On Thursday 11 September Arlo writes to Joe: >snip> [ARLO] I start with the idea of what a "self" is with Pirsig in LILA. Two quotes begin this. "This Cartesian "Me" is a software reality, not a hardware reality. This body on the left and this body on the right are running variations of the same program, the same "Me," which doesn't belong to either of them. The "Me's" are simply a program format." (LILA) "This fictitious "man" has many synonyms: "mankind," "people," "the public," and even such pronouns as "I," "he," and "they." Our language is so organized around them and they are so convenient to use it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. Like "substance" they can be used as long as it is remembered that they're terms for collections of patterns and not some independent primary reality of their own." (LILA) <snip> [JOE] ³I think therefore I am!² I suppose is the source for the allusion to ³This Cartesian ³Me². Descartes used it as a proof for his existence. It proves nothing. But like oil and water don¹t mix, I suppose you could say the oil can be scooped up and put in a different bucket of water and it will still float so I guess in that sense oil, like a program format, can float on two buckets. A very weak analogy from which it is hard to deduce much. The history of thought discounts Descartes proof for existence. ³Substance² is the Aristotelian word for what has ³real existence² as opposed to an ³intentional existence² in a mind for knowledge. IMO A common understanding of Pirsig¹s view is that a progressive evolution occurs into four levels. I do not know if he thought that inorganic, organic, social, intellectual might have some independent primary reality of their own, although that is indicated in the word ³evolution² rather than creation.
<snip> [Arlo] "It was explained to me finally that "You have a new personality now." But this statement was no explanation at all. It puzzled me more than ever since I had no awareness at all of any "old" personality. If they had said, "You are a new personality," it would have been much clearer. That would have fitted. They had made the mistake of thinking of a personality as some sort of possession, like a suit of clothes, which a person wears. But apart from a personality what is there? Some bones and flesh. A collection of legal statistics, perhaps, but surely no person. The bones and flesh and legal statistics are the garments worn by the personality, not the other way around. ... But who was the old personality whom they had known and presumed I was a continuation of?" (ZMM) [Joe] Quite apart from the tearing experience this must have been, I have no sense of the tremendous loss he must have felt to be empty. Yet he was conscious of words. Language was remembered in his consciousness and he argues; ³You are a new personality² would have been much clearer.² Instead he was faced with ³Who was the old personality whom they had known and presumed I was a continuation of?² A deep sense of loss! <snip> [ARLO] Pirsig describes this further. "These EYES! That is the terror of it. These gloved hands I now look at, steering the motorcycle down the road, were once his! And if you can understand the feeling that comes from that, then you can understand real fear...the fear that comes from knowing there is nowhere you can possibly run." (ZMM) [JOE] Again I cannot imagine the courage it took for Pirsig to put these words on paper. Being aware with no template to interpret your awareness, an awareness of emptiness! You certainly can¹t run to emptiness, and it takes time for the intellectual level to provide some necessary connections. <snip> Joe On 9/11/08 2:49 PM, "Arlo Bensinger" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [Joe] > There are three posts I have recently read that confuse > me. One by Ron composed of just symbols. A lot by Arlo: "No more > and no less a role that any of the multiplicity".. > > [Arlo] > This slipped past me, Joe, until Bo's post where he (go figure) > paints someone who disagrees with him as "feeble". I'll try to > explain more clearly what I mean. > > I start with the idea of what a "self" is with Pirsig in LILA. Two > quotes begin this. > > "This Cartesian "Me" is a software reality, not a hardware reality. > This body on the left and this body on the right are running > variations of the same program, the same "Me," which doesn't belong > to either of them. The "Me's" are simply a program format." (LILA) > > "This fictitious "man" has many synonyms: "mankind," "people," "the > public," and even such pronouns as "I," "he," and "they." Our > language is so organized around them and they are so convenient to > use it is impossible to get rid of them. There is really no need to. > Like "substance" they can be used as long as it is remembered that > they're terms for collections of patterns and not some independent > primary reality of their own." (LILA) > > The idea of a "self" is a focal marker, a way of organizing > organically bound biological experience as it is assimilated via the > contexts of culture. There is no "body reality" to the self, the > human brain in which it appears to reside is, as Pirsig says, > confusing the hardware with a software program. *Arlo* is no more his > corporeal body than Microsoft Word is my computer. To date, the idea > of the self has served social ends very well. It allows all sorts of > activity that would otherwise be impossible. > > But along the way two socially-valued (and socially-enforced) aspects > of the self became confused with an inherent nature of what the "self > is". These are continuity over time and continuity over contexts. To > this end social practices encourage the adoption of "names" we carry > with us over time, so that there is an "Arlo" tomorrow as there is an > "Arlo" right here right now. We also value what Marsha and Ian point > to as "consistency" (I prefer continuity) across contexts, so that > that "Arlo" you meet here is seen as "more-or-less" the same "Arlo" > known by others in any context. > > My point is that these two things are social values we conform to > (willingly, and sometimes with some pushing, which I will get to with > ZMM) and not inherent "realities" of the "self". Indeed, my > conjecture is that once we push these illusions aside, we can see > clearly that "we" are in fact a multiplicity of "selves" rather than > a singular "self". Sherry Turkle poses the question we should be > asking about ourselves as "Who am we?" rather than "Who am I?" > > In ZMM, Pirsig confronts head on the notion of a singular identity > tied to a physiological form. After his electro-shock, he describes > the view of the emerging self that has no memory of the former "Bob". > And this quote marks a critical point (for me) in thinking about "the self". > > "It was explained to me finally that "You have a new personality > now." But this statement was no explanation at all. It puzzled me > more than ever since I had no awareness at all of any "old" > personality. If they had said, "You are a new personality," it would > have been much clearer. That would have fitted. They had made the > mistake of thinking of a personality as some sort of possession, like > a suit of clothes, which a person wears. But apart from a personality > what is there? Some bones and flesh. A collection of legal > statistics, perhaps, but surely no person. The bones and flesh and > legal statistics are the garments worn by the personality, not the > other way around. ... But who was the old personality whom they had > known and presumed I was a continuation of?" (ZMM) > > For everyone else around him, there was some adherence to the notion > of continuity based on the physiological form. Even though his > memories were all "replaced", he had no awareness of "who he was > before", there was a tacit assumption around that this person was > still "the same Bob" in many ways. My question is "in what ways"? > These two identities, who used the same name and shared the same > brain, were about as different and unrelated as "Arlo" and "Joe", > weren't they? > > Pirsig describes this further. "These EYES! That is the terror of it. > These gloved hands I now look at, steering the motorcycle down the > road, were once his! And if you can understand the feeling that comes > from that, then you can understand real fear...the fear that comes > from knowing there is nowhere you can possibly run." (ZMM) > > This eloquently demonstrates the disconnectedness between the > physical form and the "idea of self". I brought up the case of a > young "boy" named "Mark" who believed with all his heart and mind he > was a female trapped inside a male body. His "identity" was "Julia", > and the disconnect he felt looking down at his body must've been the > same disconnect the "new Bob" felt when seeing "old Bob's" hands on > the grips. Conventionally, we'd argue that the "real person" here is > the boy named Mark, and that "Julia" is a pretend identity. I ask > "why?" And, how would our answer to that question change if > "Mark"underwent gender-transformative surgery? Would "Julia" suddenly > become "real"? > > These are examples of the problem of tying "identity" to the physical > form. We "are" who we believe ourselves to be. And we take that > "face" or "mask" or "role" into our social engagements and work to > develop a continuity to the identity we value. > > Apart from the disconnect issue, however, is also the one of > multiplicity. Pirsig's identities were temporally segmented so that > one followed the other. My contention is that in addition to the > disconnect between body and "self", it has become clear that each of > us actually have many selves that appear in very particular contexts. > The fact that these often carry the same name (contextual continuity) > is a social convention, but not an absolute reality. The first book I > had read that touched on this theme was James Carse's "Finite and > Infinite Games", a wonderful and short book I'd highly recommend. > > Into this the online world, and its use of "avatars", has made > transparent the fact that we are always in an "avatar" of some sort. > Some with greater degrees of discontinuity, others very alike, but > all tailored and negotiated as part of contextual and immediately > valuable social worlds. The "Arlo" you know here is an avatar, but > its important to see that there is no "real Arlo" that sits behind > this mask. There are only a plurality of avatars, who's connection to > a bodily form seem to unite them into an amorphous whole, but this is > merely an illusion. For example, the only "Joe" I know is the > Joe-I-know-here, and that online presentation of self has value and > realness for me independent of whatever "other Joe" exists out there > in other contexts, and also independent of the physical body "Joe" inhabits. > > When we think of "SA", we can see more avatarness upfront (our > illusions don't over right away) because this "name" is one crafted > expressly for this context. SA has resisted, mostly, pointing to > bodily realities about his corporeal form, and has resisted attempts > to pin "him/her" to a "real name". Whatever illusions you have about > SA become self-evidently illusions we can see. Some will tell you > that there is a "real person out there somewhere pretending to be > SA". I ask, why is SA not real? What are the characteristics of this > "more real person" who is pretending to be SA? If you think about > this, you'll see yourself coming back to physiological associations > and the need we have for continuity, and not anything about "SA" her/himself. > > And that's really the ground from which I am coming from on this > issue. Hope that makes what I say a little clearer. > > > Moq_Discuss mailing list > Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. > http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org > Archives: > http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ > http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/ Moq_Discuss mailing list Listinfo, Unsubscribing etc. http://lists.moqtalk.org/listinfo.cgi/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org Archives: http://lists.moqtalk.org/pipermail/moq_discuss-moqtalk.org/ http://moq.org.uk/pipermail/moq_discuss_archive/
