Greetings, David --

I'm indebted to you for referencing this source:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deleuze

some interesting ideas of Deleuze about how experience
and concepts relate that MOQers might like to ponder. Deleuze puts difference before identity, or could that be
DQ/flux over SQ?

How Deleuze's metaphysical concept of Difference may relate to Pirsig's levels and patterns remains to be seen. But his theory offers new support for my ontogeny of differentiated existents. I was particularly struck by Wiki's interpretation of this concept:

   Traditionally, difference is seen as derivative from identity:
   e.g., to say that "X is different from Y" assumes some X and Y
   with at least relatively stable identities.  To the contrary, Deleuze
   claims that all identities are effects of difference.  Identities are
   not logically or metaphysically prior to difference, Deleuze argues,
   "given that there exist differences of nature between things of
   the same genus."  That is, not only are no two things ever the
   same, the categories we use to identify individuals in the first
   place derive from differences.

Here's how The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes this French academician's contribution to philosophy:

"Deleuze conceived of philosophy as the production of concepts, and he characterized himself as a 'pure metaphysician.' In his magnum opus Difference and Repetition, he tries to develop a metaphysics adequate to contemporary mathematics and science - a metaphysics in which the concept of multiplicity replaces that of substance, event replaces essence and virtuality replaces possibility."

Thanks for pointing us to this reference, Dave. It puts a new slant on the Beingness of Sartrean Existentialism. I shall have to explore Deleuze more thoroughly.

Regards,
Ham


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