > > > words that it is an area where no one seems to know anything no matter > > > how complex, simple or even simplex the presentation! I will say this… > > > most texts by the classic Buddhist philosophers start at knowledge > > > points that are leaps and bounds above what little I have read in this > > > western arena so far. > > > > Your binary (black/white) thought experiment reminds me of one of the > > > spiritually based tribes hidden deep in the forests of South America. > > > Ignoring the obvious sexism, they place their baby boys in a cave > > > where they are tended for in almost total darkness for the first hand > > > full of years of their lives. Then, in a ritual of coming of age, they > > > are led outside blindfolded and at the proper point the blindfold is > > > removed. It is reported this is a transformative and pivotal point of > > > their lives. I have no doubt at all of this. What a marvelous > > > awakening ….seeing sunlight for the first time ever, trees, mountains, > > > the sky etc. In a way, this seems a preferable ritual for humanity in > > > general to me. > > > > One of the issues found within explanations of things qualia include a > > > non agreement of definitions of terms used. (Something all too often > > > seen on the web.) For me, long ago such things were simplexly (?) > > > clarified for me by using the Buddhist term ‘appearances’. This simple > > > linguistic tool easily applies to everything one thinks about (words/ > > > concepts) as well as all that is ‘known’ through the senses. Starting > > > out with a tenet of this order is helpful for me on many fronts. > > > First, one doesn’t have to debate about the ‘right’ meaning of a term > > > nor even what different things actually are. They ALL are of the same > > > nature…subjective/relative. They all rely upon something for their > > > ‘existence’. This of course begs the question of what else is there > > > and as you know I present the absolute, that with no components, that > > > which relies upon nothing else for its existence. Of course, this > > > latter is difficult for strict materialists to swallow. Yet, in my > > > experience and apparently that of most qualophiles, such ineffable and > > > metaphysical realities are not doubted even though they may not be > > > clearly defined or even well understood. And, of course as is the case > > > for any dialectic, the qualophobes simply reject such phenomena. This > > > act, like most current day neo-con views perplexes me greatly. > > > > Again, with the cosmology of mind-only, even though there may appear > > > to be the different sets of relative and the absolute, seen through a > > > large objective ‘eye’, all such appearances of differences quickly > > > become reunified. > > > > Enough waxing and Ivory Soap Boxing. > > > > Thanks again…my synapses thank you too! > > > > On Nov 24, 9:59 pm, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > I found much to agree with in your last long post Orn. Introspection > > > > is a key element in science, not least in deciding what we should be > > > > treating as 'real'. Einstein pondering on light is a classic. I > > > > think there is a place for the 'electrodes' and the biochemistry of > > > > the senses, but you are still right in terms of deep philosophy. This > > > > from Stanford gives enough to show some of the points: > > > > > 'Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers > > > > over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to > > > > see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I > > > > am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective > > > > character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, > > > > some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term > > > > ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively > > > > accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this standard, > > > > broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are > > > > qualia. Disagreement typically centers on which mental states have > > > > qualia, whether qualia are intrinsic qualities of their bearers, and > > > > how qualia relate to the physical world both inside and outside the > > > > head. The status of qualia is hotly debated in philosophy largely > > > > because it is central to a proper understanding of the nature of > > > > consciousness. Qualia are at the very heart of the mind-body problem. > > > > > The entry that follows is divided into eight sections. The first > > > > distinguishes various uses of the term ‘qualia’. The second addresses > > > > the question of which mental states have qualia. The third section > > > > brings out some of the main arguments for the view that qualia are > > > > irreducible and non-physical. The remaining sections focus on > > > > functionalism and qualia, the explanatory gap, qualia and > > > > introspection, representational theories of qualia, and finally the > > > > issue of qualia and simple minds. > > > > > 1. Other Uses of the Term ‘Qualia’ > > > > 2. Which Mental States Possess Qualia? > > > > 3. Are Qualia Irreducible, Non-Physical Entities? > > > > 4. Functionalism and Qualia > > > > 5. Qualia and the Explanatory Gap > > > > 6. Qualia and Introspection > > > > 7. Representational Theories of Qualia > > > > 8. Which Creatures Undergo States with Qualia?' > > > > > Typical experiments include someone theorising about the world whilst > > > > in a black and white room watching black and white television and then > > > > being let out into the world of colour (thought experiment). This is > > > > held to give physicalism a very hard time. There is a new discussion > > > > of this at Stanford this month. > > > > > I tend towards simpler notions. Popper's 'World 3' is something we > > > > lament about, even if we don't mention it directly. This is a world > > > > of human fabrication, made rather than given. It differs from the > > > > common sense world (World 2) in that it thrives and prospers on > > > > unsettling new facts rather than looking for evidence that will > > > > confirm partialities. We often lament that media hype, politics and > > > > the rest attempt to direct us to accept them as World 3. Much > > > > research is > > ... > > read more » -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups ""Minds Eye"" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected]. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected]. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/minds-eye?hl=en.
