dmb says: These would be the accusations of William James. He accuses idealism of adding stuff by treating abstractions as if they were ontological realities rather than tools. I think Pirsig makes it pretty clear that this is why he rejects the comparison with Hegel (made by those deep thinkers over at Psychology Today) and accepts the comparison to James's radical empiricism instead.
DM: That's great, of course, Dewey founds Hegel (in part) very useful. I just find this too black and white. I'd suggest that a more rounded approach would see that Hegel is alot closer to James and Dewey than say Plato and Kant. dmb continued: “Throughout the history of philosophy the subject and its object have been treated as absolutely discontinuous entities” and this gap “has assumed a paradoxical character which all sorts of theories had to be invented to overcome” (PCAP 184). DM: Of course, like Pirsig, Hegel describes how the SO approach arises abnd can be overcome, I don't think Pirsig says SOM never happened or in fact that it was a pointless exerecise in cutting up (describing) reality one way. DMB:Here he complains that the empiricists have been ignoring certain experiences in their constructions, namely the continuity of experience. His other rivals, the idealists, are guilty of trying to plug this gap by giving reality to abstractions that are aren’t found in experience. DM: Of course Hegel is more famous for trying to make experience fit a certain dialectical narrative dmb replies to these replies: I suppose Hegel's Absolute (and similar Gods) would be the quintessential example of a fictional metaphysical addition. Also, please notice the quotation marks. The problems with idealism identified here are the problems that concern James. (The "Quintessence" is the fifth element, that unknown metaphysical reality that lies behind the four physical elements.) DM: WHat I think, is that whenever the absolute or the transcendent is used as concepts by phiolsophers they are often talking about what Pirsig would call DQ, and if you look at it like this, you can get something out of reading idealists, etc. I would also suggest that unlike Pirsig, and like Ham, they often think they can tell us all about the structure/content/powers of the transcendent and absolute. This is a mistake and over reach. We can say what DQ makes manifest, SQ/values/experience/qualities, but after that DQ is without form, it is the intense potential that is left when all SQ is put aside for Tao. dmb says: Radical Empiricism doesn't deny the power of imagination, the usefulness of abstractions or the formulation of scientific theories. But until your colorful elephant lands and gets out of that UFO, we're not allowed to include it in our philosophical accounts. DM: Well scientists and even people waiting for a bus have to rely on what they think is actualbut not available to experience in the present. I think radical empiricism needs to include these aspects of dealing with experience-reality if we are to call it a pragmatism. DMB: And its a good thing too. Einstein's mathematical efforts were checkable by mathematicians but most scientists also saw that the theory had to be tested by an actual experiment. As you know, one was finally devised and Einstein's theory was put to the test. But how does one test for the existence of an Absolute Spirit? DM: Agreed, but what is the test for DQ? I have an answer, what's yours? DMB: Plato's Forms? Orange elephants with green spots or the space ship that carries it? Western Philosophy is apparently full of such untestible nonsense. And it looks like these fictions are almost always abstractions from life which are then given as the cause of that life from which it was abstracted.... DM: Yes and no. Yes we need to keep ourselves as close to what we are able to experience as possible. But we do need to deal with the non-experienced. Otherwise why would we think there should be biscuits in the biscuit box. And there is something non-linguistic about whether there are or not (to pick a fight with Matt). DM said: Sure you threw your rattle out of your cot when I suggested that possibilties are real a couple of months ago. But hey, you are getting there. dmb says: Getting there? Hardly. I think your notion of possibilities as real is just one more case of treating abstractions as real entities. I think it confuses ordinary anticipation and hope with metaphysical realities. DM: I think this is deep rooted SOM in your thinking. Because possibilities are not material they are not real for you. Take the double slit experiment. Electrons fired through one slit give no interference pattern. Two slits and one electron and you get an interference pattern. Physicists consider the extra real possibilities in the second case as changing what happens, they put them into their calculations, how real do you want? Do you leave your car unlocked with the keys in it or do you worry about the possibility that it might get taken? Possibilities are the openness that makes DQ real, without possibilties we do not have relationships we have substances and essentialism and SOM. Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
