On Sun, 28 Apr 2019 at 00:59, <cho...@jtan.com> wrote:
> >
> > Oh, those hypocrite wankers here and there..
> If you actually read the code (I know, right? Who DOES that?) you'll see how 
> omalloc_init perfectly embarrasses you. In 6.4 it would read the symlink, 
> then checked the environment, and then consider the global variable 
> malloc_options. In 6.5 it is ... exactly the same except that now sysctl is 
> used instead of readlink (and hooray for sanity).
> At no time was any attempt ever made by libc to force a programme to use only 
> the settings from sysctl née malloc.conf. If you had been using the 
> environment variable from the beginning you would have been in _exactly_ the 
> same position all that time as you are now. The security you think you've 
> been relying on and have now lost was never there. You have been protecting 
> yourself with security theatre.
> Matthew

Matthew, LOL, what?
Read the code?
You didn't even read the whole comment thread where I did explain that
I was mostly concerned with cleared up environment other than changed
options of that variable.

Actually, I'd say that preparing chroots with malloc.conf as a symlink
is more straightforward, more enforcing and easier to verify other
than putting that as an environment option that would actually have to
be read before target is running. And (of course) given with symlink
it can't be so easily vanished when the whole environment is cleared
up by user space.

All-in-all, I didn't rely on this anyways.
My question was purely theoretical and reaction was practically clumsy. :)
Looks like decision made aren't subjects of discussing(?) Well, why
the hell you have those mail lists then(?) :)
For users to come and thank you and say you did all the best possible
way only? :)
To never question any decision? Seriously? No, really? C'mon, you
gotta be kidding.

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