On Friday 9 November 2007 7:33 PM Matt writes to Ron, Krimel [snip] My preferred way: inorganic -- non-replicating entities (rocks) biological -- replicating entities (cells) social -- communicative replicating entities (animals) linguistic -- linguistically communicative replicating entities (humans) democratic -- political linguistically communicative replicating entities (Americans, Europeans, etc.) Clearly I favor a fifth level. My levels are the way they are because I think they neatly divide things in a way that follow Pirsig's rules a) discrete and b) the lower level doesn't recognize the higher level. 1) there is an obvious difference between rocks and cells, and cells obviously recognize a rock, whereas a rock doesn't recognize anything, 2) animals, as opposed to plants, do function in a way that they recognize plants, whereas not vice versa--a plant will move towards the sun, but an animal will differentiate the world in all sorts of more complicated ways, 3) an animal does not recognize language as language (until it is taught language, as in the case of gorillas), 4) it is common to see a person raised in a non-democratic culture to not understand what it means to take part in the democratic way of life (though one might argue that many Americans don't know either). My revision has one main goal: I think Pirsig, like many philosophers, looked to Greece and saw their own thing happening, rather than the important thing happening. Disciplinary chauvinism happens all the time, but the important thing in Greece wasn't Socrates, but Solon and Pericles--it was democracy, not philosophy. It was the burgeoning of a democratic culture for the first time. My main beef with Pirsig's social/intellectual split is that it is typical of a philosopher--social conventions on one side, life of the mind on the other. It is elitist in the wrong way. All this talk about pre-intellectual experience: think about it: according to Pirsig, could pre-intellectual be pre-linguistic? No, because humans had language before Greece. Could pre-intellectual be pre-reflective? No, because it would seem to be clear that we could reflect before Socrates came along, too. I think the only way to get a handle on pre-intellectual is to constrict it to pre-linguistic, but that does some raw things to Pirsig's notion of the intellectual. Matt Hi Matt, Ron, Krimel and all, For a long time there have been attempts to construct an evolutionary order of change: Earth, water, air, fire, or organic, inorganic, social intellectual etc. I follow an esoteric tradition of seven levels as exemplified in the musical scale Do Re Mi etc. Pirsig with dq/sq added his signature to evolutionary thinking with the orders listed above. I like your term replicating¹, but for myself I look to reproduction¹ to distinguish the first levels. All IMO. Do Inorganicreproduction by collision. Re Organicreproduction of one cell (man) Mi Organicreproduction by penetration of the cell wall by another (woman) Fa Proprietary Awareness, conscience (within emptiness lies a luminous intelligence, mystical)social order. (The luminous intelligence is the beginning of mystical conscious evolution not mind.) Sol The relationship of two--lawintellect (Cosmic evolution) The next step of luminous intelligence (mysticalconscious evolution). At intellect Cosmic Evolution ceases while Conscious Evolution can continue through appropriate work e.g.education, self-study. La Higher emotional (conscious evolution) enlightenment. Ti Higher intellectual (conscious evolution). End of evolution, an individual. Joe
On 11/9/07 7:33 PM, "Matt Kundert" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > > > Ron, Krimel, > > > > I have to apologize beforehand for my comments because they are mainly > regurgitated from old posts of mine. The MD is cyclical that way, and I don't > have any new thoughts about this sector of Pirsig's writing. > > > > I take the main thing you are struggling with Ron is the slippery nature of > the words in play, all the different ways one could take the meaning of > "intellect," "pre-intellect," "symbol manipulation," etc., etc. I think Ian's > mantra around here is, echoing the 1992 American Presidential campaign, "It's > the communicative process stupid!", and it's the perfect point here--there is > no correct definition of these things, the only thing we are in charge of is > trying to find the most pleasing pattern for these terms. They all relate > quite closely to each other, so our process must be the one of finding nice > variations of the terms that avoid/solve some problems while giving us some > room to do what we want. E.g., to say that the world was there before us, but > that animals have intelligence, and also that SOM is a cultural pattern, but > also deeply felt, and that without language there is no knowledge, though > there are a lot of things we do that isn't linguistic. The list could go > on and on. > > > > My point in pointing out the obvious (that we are slip-sliding around with our > key terms) is to say that philosophy is mainly about balancing the intuitions > we have about how the world is, choosing which ones to loosen up, which ones > to hold onto, which ones to exterminate. The reason I should start so far > back behind the actual conversation before actually entering it (no less than > that's how I usually proceed) is because I both want to offend and remain > inoffensive to everybody currently in it: everything everybody's so far said > about intellect, intelligence, symbol manipulation, before the word there was > nothing, etc., is right (after a fashion), though taken together > contradictory. Everybody is bringing forward a different intuition about how > the world works to add to the stew, but what happens when it isn't framed > properly is that it just looks like a mess. Ron is asking for order, and the > conversation is just getting more and more muddy. Granted, that's the general > intention of many here at the MD, but then I might be in the minority in > thinking that clear thinking, though not always in point, is not by itself > complicit in SOM (which is sometimes the feeling I get from some people). > > > > Moving to the actual conversation: What is the "intellectual level" in Pirsig? > > > > There are two ways to go at it: 1) What does Pirsig think? (An interpretive > question with a more or less definite answer.) 2) How _should_ we define it? > (Where what Pirsig thinks, while remaining important, becomes sometimes > besides the point.) > > > > To my eyes, the conversation has been mainly ignoring the interpretive > question. If it doesn't, it has to first acknowledge that Pirsig restricts > intellectual activity, defined as "symbol manipulation," to humans and then > play this restriction out across the levels: since Pirsig doesn't talk a lot > about intelligence or language, what does his restriction mean for these > related terms? > > > > For my part, I don't like Pirsig's definitions of the levels (let alone > level-talk generally), so I usually use different ones (moving to 2). The > reason I don't like Pirsig's definitions of levels is because 1) it is really > easy to muddy the water by pointing out that ants have social behavior (Pirsig > explicitly relegates ants to only biological patterns, and by extension most > other animals), 2) that many advances in science these days are on the analogy > that inorganic/biological stuff interact informationally (which is why it > isn't terribly difficult to think that ants use something like "symbols"), but > most importantly 3) it isn't clear where Pirsig places "language" in his > scheme, but a) it can't be restricted to the intellectual level because of how > Pirsig places its growth in Ancient Greece (right around the time of Socrates > coincidentally) and b) placing it across the social and intellectual levels > runs into the problem figuring out what's so special about math, the ru > les of logic, the rules of grammar, or whatever exemplar one might come up > with (the excitement Pirsig derives from the levels for evolutionary story > about the march of Dynamic Quality seems to lose some steam if it consists of, > "First there were rocks, which eventually produced a protoplasm that amazingly > learned to replicate itself. Then, against all odds, some of this replicating > protoplasm got together, split up its duties, and created an entity that > communicated with other similar entities solely by its behavior. And then, > one day, a subsection of these entities--LEARNED TO COUNT!!!") > > > > My preferred way: > inorganic -- non-replicating entities (rocks) > biological -- replicating entities (cells) > > social -- communicative replicating entities (animals) > linguistic -- linguistically communicative replicating entities (humans) > democratic -- political linguistically communicative replicating entities > (Americans, Europeans, etc.) > > Clearly I favor a fifth level. My levels are the way they are because I think > they neatly divide things in a way that follow Pirsig's rules a) discrete and > b) the lower level doesn't recognize the higher level. 1) there is an obvious > difference between rocks and cells, and cells obviously recognize a rock, > whereas a rock doesn't recognize anything, 2) animals, as opposed to plants, > do function in a way that they recognize plants, whereas not vice versa--a > plant will move towards the sun, but an animal will differentiate the world in > all sorts of more complicated ways, 3) an animal does not recognize language > as language (until it is taught language, as in the case of gorillas), 4) it > is common to see a person raised in a non-democratic culture to not understand > what it means to take part in the democratic way of life (though one might > argue that many Americans don't know either). > > My revision has one main goal: I think Pirsig, like many philosophers, looked > to Greece and saw their own thing happening, rather than the important thing > happening. Disciplinary chauvinism happens all the time, but the important > thing in Greece wasn't Socrates, but Solon and Pericles--it was democracy, not > philosophy. It was the burgeoning of a democratic culture for the first time. > My main beef with Pirsig's social/intellectual split is that it is typical of > a philosopher--social conventions on one side, life of the mind on the other. > It is elitist in the wrong way. > > All this talk about pre-intellectual experience: think about it: according to > Pirsig, could pre-intellectual be pre-linguistic? No, because humans had > language before Greece. Could pre-intellectual be pre-reflective? No, > because it would seem to be clear that we could reflect before Socrates came > along, too. > > I think the only way to get a handle on pre-intellectual is to constrict it to > pre-linguistic, but that does some raw things to Pirsig's notion of the > intellectual. > > Matt > > _________________________________________________________________ > Peek-a-boo FREE Tricks & Treats for You! > http://www.reallivemoms.com?ocid=TXT_TAGHM&loc=us > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
