Lets assume (in strategic logic) that all decisions are goal directed, and purposive. When we make (or think we make) a decision, are we fully minded of our strategic goals, and do we conduct a comprehensive purposive review of our options and variables, to arrive at an optimal outcome with the best probability of advancing our strategic goals? One could argue that this is not free will in action, since the strategic goal itself is subject to "organic" constraints; the other would have to concede, but could argue that the "decision process" was as freely made within overall system constraints as is possible to do.
On Aug 6, 3:00 pm, Vam <[email protected]> wrote: > "... but is your decision freely made ?" > > What is meant by " freely " made ? > > Do you mean ' without being under the influence of gravity ' ? > > There will always be a dynamics in our background, and some in the > foreground. So ? > > On Aug 6, 4:24 am, paradox <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Do you really, Allan? Or do you really think you do? If you always > > have a choice of 'A', 'B', or 'C', but you were always ever going to > > choose 'C', you have free will, but is your decision freely made? > > > On Aug 5, 8:04 pm, Allan Heretic <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > You lays have free will no matter how you seeing it created. It is the > > > consequences of those choices that can be a bitch, > > > Allan > > > > On 4 aug. 2011, at 17:48, paradox <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > There are a number of approaches to this question, Jo; but essentially > > > > and in summary (and i do a great injustice to a very powerful > > > > philosophical school), the deterministic tradition suggests that since > > > > we''re fundamentally bounded chemical systems immersed in a "sea" of > > > > ever more elaborate chemical processes, regulated by immutable > > > > (replicable and predictive) physical laws, and nothing else (which > > > > takes you back to the mind/brain question), our actions are no more > > > > than expressions of these chemical processes, constrained at an > > > > aggregate level by universal physical laws. When we think we make > > > > decisions based on choice, it is the mind "stroking" itself since, in > > > > terms of "proximate" action, we know that our decisions are preceeded > > > > in time by a neuro-electrcal "footprint" (interesting work by Benjamin > > > > Libet, presented in his book "Mind Time"); and in terms of more > > > > deliberative action, we are pretty certain to make the same decisions > > > > over and over again given the same set of variables, since our > > > > cognition is hard wired, and its operations are governed by the self > > > > same chemical processes and physical laws. Hence the question: do we > > > > have free will? and if we do, how much free will do we have? > > > > > On Aug 2, 7:44 pm, Jo <[email protected]> wrote: > > > >> I don't understand how some can say we don't have free will. You can > > > >> choose to do anything you want at any given time. How is that not free > > > >> will? > > > > >> On Aug 2, 12:51 pm, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > >>> "We have access to a technology that would have looked like sorcery in > > > >>> Descartes's day: the ability to peer inside someone's head and read > > > >>> their thoughts. Unfortunately, that doesn't take us any nearer to > > > >>> knowing whether they are sentient. "Even if you measure brainwaves, > > > >>> you can never know exactly what experience they represent," says > > > >>> psychologist Bruce Hood at the University of Bristol, UK. If > > > >>> anything, brain scanning has undermined Descartes's maxim. You, too, > > > >>> might be a zombie. "I happen to be one myself," says Stanford > > > >>> University philosopher Paul Skokowski. "And so, even if you don't > > > >>> realise it, are you." Skokowski's assertion is based on the belief, > > > >>> particularly common among neuroscientists who study brain scans, that > > > >>> we do not have free will. There is no ghost in the machine; our > > > >>> actions are driven by brain states that lie entirely beyond our > > > >>> control. "I think, therefore I am" might be an illusion. > > > >>> So, it may well be that you live in a computer simulation in which you > > > >>> are the only self-aware creature. I could well be a zombie and so > > > >>> could you. Have an interesting day." (from a recent New Scientist) > > > > >>> We range over debates in free will and what it is to be human. So far > > > >>> we haven't established free will or even that we are not merely > > > >>> avatars in 'something else's game'. > > > > >>> I wonder whether there are advantages in considering ourselves as > > > >>> creatures limited by programming and also capable of it?- Hide quoted > > > >>> text - > > > > >> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -
