On Sunday 2 September 2007 7:22:18 AM Ham writes to Joseph, Platt [snip]
[Ham] Joe, I don't understand Aristotle's concept of intentional existence, either. I found the following reference to intentionality in an essay on Leibniz at www.friesian/com/leibniz.htm . "In the theory of the 'four causes/ (aitía, 'causes,' 'explanations,' 'becauses'), Aristotle identified four factors in the explanation of events. The most familiar now is the one that is has typically become simply 'the cause,' i.e. what Aristotle called the efficient cause, the thing that sets the change in motion. One billiard ball hitting another one, which is how the British Empiricists thought about causality, is paradigmatic of efficient causation. Corresponding to every efficient cause, however, there was for Aristotle also a final cause, meaning the purpose or the end towards which the event aims. Aristotle thought that every event had both an efficient and a final cause, which is hard to understand when we think that purpose requires intelligence and intention, but which made perfect sense for Aristotle when the substance of things contained an entelékheia, the 'entelechy' or 'end within,' which brings about, for instance, the growth of an acorn into an oak." My problem with Aristotelian ontology is that it is based on "being", as distinguished from Ideas (Plato), Consciousness (Franklin Merrill-Wolf), or Quality (Pirsig). So that, from the start, Aristotle is dealing with a defined "substance". Your "center of the sun" analogy also assumes that ultimate reality is a substantive (i.e.,being-based) essence, whether defined or undefined. Such an ontology is not consistent with the MoQ or Essentialism in that the fundamental reality is differentiated and relational. Pirsig equivocates on this issue, since he defines Quality as "the primary empirical reality." This prompts one to ask: What, then, is the primary "metaphysical" reality? In my view, he doesn't acknowledge that there is one. As Platt says, "the MOQ 'viewpoint' took our everyday experience of everyday events." The MoQ is not a true metaphysical thesis, since Pirsig's ontology extends no further than the experiential world. This is why I contend that Quality (which is experiential) does not qualify as the primary source. I'm not sure I've addressed your question as you would wish. Essentialism is predicated on an absolute primary source which I call Essence. Any source that is relational, dynamic, or subject to change or conditions, is in my view "sub-prime". Thanks, Joe, and best regards, Ham Hi Ham, Platt and all, IMO the burning question of the day for the ancient Greeks was: How do we know things move? Heraclitus suggested we can’t step into the same river twice. Socrates insisted he knew nothing (I am empty) and when he continued asking questions they jailed him for corrupting the youth and he willingly drank the Hemlock. Plato changed the question to: How do I know? And proposed a world of ideas we contact. Aristotle, then proposed a theory of abstraction which required a split between and mind and body inasmuch as the mind was capable of abstracting the essence from a concept and giving it intentional existence in the mind. Aquinas followed Aristotle, but at the end of his life declared: "Everything I have written is as straw." Now motion is still the question. Do I know in organic motion, (if I do it is somewhat indefinable), cellular motion of the brain, or electronic motion of the computer? Ham, I prefer the knowledge of quality through organic motion some of which is indefinable, knowing how to hit a home run. The cellular motion in the brain is definable, words. The electronic motion of the computer carrying knowledge is "?" Perhaps, the knowledge of "Essence" is a connection to electronic motion too quick for awareness in experience. IMO the primary metaphysical reality is the evolution of levels, mechanical and conscious, objective and subjective. Joe Hi Joseph [Platt mentioned] -- [Ham on 9/2]: > [I]f ultimate reality is non-differentiated, as in the Buddha's > Oneness or the primary source, it is also non-relational and > does not move. To be semantically correct, one must concede > that it is "static" (or, as I prefer to call it, "immutable"). [Joe comments]: > Ham, after asking a question based on your experience why do > you propose an "if" scenario about ultimate reality which is > non-differentiated? I do not know ultimate reality such as what is > at the center of the sun! I would burn up trying to gain entrance > into that experience. However, if I say it is undefined I can discuss > what it is not, e.g. it is not an ice-cube. "Static is defined" is not the > same sense as "static is immutable". The exact point of movement > is indefinable, not unknown. Immutable is unchanging in the sense > of immovable. If I interpret your question correctly, you're asking why I hypothesize a non-differentiated reality, since I cannot possibly "know" or "define" it. Actually, that statement is self-explanatory, but I'll enlarge upon it below. > Dynamic Quality and Static quality are references to undefined > and defined quality. The theory of how we know things is open to > question. IMO Aristotle is unclear. His description of abstraction, > demanding a distinction between real existence and intentional > existence, leading to SOM, has been a stumbling block. American > philosophers are more pragmatic. Joe, I don't understand Aristotle's concept of intentional existence, either. I found the following reference to intentionality in an essay on Leibniz at www.friesian/com/leibniz.htm . "In the theory of the 'four causes/ (aitía, 'causes,' 'explanations,' 'becauses'), Aristotle identified four factors in the explanation of events. The most familiar now is the one that is has typically become simply 'the cause,' i.e. what Aristotle called the efficient cause, the thing that sets the change in motion. One billiard ball hitting another one, which is how the British Empiricists thought about causality, is paradigmatic of efficient causation. Corresponding to every efficient cause, however, there was for Aristotle also a final cause, meaning the purpose or the end towards which the event aims. Aristotle thought that every event had both an efficient and a final cause, which is hard to understand when we think that purpose requires intelligence and intention, but which made perfect sense for Aristotle when the substance of things contained an entelékheia, the 'entelechy' or 'end within,' which brings about, for instance, the growth of an acorn into an oak." My problem with Aristotelian ontology is that it is based on "being", as distinguished from Ideas (Plato), Consciousness (Franklin Merrill-Wolf), or Quality (Pirsig). So that, from the start, Aristotle is dealing with a defined "substance". Your "center of the sun" analogy also assumes that ultimate reality is a substantive (i.e.,being-based) essence, whether defined or undefined. Such an ontology is not consistent with the MoQ or Essentialism in that the fundamental reality is differentiated and relational. Pirsig equivocates on this issue, since he defines Quality as "the primary empirical reality." This prompts one to ask: What, then, is the primary "metaphysical" reality? In my view, he doesn't acknowledge that there is one. As Platt says, "the MOQ 'viewpoint' took our everyday experience of everyday events." The MoQ is not a true metaphysical thesis, since Pirsig's ontology extends no further than the experiential world. This is why I contend that Quality (which is experiential) does not qualify as the primary source. I'm not sure I've addressed your question as you would wish. Essentialism is predicated on an absolute primary source which I call Essence. Any source that is relational, dynamic, or subject to change or conditions, is in my view "sub-prime". Thanks, Joe, and best regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
