Ron --
Ham, this is a good topic. I think what throws off MoQ understanding is where in Lila, he begins to give examples of how looking at classical physics in terms of Quality relationships, changes how you conceptualize. I'm not really sure he meant those examples to be taken as MoQ gospel or not. Pirsigs books are much more than a metaphysic, and much less.
The concept of "quality relationships" comes very close to animism, where conscious feelings are attributed to inanimate objects. This may please the poetic nature of Pirsig's readers, but it is sheer fantasy. My point is that there is no need to extend value sensibility into the physical world, since it is value from which our experiential reality is constructed in the first place. If Pirsig wanted to base his ontology on value, why did he ignore the subjective entity that is the very locus of value? Even you, as a follower of the MoQ, have asserted that "We are Quality"; if that is true, surely human beings and their experience should be central to a metaphysics of Quality.
[Ham, previously]:
Pirsig has not defined his DQ as absolute, immutable, or immanent, so we are left to understand it only in relational terms.
[Ron]:
In the meaning of Absolute, I take to be unchanging. I would agree, neither Quality, DQ or SQ are unchanging. So yes we are only left with relational terms. It is this understanding which takes Quality off the chess board with Classical logic. Which is what you are using as a standard criteria to base your assessments. I think this is why laypeople grasp it more readily than someone who is well versed in classical metaphysics. I imagine it would seem incomplete to them.
You exaggerate my philosophical competence, Ron. I'm as much a "lay person" as anyone else in this forum, with only a smattering of metaphysical study, most of it quite recent. But, yes, there are standards by which a metaphysical thesis may be measured. For one thing, any stated proposition that defies empirical evidence should be duly accounted for. (This would of course include notions like "rocks prefer a stationary position." ) The thesis should be consistent throughout and define all uncommon or "special" terms used by the author. I also expect a metaphysical ontology to explain the 'whys' and 'hows' of creation sufficiently to offer a purpose or meaning for existence. For a philosopher of world prominence, I think Mr. Pirsig has defaulted on some of these requirements.
[Ham, previously]:
... A pattern is a particular form or configuration of something. According to your analysis, that something is Quality. But quality is an experienced attribute, which means that it is dependent on the "experiencer", the conscious subject of the experience. Again, that does not qualify as the fundamental source.
[Ron]:
Why not? It certainly ties into why it can not be defined.
I don't follow your reasoning. That the author is unable to define something doesn't make it fundamental. There is no rule that what is fundamental must be undefinable.
[Ham, previously]:
In my philosophy, Essence is absolute and fundamental. It is not dependent on anything. Objects and events are perceived "reductions" of Essence experienced (intellectualized) from Value. ... Value is a sensed attribute of Essence. It is the "substance" of experience, not the primary source. Being-aware is a dichotomous property of the cognizant self which exists "outside the loop" of Essence. It is the individuated self, not Essence, that is dependent on value.
[Ron]:
Don't we need value to realize Essence?
Of course we need value to experience finitude. We are value-sensible entities, so we're designed with the grist for experience. But being value-sensible doesn't our realization of Essence. If it did, there would be no atheists or nihilists. Such concepts are intuitional and require metaphysical reasoning. Even then, we can't prove our case. And that fact ensures our freedom as agents of value. As I've said before, if we had access to absolute knowledge, we would not be free agents. My contention is that individuated experience affords an extrinsic perspective of essential value.
[Ron]:
What you do not consider is what that entity is comprised of itself, which is value, a value sensible entity composed of value.
I've considered it, but it makes no sense epistemologically. If I'm comprised of Value -- my body, my mind, my experience -- then I'm only able to recognize what is NOT value. The mode of awareness, besides orienting all objects and events in space/time, is to experience that which is "other" to us. (That's the principle of the self/other dichotomy.) We know ourselves only as the locus of awareness. To understand ourselves as "beings", we must see ourselves as others see us -- as objective organisms. Self-awareness come first in human development; the latter takes time and continuous contact with other individuals.
[Ron]:
I feel our perception of being aware is based on the grammatical expression of self/other. Self/other is an illusion of the perception of complex patterns of energy of varying degrees of density or value. This is where we part ways, In MoQ, I believe, we participate on every level for we are it. Value is sensed by value, our senses are composed of value which transform patterns. From inorganic to organic to social to intellectual all transforming at varying rates and density infinitely which is why it can not be defined as absolute and immutable..
But your "pattern" is itself Value, is it not? So you have value sensing value, which is a logical tautology. Experience must differentiate otherness in order to perceive objects. How does one differentiate value from value? .
[Ron]:
We are Quality. From the thoughts in our head to the edge of the universe And beyond.
Your concept has a nice ring to it, but this epistemology doesn't hold up logically.
Best regards, Ham Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
