Ron said: Cultural derrivation being a given in this matter. dmb says: Right. It obtains in all matters.
Krimel said: The real point is that the cogito is NOT based on SOM assumption; in fact it is the result of doubting and discarding all assumptions and looking straight at what cannot be doubted. So far other than muttering about SOM assumptions I have heard no cause to doubt the original statement. dmb says: Well, right. If you can question your own existence then it's a bit silly to question your own existence. That part is not in dispute and in fact Pirsig says that Descartes was correct to begin with his own experience. And it wouldn't be quite right the say that Descartes didn't ASSUME the subject/object dualism so much as it established it. This is why they say modern philosophy is essentially Cartesian philosophy. [Krimel] So if we can agree that the "cogito" itself is not SOM then kindly quit implying that when I refer to it, I am being SOM. [dmb] But more to the point, Descartes' radical skepticism, extravagant skepticism as he called it is one of the notions most vigorously attacked by the classical Pragmatists. Dewey says this level of doubt is just paper doubt, fake doubt and by contrast talks about experience in terms of transactions. Descartes' extravagant doubt is also what makes him the classic case of solipsism. The dictionary will tell you that solipsism is the belief that the self is the only thing that can be known to exist. Or, as you put it, "I have no direct experience of anything outside of my nervous system". [Krimel] First of I don't believe Descartes was a radical skeptic. I think he was trying to answer radical skeptics. I will defer to your superior knowledge of Dewey but it sounds a bit like every other answer to solipsism: lame. Claiming that it is paper doubt is just a way of saying, "Go away. Shoo now." As answers to solipsism go it's about as good as it gets and is, I would say, why most of us reject the notion. But it really isn't a reasoned response to radical doubt to claim that you shouldn't doubt radically. Krimel said: I think the problem is that Dave, like Ham and Bo favor the Greek style of deductive reasoning. They start with general principles and reason towards specifics. dmb says: Not at all. Quite the opposite. I can't remember the last time I agreed with Ham or Bo about anything and, as I was saying to MP the other day, all abstractions are just that. They are abstracted from the concrete realities and only serve as shorthand references to those actually experienced realities. [Krimel] I didn't say you agreed with Ham or Bo I said your styles are similar. You start with some premise and cling to it. Any evidence to contrary is just bumper stickered and cast aside. [dmb] In philosophy, when abstractions are taken as real in and of themselves, given ontological or existential status - as opposed to seeing them as useful conceptual tools - it is called reification. James was quite keen on killing these reifications and you might have guessed which ones he and Pirsig most interested in killing. Yep, subject and objects. That's what it means to say that subjects and objects are secondary, that they are concepts and NOT the STARTING POINTS of experience. This is what it means to say they're derived from experience. In other words, they're abstractions. They're abstracted from actual experience. [Krimel] I want to be very clear about this. Most of the time I absorb any label that anyone cares to slap on me. I collect them in fact. But I have never said that subjects/objects are the starting point of anything. That is your label. I never understood why you keep claiming this as you never ever point to anything specific, in fact you just use the label to avoid being specific. Krimel said: My point was that Dave says, "In the MOQ there is no "out there". The idea of an independent external reality is just that, an idea." That sounds like solipsism to me; dmb says: If, if, if your basic assumption is that subjects and objects are the starting point of experience, then such a statement will sound like solipsism. [Krimel] Well, it is not my basic assumption and it still sounds like solipsism. I like to start where Descartes started and wonder just what the heck is going on here. The question has always remained open. [dmb] Or, less narrowly, it will sound like a complete denial of materialism in favor of idealism. But it's not. It's radical empiricism which is neither materialism nor idealism. Both of those views are held within SOM. As Pirsig puts it in that quote I keep trying to impress upon you, "pure experience cannot be either physical or psychical; it logically precedes this distinction". [Krimel] Ok but I don't think there is such a thing as "psychical". But if you pull materialism and idealism off the table is there even a table left? [dmb] You see, this is why I think that you misread James. And me and Pirsig. You keep interpreting this anti-SOM stuff in terms of SOM stuff. That's never gonna work. [Krimel] I think it is an open question who is misreading who. I do know that as long as you continue to avoid specificity by slinging labels and strawmen around, the subtext of our dialogue will remain which of us is (not has) the bigger dick. In the mean time I looked forward to continuing the discussion of Bolte Taylor. I ordered her book last night... 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