And where does this "power" come from, Vam?
On Aug 7, 11:18 am, Vam <[email protected]> wrote: > Let's assume nothing... except " the power to make our choice within > certain constraints." > > We could be making a wrong choice, a less preferred choice... > > but we have the power to make it... and are free to make, or not. > > On Aug 6, 8:35 pm, paradox <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Lets assume (in strategic logic) that all decisions are goal directed, > > and purposive. When we make (or think we make) a decision, are we > > fully minded of our strategic goals, and do we conduct a comprehensive > > purposive review of our options and variables, to arrive at an optimal > > outcome with the best probability of advancing our strategic goals? > > One could argue that this is not free will in action, since the > > strategic goal itself is subject to "organic" constraints; the other > > would have to concede, but could argue that the "decision process" was > > as freely made within overall system constraints as is possible to do. > > > On Aug 6, 3:00 pm, Vam <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > "... but is your decision freely made ?" > > > > What is meant by " freely " made ? > > > > Do you mean ' without being under the influence of gravity ' ? > > > > There will always be a dynamics in our background, and some in the > > > foreground. So ? > > > > On Aug 6, 4:24 am, paradox <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > Do you really, Allan? Or do you really think you do? If you always > > > > have a choice of 'A', 'B', or 'C', but you were always ever going to > > > > choose 'C', you have free will, but is your decision freely made? > > > > > On Aug 5, 8:04 pm, Allan Heretic <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > You lays have free will no matter how you seeing it created. It is > > > > > the consequences of those choices that can be a bitch, > > > > > Allan > > > > > > On 4 aug. 2011, at 17:48, paradox <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > > There are a number of approaches to this question, Jo; but > > > > > > essentially > > > > > > and in summary (and i do a great injustice to a very powerful > > > > > > philosophical school), the deterministic tradition suggests that > > > > > > since > > > > > > we''re fundamentally bounded chemical systems immersed in a "sea" of > > > > > > ever more elaborate chemical processes, regulated by immutable > > > > > > (replicable and predictive) physical laws, and nothing else (which > > > > > > takes you back to the mind/brain question), our actions are no more > > > > > > than expressions of these chemical processes, constrained at an > > > > > > aggregate level by universal physical laws. When we think we make > > > > > > decisions based on choice, it is the mind "stroking" itself since, > > > > > > in > > > > > > terms of "proximate" action, we know that our decisions are > > > > > > preceeded > > > > > > in time by a neuro-electrcal "footprint" (interesting work by > > > > > > Benjamin > > > > > > Libet, presented in his book "Mind Time"); and in terms of more > > > > > > deliberative action, we are pretty certain to make the same > > > > > > decisions > > > > > > over and over again given the same set of variables, since our > > > > > > cognition is hard wired, and its operations are governed by the self > > > > > > same chemical processes and physical laws. Hence the question: do we > > > > > > have free will? and if we do, how much free will do we have? > > > > > > > On Aug 2, 7:44 pm, Jo <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > >> I don't understand how some can say we don't have free will. You > > > > > >> can > > > > > >> choose to do anything you want at any given time. How is that not > > > > > >> free > > > > > >> will? > > > > > > >> On Aug 2, 12:51 pm, archytas <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > > >>> "We have access to a technology that would have looked like > > > > > >>> sorcery in > > > > > >>> Descartes's day: the ability to peer inside someone's head and > > > > > >>> read > > > > > >>> their thoughts. Unfortunately, that doesn't take us any nearer to > > > > > >>> knowing whether they are sentient. "Even if you measure > > > > > >>> brainwaves, > > > > > >>> you can never know exactly what experience they represent," says > > > > > >>> psychologist Bruce Hood at the University of Bristol, UK. If > > > > > >>> anything, brain scanning has undermined Descartes's maxim. You, > > > > > >>> too, > > > > > >>> might be a zombie. "I happen to be one myself," says Stanford > > > > > >>> University philosopher Paul Skokowski. "And so, even if you don't > > > > > >>> realise it, are you." Skokowski's assertion is based on the > > > > > >>> belief, > > > > > >>> particularly common among neuroscientists who study brain scans, > > > > > >>> that > > > > > >>> we do not have free will. There is no ghost in the machine; our > > > > > >>> actions are driven by brain states that lie entirely beyond our > > > > > >>> control. "I think, therefore I am" might be an illusion. > > > > > >>> So, it may well be that you live in a computer simulation in > > > > > >>> which you > > > > > >>> are the only self-aware creature. I could well be a zombie and so > > > > > >>> could you. Have an interesting day." (from a recent New Scientist) > > > > > > >>> We range over debates in free will and what it is to be human. So > > > > > >>> far > > > > > >>> we haven't established free will or even that we are not merely > > > > > >>> avatars in 'something else's game'. > > > > > > >>> I wonder whether there are advantages in considering ourselves as > > > > > >>> creatures limited by programming and also capable of it?- Hide > > > > > >>> quoted text - > > > > > > >> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > > > > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -
