Ham: I can't imagine what your compliment refers to, as we haven't discussed philosophy since our exchange on primary and secondary value. The statements you've since quoted from Wiki concerning what Wittgenstein, Russell, Schiller, Dewey, Toulmin, Pierce, et al, had to say about logic are interesting from a linguistic standpoint, but they tell us nothing about
metaphysics or philosophy. In fact, it cuts off the possibility of philosophical discussion on semantic grounds. Ron: What it does is illustrate how metaphysics and philosophy are tautological In nature and that the very method you are using to critique MoQ is too, To better bring the concept to bear that MoQ utilizes a meta-epistemological Point of View. Which does cut off the possibility of your criticism on Semantic grounds but not so much a philosophical discussion between the Two of us. Ham: I'm not as concerned about the syntax or logical construction of a proposition as I am about the concept being proposed. It seems to me that if we can't express ideas freely, a forum like this is is futile. This isn't about Hoyle's rules of gamesmanship. It's about ideas. Surely, at some point we must rise above the restrictions of formal logic and express those concepts that are important to us. Ron; But its by those very standards you base your assessments of MoQ on and have Repeatedly in the past. The very thing I AM trying to establish is an Equal understanding of the concepts involved by destroying the classical Representations of the logic you employ. So we may escape them for the time being and do as you ask, and speak plainly. Ham: So, if you'll permit me to rewind this discussion back to your last post of 6/6 and talk in common English, what you seemed to be proposing is that an agent that is essentially value experiences "patterns of value" as its reality. The problem, as I see it, is establishing Difference as the ground of physical reality. I'd like to know by what process or dynamics you believe value can differentiate itself in this manner. Ron: Pirsigs method of the intellectual construct of referring to these patterns Of experience as Dynamic and Static suffice to demonstrate his theory. Plainly, some patterns are denser than others, to use an analogy, it works (to my conceptual understanding) a lot like a thermodynamic system. " no value" does not exist. That is why I say quite literally, we are Quality. Ham: If you can address this question in your own words, I'll assume that it "makes sense" to you and refrain from criticizing you on tautological grounds. (Of course, your explanation must also make sense to me. ;-) Ron: I did not mean to play games Ham, I apologize if it was construed in that manner, what I was trying to do was disarm your critical sense a tad So that you might view MoQ as the meta-philosophy I do. So that you might use it as a tool to develop your Essentialist Concepts rather than some sort of competitive view. I think You and Pirsig share some fundamental views and I am very interested In how the two relate. Really, I am enjoying the exchange. This stuff just bubbles in my head And it is very cathartic to be able to express them to you. So, I am Not stroking your ego as a tactic, I really do appreciate and respect Your point of view. Sincerely, -Ron --------------------------------------------------------- > [Ham, previously]: >> But your "pattern" is itself Value, is it not? So you have >> value sensing value, which is [tautological]. Experience >> must differentiate otherness in order to perceive objects. >> How does one differentiate value from value? > > [Ron]: >> If you use the old Greek rhetorical meaning of the word tautology- > "Everything that is a proposition of logic has got to be in some sense > or the other like a tautology. It has got to be something that has some > peculiar quality, which I do not know how to define, that belongs to > logical propositions but not to others."- Bertrand Russell > > > Ham: > I should not have used the word "logical", and have corrected my comment > > above to avoid it. We cannot "prove" anything by logic alone. The > proposition A = A does not prove that 'A' exists or does not exist. > Logic > is only useful for justifying theories within the context of language, > where > the terms are well defined, which is what Russell and Wittgenstein were > mostly about. I'm mostly about concepts, as I believe you are also. > So, as > far as we can help it, let's try not to get mired in word games. > > [Ham, previously]: >> Your concept has a nice ring to it, but this epistemology doesn't >> hold up logically [epistemologcally?]. > > Ron: > O.K., then conceptually you level the charge of value sensing value > as tautological which I argued, so is everything in epistemology. > the debate in this field has focused on analyzing the nature of > knowledge and how it relates to similar notions such as truth, belief, > and justification. Which brings us to Pragmatist epistemology and > continental > Philosophy which I have followed via Pirsig from Pierce to Quine's > Work on naturalized epistemology, which Pirsig supports with his > Concept of certainty in immediate experience but this method yields > Objections. To do away with normatives is to alter the very meaning > and goal of epistemology, since all statements without the normative are > purely descriptive. One product of these objections is cooperative > naturalism which holds that empirical results are essential and useful > to epistemology. That is, while traditional epistemology cannot be > eliminated, neither can it succeed in its investigation of knowledge > without empirical results from the natural sciences. Which Pirsig > supports. Yet to produce > any form of truth or rational thinking It is the idea that there can be > no truths without a conceptual scheme to express those truths. Pirsig > follows > Schiller who sought to undermine the very possibility of formal logic, > by showing that words only had meaning when used in an actual context. > The least famous of Schiller's main works was the constructive sequel to > his destructive book "Formal Logic." In this sequel, "Logic for Use," > Schiller attempted to construct a new logic to replace the formal logic > he had just decimated in "Formal Logic." What he offers is something > philosophers would recognize today as a logic covering the context of > discovery and the hypothetico-deductive method. "Whereas F.C.S. Schiller > actually dismissed the possibility of formal logic, most pragmatists are > critical rather of its pretension to ultimate validity and see logic as > one logical tool among others"-wiki > > "Stephen Toulmin argued that the need to distinguish between reality and > appearance only arises within an explanatory scheme and therefore that > there is no point in asking what 'ultimate reality' consists of." > > > Ham: > I disagree that a "metaphysic" is only a perspective that "initiates > critical thinking of the everyday world." The changed perspective > should > arise on reflection of the proposition, after it has been subjected to > critical thinking. > > Ron snips wiki once again: > Dewey, in The Quest For Certainty, criticized what he called "the > philosophical fallacy": philosophers often take categories (such as the > mental and the physical) for granted because they don't realize that > these are merely nominal concepts that were invented to help solve > specific problems. This causes metaphysical and conceptual confusion. > Various examples are the "ultimate Being" of Hegelian philosophers, the > belief in a "realm of value", the idea that logic, because it is an > abstraction from concrete thought, has nothing to do with the act of > concrete thinking, and so on. David L. Hildebrand sums up the problem: > "Perceptual inattention to the specific functions comprising inquiry led > realists and idealists alike to formulate accounts of knowledge that > project the products of extensive abstraction back onto experience." > (Hildebrand 2003) > > And > > "In "The Fixation of Belief" (1877), C.S. Peirce denied that > introspection and intuition (staple philosophical tools at least since > Descartes) were valid methods for philosophical investigation. He argued > that intuition could lead to faulty reasoning, e.g. when we reason > intuitively about infinity. Furthermore, introspection does not give > privileged access to knowledge about the mind - the self is a concept > that is derived from our interaction with the external world and not the > other way around." > > Ham continues: > For example, when you say "We are Quality", I need to > know if you mean this literally. Also, I believe the "fathers" of > quantum > physics were limited by the empirical data available, not > "conceptually". > Pirsig analyzed this enigma quite well in his SODV paper: > > "Bohr saw that the quantum theory's mathematical formulation had to have > a > connection to the cultural world of everyday life in which the > experiments > were performed. If that connection were not made there would be no way > to > run an experiment that would prove whether a quantum prediction was true > or > not. ...Yet as I read through the material even I could see that this > was > not primarily a quarrel about physics, it was about metaphysics. And I > saw > that others had noted that too. ...It is only in the last hundred years > or > so that our measurements are showing that the objects we are studying > are > apparently impossible. Since the phenomena from the measurements are > not > about to change, Bohr concluded that the logic of science must change to > > accommodate them. ...This view, known as phenomenalism, says that what > we > really observe is not the object. What we really observe is only data." > > Ham: > My own answer to this is that because the physical world is constructed > by > experience, the dynamics and order of the universe are limited to a > magnitude perceived by human experience. Human beings are equipped to > deal > with a macro world, not a quantum world. So, when we push investigation > > beyond this point, the empirical data become fuzzy and contradictory, > and > the conclusions drawn by physicists are mostly speculative. > > Metaphysics, however, must deal with "all possible worlds", so the > precise > arrangement of energy particles and their dynamics can't be its primary > concern. More important to the philosopher are the questions "What is > the > stuff of existence?", "From what is this stuff derived?", and, perhaps > most > important, "WHY?" > > This is where I'm coming from, Ron, and what I've tried to address in my > > website and book. > > Ron: > If " the dynamics > and order of the universe are limited to a magnitude perceived by human > experience." And " the conclusions drawn by physicists are mostly > speculative." Then the questions "What is the > stuff of existence?", "From what is this stuff derived?", and, perhaps > most > important, "WHY?" are meaningless in a universal normative sense. > > > Thanks for a superior discussion Ham. > > -Ron Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
