Hi Magnus
Magnus:
> Yes, we really need to find some common root here. And perhaps see
> where we part ways.
I know where we part ways, but as you find me "tiresome" I'll just
answer your mysterious questionnaire before zooming in on the crucial
issue.
> * What type of pattern is the observed data of a falling stone?
The observation of a falling stone is a visual experience and thus
biological, that goes for stones at rest also. Hope this doesn't make
stones "biological" ;-)
> * What type of pattern is the explanation of why the stone falls?
The social level has many explanation why a stone falls, but all
included some animated force (god) imbued in things or in the ground
attracting it. The intellectual level has the gravity explanation, the
latter is higher value.
> * What type of pattern is the stone? Does it exist to you?
A stone is some inorganic aggregate. It exists to me and to all who
observe it ... and to all I tell that I've seen it if they trust my
word, but that .... alas.
Then to the said crucial issue
Pirsig:
There has been a tendency to extend the meaning of "social" down
into the biological with the assertion that, for example, ants
are social, but I have argued that this extends the meaning to a
point where it is useless for classification. I said that even
atoms can be called societies of electrons and protons. And since
everything is thus social, why even have the word? I think the
same happens to the term, "intellectual," when one extends
it much before the Ancient Greeks.*
Bo's comment:
> > The same (=usless for classification) happens to an intellectual
> > level before the Greeks. It means that the SOL interpretation is
> > vouched for by Pirsig.
Magnus:
> First, isn't it a stretch to take that as an approval of SOL? Just
> because he thinks the intellectual level appeared by that *time*
> doesn't mean that SOL is the only possible result.
"Greeks" in a MOQ context=SOM, ergo Pirsig sees the emergence of
SOM identical to the 4th. level's emergence. This you possibly can't
deny.
> Second, as I said the other day. I have refuted the above too many
> times to count so I don't take it as proof of anything. I simply
> think Pirsig is wrong here and I would frankly love to hear what he
> would have to say about my essay.
Well, about Pirsig being wrong is a way out for you, but it's here he
is consistent with the message his ideas convey, and what gives the
MOQ it's explanatory power, while your "thinking intellect" is SOM's
old tea.
> I'll summarize:
> The social level does *not* extend down to atoms.
> Atoms are created by the atomic level where the only forces (i.e.
> types of experience/value) are the strong and weak nuclear forces
> and electromagnetism. Also gravity is involved but that comes from
> the lower, spatial level.
> Further, molecules are not societies because they are created by the
> chemical level. The forces (experience/value) here are the atom
> bonding preferences of different types of atoms.
> After that, some basic combinations of molecules are biological
> value. If two molecules happens to have a good 3D fit with
> eachother, they can stick together. That's the molecular version of
> biological sexual attraction.
Good, you (no longer) don't attribute Q-social value to the inorganic
and biological levels. The 3D fit as an inorganic prerequisite for
biology sounds scientific but OK.
> This sets the stage for the social level. If that combination of
> molecules are better (i.e. more moral) than they are separate, they
> will stick together. *That's* a social pattern and it is
> metaphysically identical to two humans combining to make a family,
> or a few people with different abilities combining to make a small
> village. All are better as a whole than the parts individually, they
> are even better than the sum of its parts.
But here you go again and it stems from not having understood the
MOQ tenet about the levels as an escape from the former level's
limitations. "Social" has little to do with mutual attraction, but is about
transcending biology, the first social (value) sign is burial rituals that
indicate the notion of an existence beyond. NB I don't mean "saving of
souls" as in Christendom (which is intellect's body/soul) but existence
in a most tangible sense.
> When I see a "thing", I want to explain what types of
> forces/patterns are used to keep that thing intact. You don't seem
> to bother much with that though. For example, what patterns keep a
> dog together? Biological you'd say, but does taste, smell and touch
> keep the dog together? Does the tail taste good to the back end of
> the dog and that's why the tail doesn't fall off?
The MOQ merely asserts that life began as a dynamic escape from
the inorganic, that's all it claims. If you remember Pirsig says that no
rational exålanation can be found for how this came about and also
says that the MOQ combines creationism and Darwinism (spans
religion and science by making them respectively its own 3rd. and 4th.
levels) You suffer from the illusion that the MOQ will improve on
science and provide rational explanations how dogs are kept together.
Biological value does that like inorganic holds (what was Pirsig's
example?) a glass together.
NB.
Senses (sensation) is biology's "expression" meaning the most
prominent aspect of an organism seen from the outside, like
"interaction" is for the inorganic, "emotion" for the social and "reason"
is for the intellectual level.
> I think you and many others are making it way too easy for
> yourselves. You only care to solve one particular problem you set
> your sights on, but the rest is just left as a pile of rubbish.
Marsha took over at this point, she liked your Bo bashing, but how it
developed I don't know. Such "instant-philosophy" I don't bother with.
Bo
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