> SA previously said:
> Everybody has a philosophy. Some more descriptive than
> others. Some more descriptive in the usage of philosophical
> points by those that call themselves philosophers, academic
> to be a little more meaningful as to whom I'm pointing
> out.
> ...
> So what are the philosophies of these football game
> watchers. What is my philosophy, yours, or anybodies? One
> way, as we well know, is understood in their lifestyles.
> Whether people realize it or not, our lifestyles are
> philosophies, ways of life are philosophies.
> Matt:
> Your's was a very nice post, and I think effective. I
> think you are right that everybody has a way of life. My
> trouble is simply--I think one still gets into a little
> trouble, or at least you're more inviting for trouble,
> when you start attributing philosophies to people, as you
> say, "whether people realize it or not." I mean,
> people are still wary and very uncomfortable, and sometimes
> hostile, when psychologists attribute all manner of
> what-your-mind-is-doing-behind-your-back. People are
> suspicious of attributions of things experts think they
> have.
SA: Yes. I thought of this. That's why anybody's philosophy is defined by
themselves. We could try to define aspects of their lives, overlap our
patterns, but if we let people define themselves by their actions and what they
say, well, their making public who they are, what their philosophy is. If we
take the overlapping patterns far enough we could say we would need to rid
philosophy all together this way we will not overlap and say people have a
philosophy. Not even define it, just say they have a philosophy. We could
define what philosophy is, and therefore we would still be applying this
definition of philosophy onto people. Yet, this extreme approach could be the
same as not calling people, "people" anymore. Maybe some of these creatures
don't want to be called "people" - but then what about "creatures", etc...,
etc...
Matt:
> That doesn't mean the experts aren't right, of
> course. There are two real reasons I say this now, as
> opposed to more audience-choice reasons: 1) I don't
> like the idea of attributing the sometimes strange views
> that philosophers end up holding to "normal"
> people and 2) it gives the appearance that philosophers
> hold a particular kind of special view on humanity. For
> both reasons, there is, however, an extent to which they
> are true and important to how philosophy composes itself,
> an extent I don't wish to deny.
> On (1), philosophers hold strange views because they ask
> strange questions about normal things. They do this
> because it behooves us (and over time has proven out to
> behoove us) to sometimes rethink the normality of our
> "normal" views. However, the practice of
> combining a critical view of society with a view towards
> what really underlies people's views is a dangerous
> thing--are we suggesting changes or are we locating
> what's really going on (which involves the
> "attribution" move)? Take the physicist:
> he's suggesting that what's really under the
> "table" is a cloud of electrons. But the
> physicist typically doesn't suggest that we talk about
> clouds of electrons. So the physicist, we say, isn't
> suggesting changes, but he is locating what's really
> going on. With the philosopher, it has never been entirely
> clear which they are doing, partly because--I think--they
> have historically been involved in doing both at different
> times (and they've often confused which was which). I
> think one thing it is good for philosophers to start doing
> is more explicitly differentiating between these two
> different jobs that they do. And until we do a better job
> of disseminating and understanding these two different
> roles (which, naturally, involves arguments that they
> _are_, in fact, different--since this, like many other
> issues, is contentious among philosophers), I warn away
> from ascribing underlying _philosophies_.
SA: To differentiate what I was doing above, I guess I took the approach in
which I did not "ascribe (an) underlying philosophy". I *try* to take a 'soft'
approach, which is another way of putting this kind of philosophizing, but then
I also *try* to keep in mind what I mentioned above about 'slipping'. If
you've ever heard of my "quietness" approach I think it fits nicely into this
type. The metaphysical hole, that people refer to in this forum, is quiet I
would say.
Matt:
> Philosophy does still have
> a fairly distinct enough voice in the cultural conversation
> of humankind.
> I like "way of life" because it is a vague enough
> formulation, one that could involve all sorts of things
> without implying any particular thing. I would, on the
> other hand, affirm "philosophy" as a particular
> kind of way of life, rather than as coextensive with it. I
> take it to be a particular way of life that makes holding
> certain kinds of views (so-called "theoretical
> views") central to it. Other ways of life don't
> make holding theoretical views central to their living of
> life. Some people think that Socrates created this form of
> life, but I think only one particular interpretation of what
> Socrates stood for did (roughly, the one that flows through
> Plato to Aristotle and on). I think people can live in
> Socrates' spirit without holding theoretical views. I
> also think that many ways of life are compatible with
> Socrates' spirit in a way that often escapes the
> philosopher's notice.
SA: I agree with you that something different and distinct can be identified
with a philosopher, the one your pointing out above (Socrates' spirit, and
all). I also still hold out that the football fan, the couch potato, etc...
has a philosophy and is a philosopher too, but the Socrates' philosopher is
distinct from the couch potato philosopher. I would say both of them web
theoretical webs and habits into their lives. Ones that go into detail to cope
with their current pains and plan out their dealings with other people and
such. Yet, I still find the distinction remains. I think how we make such a
distinction is done, for one, the way we just made the distinctions. Were we
drew the line would be difficult, but yet we end up with a distinction.
Matt:
> To help combat my own, for instance, potential blindness to
> ways of life I don't understand (like the one where you
> find meaningfulness in Sunday football)
SA: By the way, I find meaningfulness in Sunday football, but I haven't done
this for over seven years now.
Matt:
>, I try to avoid
> undue disciplinary privileging as often as possible. And
> one way is to avoid ascribing philosophies. When doing big
> cultural diagnoses like the one you, SA, were involved in, I
> like vague terms like "a way of life" and "a
> view," as opposed to "a philosophy." This,
> I think, helps avoid what I think might be an undue
> privileging in your formulation: "Everybody has a
> philosophy. Some more descriptive than others."
SA: Depends on what you mean by "descriptive than others". I meant some are
more lengthy. I try to avoid a lengthy, worded philosophy. It seems to make
real time participance too inflexible for me. I'm not referring to essays or
even books. I read books. I write lengthy stories from time to time, even
poems. Some philosophizing of mine may take pages and pages, yet, the
intention in my philosophy is to leave quietness, so, I may come back to it or
it comes back to the woods. I find geography to be very important in how a
philosophy develops and takes root. Real rocks and soil. Thus, the woods.
This woods goes deeper than I find some people may take notice of. If a
philosophy needs a lot of memorization and to learn from somebody else their
view for an extended period without allowing me to breath my breath, well, the
feeling becomes cramped and I tend to dodge it. I'm a bit too wild for these
types of philosophies. I could learn a lot from
other people, but if I can still go back to my fire in the woods, sit, and
find peace and quiet, then I feel contented. If I need to memorize and learn
somebody's philosophy and keep going over it in my mind over and over and over
again to make sure I have it down pat while I'm away from them and in the
woods, then somethings not very smooth about this. If I can let it go, be in
the woods, then come back and find it pertinent and I continually find it
helpful to think about, well, I tend to keep those. It seems natural. What
does this mean for you or you or that guy or gal over there? I don't know.
I'm talking about what I like.
Matt:
> Substituting "way of life" for
> "philosophy" might have been better because, if
> you are talking to a philosopher, then saying there
> philosophy is less descriptive is usually a sort of slap
> (just look at slaps at Rorty because he supposedly only has
> negative views, as opposed to Pirsig who holds both negative
> and positive). But I think some ways of life are what they
> are _because_ they are less descriptive, because they
> don't take the holding of certain
> "descriptions" (the kind I previously called
> "theoretical views") as central to the living of
> that way of life.
> Does that make sense?
SA: Yes. I think it was a mistake, a misunderstanding as to the "descriptive"
part I mentioned. I think I was referring to what I hopefully made more clear
above.
quietness,
woods,
SA
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