[SA] One can easily suggest, too, that we know we can't eat inorganic and we can eat organic,
[Ron] We eat salt, iron, zinc, calcium ect...... not to be persnickety, Iron in our blood gives it it's red color. We couldn't live without ingesting inorganic substances.. -----Original Message----- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Heather Perella Sent: Thursday, October 18, 2007 2:21 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [MD] subject/object: pragmatism Comments below: [Matt] > You brought up your problems with Rorty and how he > supposedly rejects radical empiricism (which, under > certain specifications, I deny) and the notion of > "pure experience," so I thought I might return > briefly to the subject. > The reason I've gotten in the habit of regarding > Rorty as much of a radical empiricist as James or > Dewey is because I take the thesis to be the > collapse of the metaphysical/epistemological divide > between subject/object, knower/known. The question > then becomes, "What of pure experience? What role > does it play?" > SA answered that pure doesn't contrast with impure, > that DQ and static patterns are both pure, just > different. This is a standard move (one that Paul > Turner and others have taken in dialectical > response), but it doesn't bode well for the > adjective "pure," for if nothing then counts as > "impure," you might as well just drop the "pure" and > stick with "experience." Who came up with pure experience? That was James, correct? If so, then how I view/experience quality is as dynamic and static. To wonder if pure and impure needs to be defined in a certain role depends on the perspective one comes from. Within quality, a dynamic perspective exists, and this is the pure experience I assume you refer to. I see static quality as a pure experience, too, but in comparison with dynamic quality, static quality isn't as broad as an experience as dynamic quality. Dq is on all levels and outside those levels. Dq is where a catalytic moment happens and one of the levels or more than one of the levels are to grasp/latch this catalytic moment. And to finish up what I'm getting at, the intellectual experience is more pure than dq when it comes to intellectual experience. [Matt] > Another answer is that it is more direct, but what > does that mean? Well, for me, direct means to quickest way with the least amount of hurdles. Dynamic quality is more direct than any of the levels due to how dq can be met by any one of the levels quicker and with the least amount of hurdles by all the levels. If I were to go from intellectual to inorganic that would not be a very direct option. I would need to go through the social and biological and use them or go through them to get to the inorganic. How would you get to the inorganic from the intellectual? Well, the most direct that could be suggested is society has been able to agree what inorganic is, but this has thousands of years of biological natural history also accumulated to get to this point called human beings in a society that can point out more and more of a difference between inorganic and organic. One can easily suggest, too, that we know we can't eat inorganic and we can eat organic, and that would have been known long, long ago. That's even more of a direct route for the intellect to connect with the inorganic, but still no matter how I've put this route of intellect to inorganic the comparison with dq and each level is more direct for dq is embedded within each level to begin with. [Matt] > Dan Glover once explained that > distinction on analogy with being at a baseball game > and watching the game on TV. But once we become > radical empiricists, aren't the two separate > experiences, an experience of watching a baseball > game on TV and an experience of watching a baseball > game at Wrigley Field? I question what the > metaphysical import is of calling one direct and the > other indirect. I see this in the same light as how I view/experience pure. Any of the levels can directly be routed to another level, and yes, dq is more direct, but when intellect and inorganic are direct in route they are more direct than dq, for we are discussing intellect and inorganic and their direct route. They are more direct than dq, due to it is a relationship between intellect and inorganic with dq is not either of these when intellect and inorganic are viewed in their pure experience. Direct and pure can bend and flex into any context. I can discuss with you how dq is more direct than intellect and inorganic, as I have earlier in the previous comment above in this post. [Matt] > Certainly we _should_ make a > distinction between the two and the distinction is > wildly important in discussing the changes in our > culture and which directions we should be going, but > it eludes me how this gives us a foothold, at least > one without sliding away from being radical > empiricists. I was able to describe above how pure and direct could be used, and I pointed out that these two could be seen/experienced differently depending on what the focus of the discussion/experience/experiment is. As with the squirrel and the tree. Are we all focused on the north, south, east, and west circling of the squirrel, or are we focused on the stomach of the squirrel always faces the one trying to circle? Either way is correct, but which one are we focused upon, then go from there. I'm not saying rid the one in which we are not focused upon. That's a whole other path to walk tomorrow if you would like. [Matt] > The most important answer that Pirsig, James, and > Dewey give is the one you, DMB, gave, which is that > pure experience is more basic. One version of > "basic" is on the analogy with the experience of a > baby. A baby experiences everything freshly and > from there accumulates the patterns of experience > that are less basic to the first experiences. The > question: why do we want to become more like babies? > If "basic" means "first" or even just "new," it > makes sense, but it doesn't explain what the > metaphysical import is--why make such a big deal out > of it if it's simply the first shit you've been hit > with and/or the most recently new shit you've been > hit with? More basic, less shit, less clutter, and the autumn leaves become more colorful, hang-on until the new bud pushes through, and as red leaf falls to the earth dirt hinges on its' fall, trees hinge on its' fall, whole societies lay in wait, and everybodies mind is upon this event - where will it fall!! where! what will come out of this event! So much, so much I say! And the red leaf goes falls... falls... falls to the earth, but where. [Matt] > As I see it, once we become radical > empiricists, it _doesn't matter_ whether we talk > about what we experience or we talk about what we > talk about. It simply doesn't matter. Yes, they're both experiences. [Matt] > The position of the pragmatist should simply be that we need to > stay away from metaphysical/epistemological > problems/dualisms. It doesn't matter whether we are > professed radical empiricists or psychological > nominalists--what matters is the collapse of > dualisms: appearance/reality, subject/object, > accident/essence, knower/known, scheme/content, > fact/convention, analytic/synthetic, etc., etc. We move on. The red leaf has fallen. Will a tree grow here? Will it be more dirt for somebodies garden? Will they sell this dirt once leaf? This whole event, hinged upon a leaf, all in wait. Where! Where! Where, I say! And night has come, the leaf has fallen. Now I'm watching the clouds. Where, where, where, I say will they go! Where will these clouds go, the earth is in wait, societies wait as they may become rain, poets sing, "Where!, Where! Where!" I say all this, for it is the clutter that washes away down stream, and these simple moments in which my son now claps his hands, my wife plays with dog, and I'm lovin' every bit of it. Is this not a direct experience? I say indeed this is. [Matt] > The stance that Rorty ended his life with was > basically that the linguistic turn had been useful > for Anglo-American philosophers because it had > helped work the dialectic of modern philosophy to > its end point. That's about it. "Experience" as it > had been used at the beginning of the century was > still being used ambiguously between something like > a "sense impression" and an "idea". But working our > way out of the ambiguity in philosophical discourse > and ditching the dualisms is just as possible with > "experience" as with "language," it just so happens > the historical record (for the most part, barring > the philosophers driven underground by the analytic > establishment) shows philosophers turning from talk > about experience to talk about language. I see experience as a more broad 'experience', than language which seems to be a focus in experience. [Matt] > (And just a note, Quine did aggressively take the > linguistic turn, and though he did take the first > huge swing at the structures of the logical > positivists, he could easily be accused of having > remained too positivistic (which is, roughly, what I > accused him of). Kuhn is another matter. To my > knowledge, Kuhn wasn't influenced by the positivists > much at all, and saying he was an analytic > philosopher is like saying that Wittgenstein was a > Continental philosopher--he was from Europe, but his > way of philosophizing didn't have much similarity > with Heidegger or Sartre. To my mind, Kuhn is one > of your biggest allies--as, indeed, he was first > taught to me, side by side with Pirsig.) ok. thanks. SA __________________________________________________ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! 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