Such lack of specificity makes our concept of experience fuzzy at best and
subject to spurious interpretations. For example, is the reality of
experience illusionary? Is experience the only reality? And who's
experience are we talking about -- mine, yours, or "the totality of ...all
that is perceived and remembered? How does experience differ from
intellectual knowledge, or the accumulation of knowledge throughout all of
human experience? (A library is full of such knowledge, but it isn't
experience.) Don't you see the ambiguity here, and how it leads to models
of reality constructed from loose assertions that have different meanings
for different people? That's an exercise in folly, not philosophy.
I submit that there is nothing vague or ambiguous about being-aware. This
definition
encompasses sentience, perception, cognition, and apprehension in the
"immediate" sense, avoiding misconceived allusions to intellect, conception,
memory, or behavior. More significantly, it relates the individual subject
(self) of experience to its objective content: Being. This affords an
epistemological foundation for philosophical development, without limiting
"reality" to existence or forcing either a phenomenalistic or a
materialistic ontology.
Words and phrases may evoke emotional responses, but they add nothing to
ontology unless they express a concept or proposition. The "problem" is one
of communication and understanding. The distinction I'm trying to draw here
is between descriptive prose and dialectic principles.
************************************************************
AHHH but in Gehenna thy MoQ abides!!!
tis not clear yet?
Thy purification of thine illusion of self
is thy object, naught thy formulation of
thine philosophy. Hoplessly lost mortals
thou bathe in agony to our amuse!
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