The question why knowledge is distinctively valuable has an important historical precedent in Plato's Meno in which Socrates raises the question of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief. Initially, we might appeal to the fact that knowledge appears to be of more practical use than true belief in order to mark this difference in value, but, as Socrates notes, this claim is far from obvious on closer inspection. After all, a true belief about the correct way to Larissa is surely of just as much practical use as knowledge of the way to Larissa—both will get us to our destination. Given that we clearly do value knowledge more than mere true belief, the fact that there is no obvious explanation of why this should be so creates a problem. We will call the issue of why knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, the Meno problem.
You can get the rest here - http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-value/ I somehow doubt I will be causing much mouse clicking in posting the link! I did some work on knowledge justification and value whilst bored out of my tree, recovering from a serious injury. I was discovering most of academic study is 'witterpiss for wuckfits' at the time. There's a big snag in the Meno problem in that it restricts us to argument not much informed by science. We could sit down all day trying to define knowledge, which might be nice under the Greek sun with some Rakis, local beer and imported coffee. No one has defined knowledge - rather as we don't have a precise decimal for pi. There are, of course, many definitions. There are lots of teasers like this in philosophy. My take on this is : 1.there are some things I believe true and have tested scientifically or in mathematical proof - these I trust as knowledge 2. there are some things I think true and can't do the above with. 3. etc. etc. on what I consider reliable or barking. we worry too much about this kind of stuff and not enough about the issues of the condition of ignorance.
